My one-step proposal for Vatican reform (Part II)

By Phil Lawler ( bio - articles - email ) | Jun 12, 2026

Yesterday in Part I of this essay, I suggested that the Secretariat of State should not be the most powerful office of the Vatican. Here in Part II I continue my argument that the Secretariat of State, because of its focus on relations with the world’s governments, tends to give primary attention to worldly rather than the pastoral concerns.

A source of temptations

Diplomats focus on the things of this world, and the sostituto—who already must cope with the all-too-human needs of the Vatican—operates in the shadow of international affairs. Clerics who have trained for the Vatican’s diplomatic service, and risen through the ranks of the Secretariat, have regularly faced temptations:

• to cherish human respect, and enjoy the flattery of other seasoned professionals who encourage them to think of themselves as major “players” in international affairs;
• to think first of the institutional needs of the Vatican—for money, for legal preferences, for a seat at the table—rather than the spiritual welfare of the faithful or the integrity of Catholic doctrine;
• to preserve a positive image of the Vatican at all times, covering up scandals, minimizing tensions, shifting quickly into damage-control mode when troubles arise rather than frankly admitting and addressing problems;
• to protect old allies, even when they are in the wrong, and to form alliances of convenience with ideological foes;
• to avoid policies and mute statements that might offend special-interest groups inside or outside the Church; and
• above all, to compromise, whenever compromise seems to serve immediate material interests.

Diplomats are trained to treat the representatives of other countries with elaborate courtesy, even if they question the legitimacy of those governments. So perhaps it seemed only natural, when the Archbishop of Canterbury visited Rome, for Vatican officials to extend her the same courtesy that they would offer to, say, a visiting prelate of an Orthodox church. But by doing so, the Vatican allowed for the mistaken impression that the Catholic Church recognized the validity of her episcopal orders.

For decades the Vatican’s commitment to Ostpolitik has dictated careful steps to avoid offending the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate of Moscow. As a result the Catholic archbishop in Russian capital is not known as the “Archbishop of Moscow”—a title that would conflict with the Orthodox Patriarch’s. Instead the Catholic see is the “Archdiocese of the Mother of God.” A similar anxiety to avoid giving offense has forestalled the recognition of the Major Archbishop of Kiev as “Patriarch” of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, since Moscow still maintains a claim (now thoroughly outdated) to “canonical jurisdiction” over the Byzantine faithful in Ukraine.

The diplomatic complications are multiplied in relations with Islamic countries. How can the Holy See recognize the legitimacy of Islamic rulers, without acknowledging the legitimacy of the faith in whose name they rule? Notice how frequently the Vatican chides Western countries that retain the death penalty, while remaining silent on the far more common use of capital punishment in the Islamic world. Or how Pope Leo is explicit in saying that US military action against Iran does not meet just-war criteria, while only obliquely criticizing Iran—and never by name—for its support of terrorist groups. In these cases the Vatican’s criticism of the West may or may not be warranted; that is a separate question. But the unequal application of moral principles saps the credibility of the Church’s message.

Nowhere is the conflict between diplomatic imperatives and pastoral needs more evident than in the Vatican’s relations with China. In a headlong rush for an accord that would (in theory) provide legal status for all of China’s Catholic bishops, the Vatican accepted a deal that gives Beijing control over episcopal nominations. Still more remarkably, the Vatican has renewed that agreement, despite unmistakable evidence that the government is constantly pressing the “official” Catholic churches to support the Community Party line, while stifling the “underground” churches that resist that pressure.

The Vatican has not spoken out against the kangaroo-court conviction of Jimmy Lai, the heroic Catholic human-rights advocate in Hong Kong. More mysteriously still, the Vatican has been mostly silent about open assaults on the Catholic hierarchy by Marxist governments in Nicaragua and Venezuela. Church leaders in Europe have been openly hostile toward conservative populist leaders, saying that they betray fundamental Catholic principles. But the same complaints are not raised—at least not by the hierarchy—about prominent American Catholic politicians who support abortion, homosexual marriage, and euthanasia. Conservatives are not mistaken when they perceive a Vatican reluctance to criticize leftist regimes; it is apparently a function of that Ostpolitik approach—a diplomatic choice that tempers the Gospel witness.

Since its inception the Vatican has strongly supported the UN, persistently ignoring the failure of that organization to fulfill its stated goals—and worse, its frequent forays into anti-Catholicism. The same can be said about the Vatican’s unrequited love affair with the European Union.

Ross Douthat of the New York Times recently complained about the many Vatican documents that “assume a benign social-democratic world authority that conspicuously does not exist.” The language of Vatican statements (in this case Douthat was reacting to the papal encyclical, Magnifica Humanitas) routinely sounds like the language of European politicians of the “soft” Left. But why should that be a surprise? All Vatican documents are filtered through the perspective of the Secretariat of State, which moves in precisely that European orbit!

First things first

My argument is simple: The Secretariat of State, insofar as it serves as the “foreign office,” has its eyes on the here and now. That is as it should be; politics and diplomacy are noble pursuits. But the Catholic Church has her eyes on the hereafter, and should not be distracted.

Bear in mind, too, that the Catholic Church does not make any claim to infallibility in political and diplomatic affairs. Far from it. Consult a map of the Papal States at the peak of their power, and compare it with the size of Vatican City today; thereby hangs a tale. Throughout history, skilled politicians have often taken advantage of the Church to serve their own ends. On this earth the Church has no permanent political allies.

Our Lord did not instruct his disciples to curry favor with the world’s leaders; on the contrary:

If you were of the world, the world would love its own; but because you are not of the world, but I chose you out of the world, therefore the world hates you. [Jn 15:19]

Nor did Jesus tell the apostles to solve the problem of world hunger and need (“You always have the poor with you”), or to pursue world peace. As valuable as those efforts are, they are not the ultimate purpose of the Church. “Do not think that I have come to bring peace on earth; I have not come to bring peace, but a sword.” [Mt 10:34]

What the Lord did order his followers to do is spread the Gospel. “Go therefore and make disciples of all nations.” [Mt 28:19] In light of that mandate, surely the greatest challenge facing the Church today is the challenge of evangelization—including the evangelization of the many people who have lost their faith. At the Vatican, anything that distracts attention from that top priority needs to change.