Just-war thinking: an answer to George Weigel

By Phil Lawler ( bio - articles - email ) | Jul 23, 2025

Writing in the National Catholic Register last week, my friend George Weigel complained that the tradition of just-war analysis had been “folded, spindled, and mutilated” by some writers who questioned the wisdom of the US bombing raid against Iranian nuclear-enrichment facilities. Although he did not mention me by name, I suspect that I was one of the offenders he had in mind—not only because I had argued that the bombing did not meet just-war criteria, but also because the first “fallacy” on his list was a statement that I have made frequently. His argument deserves a reply.

George Weigel has been a consistent and able defender of American military action, direct or through proxies, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine. So it is not surprising that he would approve of the latest US intervention in Iran. (And today, with the benefit of hindsight, I can admit that my concerns have proven mostly unfounded. But more on that later.) Still I was taken aback by his bold rejection of what he terms: “Fallacy No. 1: The just war way of thinking begins with a ‘presumption against war.’” No, it doesn’t, Weigel insists.

Really? Are we to believe, then, that those of us who follow the Prince of Peace, and honor the Decalogue’s command: “Thou shalt not kill,” have no special obligation to avoid the bloodshed that defines warfare?

War is hell, said General Sherman (who helped to make it so). When we “let slip the dogs of war,” we accept the likelihood that many people—including our own—will be killed, maimed, or scarred for life, that families will be shattered, property destroyed, vulnerable people neglected or exploited. Any sane person, not to mention any Christian, approaches a foreign-policy crisis with the understanding that war is undesirable.

To be sure, just-war theorists recognize that sometimes an injustice is so grave that war might be required to right the wrong. But even in those cases, the goal of military action is to secure peace. Indeed the quest for a just peace is the only possible reason for a just war. Peace is always the preferred solution. Thus the Catechism of the Catholic Church (#2308) teaches: “All citizens and all governments are obliged to work for the avoidance of war.”

Next Weigel skewers the “fallacy” that “just war theory precludes preemptive military action or striking the first blow.” Again his response is peremptory: “No, it does not.” However he does not cite any classical thinker or magisterial document to support his judgment. Instead he sketches a hypothetical scenario, and concludes—on his own authority—that in this case a pre-emptive attack would be morally licit.

Arguing about a non-existent situation is always tricky, since we do not have the relevant facts at hand. However, the absence of information is a problem in any analysis of pre-emptive war. You may feel justified in attacking your neighbor today if you are certain that he will attack you tomorrow. But can you ever be fully certain? You may be “certainly” wrong, in which case your attack is unjustified. In just-war analysis, a military action must be judged by its likely consequences. If your pre-emptive strike prevents a more devastating attack by an unjust aggressor, the world may be a better place. But if you were misinformed, and your adversary had no plan to attack, then you are the aggressor. This is not to say that a pre-emptive strike can never be justified. But it does suggest that the argument for pre-emptive war must be based on virtual certainty about the imminence of aggression: a higher bar even than the ordinary presumption against unilateral military action.

Finally, George Weigel rejects the notion that: “’Last resort’ is the first principle in the just war tradition.” He explains: “Because it’s impossible to know with certainty when the ‘last’ option has been reached.”

Fair enough—and it is gratifying to notice that here George recognizes the need for “certainty” to clinch a moral argument. In times of international crisis we can very rarely have the sort of certainty that we would like. The Catechism (#2309) treatment of just-war reasoning does not require an absolutely exhaustive test of every possible alternative to war; it says only that the available means “must have been shown to be impractical or ineffective.” Even at that, there is always an opportunity for second-guessing. Moralists and historians invariably have differing opinions about the wisdom of military strategies.

After the fact, when the dust settles, it becomes much easier to assess the consequences of a military action. Today I am happy to acknowledge that my fears about the US bombing raid in Iran have not materialized. My predictions were inaccurate, largely because—as always—my information was incomplete. The situation “on the ground” was not as I thought it to be; the conflict has not (at least to date) escalated.

Our information about international crises is always incomplete; we never know as much as we would like to know about what a potential adversary is thinking, what internal political pressures he faces, what secret pacts he has made. Largely for that reason, the just-war tradition avoids making hard-and-fast judgments about particular conflicts. George Weigel is right when he says that just-war principles should not be treated as “a series of hoops ethicists demand that public authorities jump through.” Rather, the tradition reminds us of the moral questions that should be addressed as we weigh decisions about war and peace.

The Just-war tradition rarely offers a simple Yes or No to those questions. Editorial writers are free to assert their opinions, but the Catechism wisely leaves the ultimate decision to government leaders, who should have the best information available: “The evaluation of these conditions for moral legitimacy belongs to the prudent judgment of those who have responsibility for the common good.”

For the rest of us, the just-war tradition provides a framework for intelligent discussion, in which we can sharpen our own moral reasoning while recognizing that other good and reasonable people might reach different conclusions. In fact I have found that a discussion of just-war principles—especially if it can be wrenched away from partisan claims about current conflicts—gives rise to some very lively and enlightening debates.

Which is why, in August, I’ll be hosting an open discussion of just-war principles on Substack. Join us!