Human Embryology and Church Teachings
by Dianne N. Irving, M.A., Ph.D.
Outline:
A. Human Sexual ReproductionD. Human Sexual Reproduction: Carnegie States of Early Human Embryonic Development
1. Methylation and Regulation
A. Philosophical AnthropologyIII. BibliographyC. Ensoulment and the "Personhood" Arguments
D. Human Embryonic "Stem Cell" Research, Human Cloning, Human Genetic Engineering, Etc.
A. ScienceB. Bioethics/ Medical Ethics/ Law
For the last 40 years debates have been raging over abortion, the use of abortifacients, in vitro fertilization (IVF) and other artificial reproductive technologies (ARTs), pre-natal genetic diagnosis, human embryo and fetal research, human embryonic "stem cell" research, human genetic engineering, human cloning, and other related issues. During that time the "scientific facts" used as the "starting points" for arguments both "pro" and "con" have been astoundingly and boldly deconstructed — to the point that such scientific fabrications have now become assumed and appealed to as the "norm". Scientific fictions such as the "pre-embryo" and its many and various (often ingenious) "substitutes" have been incorporated into a variety of scientific fields, medicine, bioethics, philosophy, theology, law, public policy making, industry, even concretized for posterity in libraries, textbooks, journals, government regulations, professional societies, and information technology around the world — truly a massive and destructive epidemic of scientific misinformation. This politicization of science is astounding.
The consequences of this scientific misinformation to the individual formation of conscience, as well as to the public good and welfare, has already been staggering and yet to be finally weighed. Both individual and professional intellectual honesty and integrity would seem to be a thing of the past. It is now almost impossible for people to even think clearly or rationally about these issues. Yet it goes without saying that, if the starting point of any argument consists of false or erroneous scientific "facts", then any and all presumed conclusions that are drawn from such "facts" are by definition invalid and worthless. Such is the case when false and erroneous scientific "facts" of human embryology and human molecular genetics are used in these debates in order to "scientifically" justify essentially unethical actions.
This article is an attempt to start the process of correcting this shameful historical record by documenting the objective scientific facts of human embryology that have been known scientifically and professionally for over a hundred years. It is hoped that more professionals and leaders will finally understand the depth of the problem and come forward as well. This article will also demonstrate briefly how well a realist-based philosophy, as well as the formal teachings of the Church on these various related issues, coincide with the objective scientific truth. Clear thinking on these critical issues is the objective.
Human embryology is the scientific study of the material aspect of the developing human embryo and fetus with focus on the embryonic period, from the beginning of fertilization [or "when the matter is appropriately organized"] through 8 weeks (O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 7). It has been systematically documented in the Carnegie Stages of Early Human Embryonic Development (CSEHED) since 1942. Human embryos can be reproduced both sexually (by fertilization — both natural and artificial, such as in IVF in vitro fertilization and other artificial reproductive technologies) and asexually (as in naturally occurring human monozygotic identical twinning in vivo as well as in many different kinds of cloning and genetic engineering techniques in vitro). The immediate products of both human reproductive processes are new genetically unique individual living human beings, who immediately produce specifically human proteins and enzymes, and continuously form specifically human cells, tissues, and organs throughout development. Such objective scientific facts should be the starting point for any discussions, debates, policies, or legislation on these issues. Unfortunately, they often are not.
Since the fine details of human embryology have been corrupted for political purposes (Biggers 1990, pp. 1-6), it is important to identify and address some of those details, especially those occurring just before and in the first few weeks after the initiation of embryonic development.
The genome of a member of a species is determined by the total amount of DNA in both the nuclear and cytoplasmic chromosomes (Lewin 2000, pp. 4, 81; Strachan and Read 1999, pp. 10, 18, 139). However, the species to which an individual belongs is determined only by the number of nuclear chromosomes per cell and the specific kinds and sequences of base pairs of amino acids in the genes comprising them. For humans, that species number is 46 (plus or minus). When a cell in the human body contains 46 chromosomes, it is called diploid. If it contains only 23 chromosomes, it is called haploid. There are two basic categories of diploid cells: somatic (body) cells, and germ line cells (future sex gametes). Before fertilization can take place, the number of chromosomes in each diploid germ-line cell must be cut in half through the process known as gametogenesis. The final effect of gametogenesis is the production of haploid sex gametes, the sperm and the oocyte, which have only 23 chromosomes in each cell. [The terms "egg" and "ovum" are rejected as unscientific (O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 12).] The oocyte must first be fertilized before its chromosomes are halved (Carlson 1999, p. 2; Emery 1983, pp. 52-53, 60, 91; Larsen 1998, p. 4; Moore and Persaud 1998, p. 18; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 12, 19, 25; Strachan and Read 1999, p. 30).
It has been known empirically for over a hundred years that fertilization is the beginning of sexually reproduced human beings (Wilhelm His 1880-1885). However, it is obviously not the beginning of asexually reproduced human beings. During the process of fertilization, the sperm and the oocyte fuse. [The terms "fertilized oocyte" and "fertilized egg" are rejected as unscientific (O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 12).] The diploid number of chromosomes is restored, and a new single-cell genetically unique living human being is reproduced. This is also the beginning of: the human embryo, the human organism, the human individual, the genetic sex of the embryo, the embryonic period, and normal pregnancy, which begins at fertilization in the fallopian tube, or ovaduct, of the mother, not at implantation in her womb (Carlson 1999, pp. 2, 23, 27, 32, 444; Larsen 1998, pp. 1, 17; Moore and Persaud 1998, pp. 2, 12, 18, 34, 37; O'Rahilly 2001, pp. 31-33). All cell constituents, including the nuclear chromosomes and chromosomes in the mitochondria that are outside the nucleus in the cytoplasm of the cell, now belong properly to the new embryo.
This single-cell embryo is totipotent, that is, capable of forming all the cells, tissues, and organs of the later embryo, fetus, and adult. The cells (blastomeres) of the early developing human embryo will also exhibit a range of totipotency, that is, if separated from the developing embryo, these totipotent cells are capable of forming new human organisms (as in natural and artificial monozygotic identical "twinning"). This totipotent capacity also applies to the cells of the developing embryo from 2 cells (about 1½-3 days) until the first formation of the free floating blastocystic cavity (about 4 days), to the cells of the inner cell mass of the implanting blastocyst (about 5-7 days), and to the diploid primitive germ-line cells (future haploid sex gametes) (as early as 2½ weeks) of the later blastocyst. Thus to refer to these cells as being all "pluripotent" rather than "totipotent" is scientifically erroneous, and done in order to mis-frame the debates (American Medical Association 1994, pp. 1-9; American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2004, pp. S256-257; Carlson 1999, pp. 43-45, 73; Denker 2008, pp. 1656-1657; German National Ethics Council 2004, p. 14; Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 1989, pp. 25, 102ff; Irving 2005, pp. 1-36; Lewin 2000, p. 605; A. Liu 2005, pp. 369-378; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 23, 24, 37, 39, 136-137, 139; Strachan and Read 1999, pp. 508-509; Schieve et al 2004, pp. 1154-1163). This new single-cell human being immediately directs his/her own further continuous human growth and development by producing specifically human proteins and enzymes (Emery 1983, p. 93; Hao et al. 2006, p. S513; Holtzer et al. 1985, pp. 3-11; Illmensee et al. 2006a, pp. 1112-1120; Irving 1993a, pp. 18-46; Irving 1999, pp. 22-47; Kollias et al. 1987, pp. 5739-5747; H. Liu et al. 2005a, p. S368; H. Liu et al. 2005b, p. S370; Moore and Persaud 1998, p. 12) that will cascade (will be produced on demand) throughout development (Emery 1983, p. 91; Lewin 2000, pp. 63, 914, 950). This embryonic development is most accurately documented in the Carnegie Stages of Early Human Embryonic Development (CSEHED).
D. Human Sexual Reproduction: Carnegie States of Early Human Embryonic Development
The first to systematically study human embryos was Wilhelm His (Anatomie Menschlicher Embryonen 1880-1885, 3 vols.), and the first to stage them was Franklin Mall in 1914. Later George Streeter (Streeter 1942, p. 211; Streeter 1945, p. 27; Streeter 1948, p. 143) laid down the basis for the currently used Carnegie staging system, which was completed by Ronan O'Rahilly in 1973 and revised by O'Rahilly and Müller in 1987. The Carnegie Stages are often referred to as "the Bureau of Standards" of human embryology (O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 3). Today they continue to be verified and documented by the international Terminologia Embryologica (formerly, Nomina Embryologica) committee, which consists of more than twenty experts academically credentialed specifically in human embryology from around the world. After reviewing the latest research studies in human embryology, their deliberations are published in the Terminologia Embryologica, part of the larger Terminologia Anatomica.
According to the CSEHED, the embryonic period is composed of twenty-three stages (CSEHED; also Irving 2006a, pp. 1-33). Approximately 90 percent of the more than 4500 structures of the adult body become apparent during the embryonic period. Of special note is Stage One-which begins when the sperm penetrates the oocyte and continues until just before the zygote starts its first cleavage cell division at syngamy, that is, when the 23 paternally- and 23 maternally-derived chromosomes from the haploid pronuclei in the single-cell embryo mingle and line up on opposite sides of the mitotic spindle fibers that appear in the zygote just before cell division (Edwards et al. 1992, pp. 994-998; Food and Drug Administration 2002; Gasser 2003; Levron at al. 1995, pp. 653-657; Michelmann et al. 1986, pp. 243-246; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, Table 8-1, p. 89; Riley and Merrill 2005, p. 1; Sathananthan et al. 1991, pp. 4806-4810). Much human cloning and human genetic engineering takes place during Stage One of the developing human embryo, even before the formation of the zygote, or slightly later while the cells of the very early human embryo are still totipotent.
The characteristic feature of the embryo in Stage One is unicellularity; it is a single-celled organism. As documented by the CSEHED, "Embryonic life commences with fertilization, and hence the beginning of that process may be taken as 'the point de depart' of stage 1." Despite the small size and weight of the organism at fertilization, the embryo is "schon ein individual-spezifischer Mensch" ("already an individual and specifically human person") (Blechschmidt 1963; Blechschmidt 1973; Blechschmidt 1982, pp. 171-181). Again, "It is to be remembered that at all stages the embryo is a living organism, that is, it is an on-going concern with adequate mechanisms for its maintenance as of that time" (Streeter and Heuser 1951, p. 165).
Fertilization, which normally takes place in the uterine (fallopian) tube, is the procession of events that begins when a spermatozoon mature sperm makes contact with an oocyte and ends with the intermingling of maternal- and paternal-derived chromosomes at metaphase of the first mitotic (cell) division of the zygote. Stage One of the embryo thus includes: (a) the penetrated oocyte — the term used once a haploid spermatozoon has penetrated the diploid oocyte (causing the diploid oocyte to half its number of chromosomes to 23) and, strictly, "after the individual plasma membranes of the sperm and of the oocyte have become one"; (b) the ootid, characterized by the presence of the male and female haploid pronuclei (each pronuclei containing 23 chromosomes); and (c) the zygote, which characterizes the last phase of fertilization. At syngamy, or when the chromosomes from the male and female pronuclei mingle, the first cleavage spindle (mitotic spindle) forms rapidly, the two pronuclear envelopes (outer membranes of the individual haploid male and haploid female pronuclei) break down, and the two groups of chromosomes move together (46 chromosomes in all) and assume positions on the first cleavage spindle. Thus the zygote lacks a nucleus. In the human this initial cleavage (cell division), which heralds the onset of Stage Two, normally occurs in the uterine (fallopian) tube (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage1.pdf; also Carlson 1999, pp. 24-37; Larsen 1998, pp. 12-14; Moore and Persaud 1998, pp. 34-37; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 31-33, 19-35). Also see Carnegie Stages online from University of Fribourg, Switzerland, "Human Embryology," 1999).
The age at Stage Two is believed to be approximately 1 1/2 -3 days post ovulatory days. The range is probably 1-5 days (Sundstrom, Nilsson, and Liedholm, 1981). in vitro, 2 cells may be found at 1½ days (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage2.pdf; Carlson 1999, fig. 3-2A; Larsen 1998, p. XI). Stage Two comprises embryos from two cells up to the appearance of the blastocystic cavity within the embryo. Successive cleavage divisions of the cells (blastomeres) occur asynchronously (not in perfect multiples, but alternately) (Carlson 1999, p. 38). Separation of the cells of the early embryo is believed to account for about one-third of all cases of natural human in vivo monozygotic twinning (identical twins), a natural form of human cloning. (Fraternal or dizygotic twins are reproduced by two sperm fertilizing two oocytes) (Commonwealth of Australia 1986; Commonwealth of Australia 2001; Brinsden 1999, p. 421; Campbell et al. 1997, pp. 18-19; Corner 1955, pp. 933-951; Council of Europe 1998, p. 2; Geraedts et al. 2001, pp. 145-150; Irving 2005, pp. 1-36; National Institutes of Health 1998, p. A-3; Robertson 1994, p. 6; Strachen and Read 1999, pp. 508-509). The embryo proceeds along the uterine tube and enters the uterine cavity (womb) 3-4 days after ovulation, comprised of 8-12 cells or more. The primary factor for determining one of the two alternative routes of cell specialization or differentiation (specialization as the outer layer of cells of the embryo, or trophoblast, or specialization as the cells of the inner cell mass of the embryo) is probably the position that a given cell occupies (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage_2.htm; also Carlson 1999, pp. 38-48; Larsen 1998, pp. 14-15; Moore and Persaud 1998, p. 41; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 37-39).
At about 4 days Stage Three consists of the free-floating, unattached blastocyst, a term used as soon as a cavity in the embryo can be recognized by light microscopy. The outer membrane, or zona pellucida, may be either present or absent. in vitro the blastocyst emerges from the zona at about 6-7 days, commonly referred to as hatching. The whole blastocyst is the embryo, not just the cells of the inner cell mass, whose cells have now clearly differentiated into at least two types: trophoblastic (outer layer) and embryonic cells proper (the inner cell mass that is observable by light microscopy). The inner cell mass constitutes a germinal mass of various potentialities (totipotent and pluripotent), which continues for a time to add cells to the outer trophoblast. The inner cell mass also gives origin to the hypoblast, and its remainder constitutes the epiblast. The epiblastic cells soon become aligned into the germ disc. Duplication of the inner cell mass (sometimes referred to as blastocyst splitting, embryo multiplication, or embryo splitting) accounts for most instances of natural human in vivo monozygotic identical twinning (Bulmer 1970; Corner 1955, pp. 933-951), another form of natural cloning. Note that the blastocyst has not yet tried to implant in the uterus (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage3.pdf; also Carlson 1999, p. 48; Larsen 1998, p. 15; Moore and Persaud 1998, pp. 41-42; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 39-40).
Stage Four is reserved for the attaching blastocyst, which is about 5-6 days old at the beginning of implantation. Implantation (Stages Four and Five) includes the dissolving of the zona pellucida (outer membrane), contact and attachment between the blastocyst and the endometrium (lining) of the uterus, and penetration and migration of the embryo through the endometrium. These early embryos may be surrounded by an intact outer membrane, which disappears so that the embryo can begin implantation. The cytotrophoblast and the syncytiotrophoblast become distinguishable, and the amniotic ectoderm develops (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage4.pdf; also Carlson 1999, p. 48; Larsen 1998, pp. 15-16; Moore and Persaud 1998, p. 42; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 40-41).
Stage Five comprises embryos that are about 7-12 days old. Implantation, which began in Stage Four, is the characteristic feature of Stage Five. Both maternal and embryonic tissues are involved, and an amniotic cavity is present. The chief function of the amnion is not mechanical protection but rather "the enclosing of the embryonic body in a quantity of liquid sufficient to buoy it up and so allow it to develop symmetrically and freely in all directions" (Mossman 1937, pp. 129-246). At the caudal margin of the epiblast, the earliest differentiated cells of the later primitive streak appear, which will give rise to the extra-embryonic mesoderm of the chorion, chorionic villi, and body stalk (Luckett 1978, pp. 59-97). The embryonic disc formed is composed of the epiblast and the primary endoderm. On the ventral side of the embryonic disk, extra-embryonic endoderm grows around to enclose a cavity called the primary umbilical vesicle, or yolk sac. [The term yolk sac has been scientifically rejected (O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 12).] The primary umbilical vesicle will provide most of the lining of the alimentary and respiratory systems. It is the site of the earliest blood vessels and blood cells as well as of the formation of fetoproteins, appears to be the place of origin of the totipotent future sex gametes, and will become part of the later adult gut. If duplication of the embryo occurs after the differentiation of the amnion, the resulting twins would share an umbilical cord and amniotic sac. It has been estimated that the frequency of monoamniotic twins among monozygotic twins is about 4 percent (Bulmer 1970). In about one in every 400 monozygotic twin pregnancies, the duplication is incomplete, and conjoined (Siamese) twins result, sometimes forming many weeks post-fertilization (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage5.pdf; also Baron et al. 1990, pp. 9-22; Carlson 1999, pp. 48-60; Larsen 1998, pp. 15-16; Moore and Persaud 1998, pp. 41-45, 154-162; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 43-46, 53-55; Wilder 1904, pp. 387-472).
At about 13 days the appearance of recognizable chorionic villi is used as the criterion for Stage Six. The secondary umbilical vesicle, the embryonic disc, and the extra-embryonic mesoblast develop. The blood vascular system first derives from extra-embryonic areas, and the amnion is well formed. With the appearance of the primitive streak during Stage Six, certain cells of the epiblast enter the streak, and the remaining cells on the dorsal aspect of the embryo will become the embryonic ectoderm. Some of the cells of the endoderm may be primordial germ cells (future sex gametes). The primitive streak is a proliferation of cells lying in the median plane in the caudal region (toward the posterior end of the embryo) of the embryonic disc. Its essential features are the pluripotential nature of the cells that compose it and the continued segregation of more specialized cells that migrate, or delaminate, from the less specialized remainder. The primitive streak enables cells from the outer layer of the embryo to pass inside and become mesodermal endoderm. The primitive streak is believed to be an entrance where cells of the epiblast move toward the streak, folding in takes place at the streak, and subsequently cells migrate to both homolateral (same side) and heterolateral (opposite side) mesoderm. Zones have been established for future ectoderm, mesoderm, endoderm, and notochord. With the establishment of bilateral symmetry, the embryonic disc, in addition to its back and belly surfaces, now has rostral (top) and posterior (bottom) ends and right and left sides. Although the main bulk of the embryonic mesoblast is believed to come by way of the primitive streak, other sources are not excluded. The prechordal plate, the cloacal membrane, and the connecting stalk (the later umbilical cord) also form. At about 18 days, the primitive streak begins to recede (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage6.pdf; also Carlson 1999, pp. 60-64; Larsen 1998, 21-34; Moore and Persaud 1998, pp. 48-51; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 46-50).
At Stage Seven, about 19 days, the notochordal process (primitive axis of the body below the primitive groove) becomes visible, and the formation of blood begins. The allantoic diverticulum (a tubular formation in the posterior part of the hind gut of the embryo initially derived from the outer layer of the blastocyst, or trophoblast layer) becomes definite; this persists in the adult as the median umbilical ligament (a band of tissue that connects bones or supports organs), blood cells, and urinary bladder (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/stage7.pdf; also Carlson 1999, p. 64-73; Larsen 1998, pp. 34-40; Moore and Persaud 1998, pp. 68-80; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 57).
At this point it is clear that the scientific bases of philosophical and theological arguments for "delayed personhood", especially those in bioethics, a new quasi-ethics created by the U.S. Congress in 1978 (Irving 1999c; Irving 2002b, pp. 1-84; Jonsen 1998, pp. 90-122; Neuhaus 2002, pp. 71-72; Rothman 1991, pp. 168-189; Saletan 2001), are erroneous and completely without scientific merit. The "science" used has been formally rejected as unscientific and misleading by the international nomenclature committee on human embryology for years. This includes such arguments containing the various pre-embryo and individuality claims (Grobstein 1985, pp. 213-236; Grobstein 1988, p. 33; McCormick 1975, pp. 34-35; McCormick 1991, pp. 1-15), the biogenetic law or "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny", (see Irving 2001a, pp. 1-24), and "seeds" or "beings-on-the-way" (Wallace 1989, pp. 23-53). Similarly, assertions that the early human embryo is not an organism but just a cell or a ball of cells (National Academy of Sciences 2002a, b; Varmus 1999; Weissman 2003; West 2001 and 2007) are erroneous and without scientific merit (Biggers 1990, pp. 1-6; de Beer 1958; Irving 1991, pp. 1-400; Irving 1993a, pp. 18-46; Irving 1999a, pp. 22-47; Irving 2001a, pp. 1-24; Irving 2001b, pp. 1-12; Irving 2001c, pp. 1-17; Irving 2001d, pp. 1-32; Irving 2003, pp. 1-42; Irving 2004a, pp. 1-31; Kischer and Irving 1997, pp. 4-13, 129-184, 224-247, 248-257, 267-282; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 16, 88). It should be pointed out that a host of scientists, organizations, and countries now routinely use the false scientific term "pre-embryo", or its various substitutes, as justification for doing embryonic research (American Fertility Society 1986; American Medical Association 1994; American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2007, pp. S52-S58; British House of Lords 2001; California Advisory Committee 2002; Gerontology Research Group 2001; McLaren 1984; National Institutes of Health 1994; National Academy of Sciences 2002a, b; National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1997; New Zealand 2004; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1986 and 1989; Pia Saldeen and Per Sundstrom 2005, pp. 584-589; The Twins Foundation 1994; Varmus 1999; Warnock Report 1984; Weissman 2003; West 2001 and 2007; Zaninovic et al. 2005, p. S476). It would seem that professional ethics across the academy has suffered (Irving 1993a, 18-46; Irving 1993b, pp. 243-247; Irving 1993c, pp. 77-100; Irving 1995, pp. 193-215; Irving 2004b, pp. 1-65).
The remaining Carnegie Stages are summarized more briefly as follows. Stage Eight, about 23 days: the embryonic disc is piriform, or oval-shaped; the primitive pit (primitive digestive cavity) appears; the neural folds may begin to form; and the notochordal and neurenteric canals are generally detectable. Stage Nine, about 25 days: the embryo has the shape of the sole of a shoe as seen from the back; the mesencephalic (midbrain) flexure begins and the otic, or ear, disc forms; the embryo begins to be lordotic (the curvature of the primitive spine becomes concave); the neural groove (caused by the folding in of the neural plate) is evident; the three major divisions of the brain are distinguishable; and the heart begins to develop. Stage Ten, about 28 days: fusion of neural folds begins; the otic pit develops; pharyngeal arches 1 and 2 are visible on the surface; optic, thyroid and respiratory primordia begin to develop; the cardiac loop begins to appear; and the intermediate mesoderm becomes visible. Stage Eleven, about 29 days: the rostral neuropore (open end of the neural tube near the head of the embryo) closes; the otic (eye) pit is still open; the optic vesicles develop; sinus venosus (common receptacle of veins) begins; and the mesonephric (excretory) duct and tubules appear. Stage Twelve, about 30 days: the caudal neuropore closes; four pharyngeal arches are visible; upper limb buds are appearing; secondary neurulation commences; the lung bud appears; and the cystic primordium (urinary and gall bladder) and dorsal pancreas become distinguishable. Stage Thirteen, about 32 days: the otic vesicle is closed; the lens disc is usually not yet indented; four limb buds are usually visible; retinal and lens discs develop; the septum primum and foramen primum are distinct in the heart; and the right and left lung buds are recognizable. Stage Fourteen, about 33 days: the lens pit appears; the endolymphatic (pertaining to the ear) appendage becomes defined; the upper limb buds are elongated and tapering; the optic cup develops; the adenohypophysial (gandular portion of the future pituitary gland) pouch is defined; and the ureteric bud appears. Stage Fifteen, about 36 days: the lens pit is closed; the nasal pit is appearing; the hand plate is forming; the future cerebral hemispheres become defined; retinal pigment becomes visible; and lobe buds appear in the bronchial tree (primitive lung). Stage Sixteen, about 39 days: retinal pigment is visible in the intact embryo; nasal sacs face ventrally; the foot plate appears; the epiphysis cerebri, or pineal gland, develops; neurohypophysial evagination is visible; and the lobar bronchi are evident. Stage Seventeen, about 41 days: the head is relatively larger and the trunk is straighter; the nasofrontal groove (origin of nose and facial bones) and the auricular hillocks (part of future ear) are distinct; finger rays become visible; chondrification (formation of cartelage) begins in bones such as the humerus, radius, and some vertebral centra; segmental bronchial buds develop; and the vermiform (worm-shaped) appendix becomes visible. Stage Eighteen, about 44 days: the body is more cuboidal, or cube-shaped; the digital plate of the hand is notched; toe rays begin to appear; the oronasal (mouth and nose) membrane develops; one to three semicircular ducts are present in the internal ear; and the septum secundum (a temporary dividing wall in the right side of the primitive heart) and the foramen ovale (natural openings) are distinct in the heart. Stage Nineteen, about 46 days: the trunk is elongated and straightening; limbs extend nearly directly forward; toe rays are prominent, but interdigital notches have not yet appeared; the olfactory bulb develops; the cartilaginous otic capsule is visible; and the posterior epithelium (covering) of the cornea begins to develop. Stage Twenty, about 49 days: the upper limbs are longer and bent at the elbows; nerve fibers reach optic chiasma (crossing over); and S-shaped renal vesicles are visible in metanephros, or future kidneys. Stage Twenty-One, about 51 days: hands approach each other; fingers are longer; feet approach each other; the cortical plate becomes visible in the brain; the substania propria (fibrous, tough, transparent main part) of the cornea develops; and glomerular capsules develop in metanephros. Stage Twenty-Two, about 53 days: the eyelids and the external ears are better developed; the adenohypophysial (pertaining to the pituitary gland) stalk is now incomplete; scleral (white part of the eyeball) condensation is visible; and some large glomeruli are present in metanephros. Stage Twenty-Three, about 56 days: the head is more rounded; the limbs are longer and better developed; humerus (bone that extends from the shoulder to the elbow) presents all cartilaginous phases; the bone collar of humerus has not yet been eroded through completely; secretory tubules of metanephros (permanent embryonic kidney) become convoluted; and numerous large glomeruli are present (CSEHED at http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/Select_Stage_and_Lab_Manual.htm; also Carlson 1999, pp.60ff; Larsen 1998, 45ff; Moore and Persaud 1998, pp. 85ff; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, pp. 57-111 and ff).
After the embryonic period, the fetal period comprises the development of the human fetus from nine weeks until birth (Carlson 1999, p. 447; Larsen 1998, p. 317; Moore and Persaud 1998, p. 107; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 103).
Understanding human sexual reproduction can aid in understanding human asexual reproduction, especially in terms of the natural biological processes of methylation and regulation (Irving 2003a, pp. 1-42).
Following fertilization (sexual reproduction) the early human embryo grows and develops by means of multiplying its cells, and by means of various biochemical processes, including methylating and demethylating the DNA in each of those cells-part of the critical natural process called regulation. That is, the DNA in each cell of the organism is "allowed to speak" or is "silenced" by adding or removing these methylation bars-depending on what products, tissues, or organs the embryo or fetus needs to grow and develop at any point in time. These products then cascade throughout growth and development. The more specialized (or differentiated) a cell, the more methylated or silenced its DNA becomes. This is one way that the programming of the DNA of a cell is naturally accomplished. By adulthood the DNA in many of the cells of the human being have been almost completely silenced by the insertion of methylation bars-such as in human skin cells (Carlson 1999, pp. 49; Lewin 2000, pp. 678, 914, 950; Strachan and Read 1999, pp. 193ff; O'Rahilly and Müller 2001, p. 39).
In human asexual reproduction many of these processes operate in reverse to reprogram, or de-differentiate, the DNA in a cell. For example, in cloning by somatic cell nuclear transfer, one can begin with a highly specialized or differentiated human cell (such as a skin cell — in which some or even most of the DNA in that cell's nucleus has been silenced) and then incrementally remove the methylation bars on that DNA to allow it to speak until the DNA in that cell is in the same state of differentiation as the single-cell totipotent zygote — resulting in a new, single-cell human organism, a single-cell embryo, or human being (Commonwealth of Australia 2001; Brinsden 1999, p. 421; Campbell et al. 1997, pp. 18-19; Council of Europe 1998, p. 2; Geraedts et al. 2001, pp. 145-150; German National Ethics Council 2004, pp. 18, 19, 41; Irving 2005, pp. 1-36; National Institutes of Health 1998a; National Institutes of Health 1998b, p. A-3; Robertson 1994, p. 6; Strachen and Read 1999, pp. 508-509). That is, one begins with just a human cell, but ends up with a new single-cell organism, a human being.
This is roughly what happened with the reproduction of Dolly the sheep (Wilmut 1997, pp 810-813; Wilmut 1988, p. 138). Quoting human molecular geneticists Strachan and Read: "For the first time an adult nucleus had been reprogrammed to be totipotent once more, just like the genetic material in the fertilized oocyte from which the donor cell had ultimately developed" (Strachan and Read 1999, pp. 508-509). And as documented above, a fertilized oocyte is a single-cell human being — a human embryo — a single-cell human organism at Stage One of embryonic development.
Despite certain claims to the contrary (NAS 2002a, b; Weissman 2003; West 2001 and 2007), the technique referred to as nuclear transfer just described is always cloning-regardless of why it is performed, (Commonwealth of Australia 1986; Commonwealth of Australia 2001; Brinsden 1999, p. 421; Campbell et al. 1997, pp. 18-19; Council of Europe 1998, p. 2; Geraedts et al. 2001, pp. 145-150; Irving 2005; National Institutes of Health 1998a; National Institutes of Health 1998b, p. A-3; Robertson 1994, p. 6; Strachen and Read 1999, pp. 508-509). Furthermore, the cloned human embryo reproduced would not be "virtually genetically identical to the donor cell" because it would have a different genome due to the presence of foreign DNA from the extra-nuclear mitochondrial chromosomes left over from the enucleated oocyte used and due as well to the lack of original mitochondrial chromosomes from the donor cell used (Council of Research, Technology, and Innovation 1997, p. 5; German National Ethics Council 2004, p. 18; Irving 2001c, pp. 1-17; Irving 2006b, pp. 1-3; President's Council on Bioethics 2002; Strachan and Read 1999, pp. 508-509). Further, in normal cells there is critical intercommunication betwee the nuclear DNA and the mitochondrial DNA; such critical intercommunication would be altered in cells of the cloned embryo. Thus using stem cells from such cloned human embryos in therapies could cause serious immune rejection reactions, even in human donor recipients, as acknowledged by anti-cloning and pro-cloning policy makers alike (Kass 2001; Brownback 2003; Weldon 2005; Wilmut et al. 1997, pp. 810-813; Wilmut 1988; Silver 1997, p. 107; National Bioethics Advisory Commission 1997, p. 3; National Institutes of Health 1998, p. 3).
In addition to cloning by means of nuclear transfer, one may also clone by means of twinning (blastomere separation, blastocyst splitting, embryo splitting, embryo multiplication), for example, as happens in naturally occurring monozygotic identical twinning in vivo and artificially in vitro. Twinning can also take place with the separated cells of the early embryo (through the blastocyst stages) because such cells still exhibit a range of totipotency (American Medical Association 1994, pp. 1-9; American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2004, pp. S256-257; Carlson 1999, pp. 43-45, 73; Denker 2008, pp. 1656-1657; Illmensee et al. 2006 a, pp. 1112-1120; Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 1989, pp. 25, 102ff; Lewin 2000, p. 605; A. Liu 2005, pp. 369-378; O'Rahilly and Müller, pp. 23, 24, 37, 39, 136-137, 139; Schieve et al. 2004, pp. 1154-1163; Strachan and Read 1999, pp. 508-509). Twinning is also a common, and the most exact, form of cloning because the chromosomal DNA in the mitochondria in cells of twins are the same (Commonwealth of Australia 2001; Brinsden 1999, p. 421; Campbell et al. 1997, pp. 18-19; Council of Europe 1998, p. 2; Council of Research, Technology, and Innovation 1997, p. 5; Geraedts et al. 2001, pp. 145-150; German National Ethics Council 2004, p. 18; Irving 2006b, pp. 1-3; National Institutes of Health 1998a; National Institutes of Health 1998b, p. A-3; Robertson 1994, p. 6; Strachen and Read 1999, pp. 508-509).
Regulation not only helps one understand asexual reproduction; it is also involved in repairing an injury that has occurred to an organism, sometimes even repairing early genetic mutations. Regulation is the ability to heal a normal structure if parts have been removed or added (Carlson 1999, pp. 44-49). Thus, if successful, regulation could heal a damaged embryo whose totipotent cells have separated from it as well as revert the separated totipotent embryonic cells back to new human embryos, that is, new living human beings.
The question can arise as to when each of the twins begins to exist as an individual. Considering twinning from the standpoint of regulation, a human embryo is normally first produced sexually via fertilization (in vivo or in vitro). Scientifically it is known that this embryo has already been determined as a unique individual - both genetically and developmentally. He or she is a new human being. The developing embryo is also composed initially of totipotent cells and grows developmentally in total continuity with itself. If these totipotent cells of the embryo are damaged, the embryo could die, or regulation could set in to heal the damaged embryo and restore it to wholeness. However, if these totipotent cells of the embryo are actually separated from the intact embryo, then these separated cells too could die, or regulation could set in and possibly revert these totipotent cells to new human embryos. Thus the first twin would be the original human embryo produced sexually (in vivo or in vitro) and would begin to exist as an individual at the beginning of fertilization (penetration of the oocyte by the sperm). As the embryo begins to develop it could be healed (if damaged) by regulation, which reverses the degree of methylation of the DNA in each remaining cell of the damaged embryo back to that required by the number of cells that remain in the intact embryo. The second twin is the new human embryo produced asexually (in vivo or in vitro) from totipotent cells that have separated from the original embryo, and this twin begins to exist as an individual when regulation is successfully completed and the DNA of the separated cells has been reprogrammed back to that of a new single- or multiple-cell embryo (Irving 2003a, pp. 1-42).
The same considerations of regulation can be applied to questions about the fusion of two early human embryos to form a single human/human chimera. In this case the original sources of the cells, or sometimes pronuclei, are from two or more human embryos. If two human embryos fuse to make one organism, that organism is not a human being. It would have 92 nuclear chromosomes per cell. Both original embryos have died. If this chimeric organism undergoes regulation, ejects all excess chromosomes, and reduces the number and proper mixture (male and female) of nuclear chromosomes to 46, then it could theoretically result in the formation of a new human embryo. But that embryo would not be the same individual as either of the original embryos that fused. Or one can form a new human-human chimeric embryo using the male and female pronuclei from different already — existing human embryos reproduced either sexually or asexually. The same basic mechanisms would operate in the formation of human/non-human chimeras, e.g., human/mouse (Chang et al. 2004, pp. 960-962; Hutton 2007; Illmensee et al. 2006b, pp. 1248-1260; Weissman et al. 1988, pp. 1632-1639; Weissman 2003; Weissman 2005).
There are many different kinds techniques that can be used to clone human beings: twinning (blastomere separation and blastocyst/embryo splitting, embryo multiplication); somatic cell nuclear transfer, or SCNT; germ line cell nuclear transfer, or GLCNT; "hemi-cloning;" pronuclei transfer; parthenogenesis; mitochondria transfer; the use of artificially constructed sperm, oocytes, and embryos; nano-cloning; and many other reproductive genetic engineering techniques. Many of these cloning techniques are being considered or have already been used in IVF as infertility treatments (American Fertility Society 1986, p. 27S; American Medical Association 1994, pp. 1-9; American Society of Reproductive Medicine 2000, pp. 873-876; American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2004, pp. S256-257; Commonwealth of Australia 1986; Commonwealth of Australia 2001; Barr 2003; Escriba et al. pp. 149-161; German National Ethics Council 2004, pp. 18, 19, 41; Gordon and Ruddle 1981, pp. 1244-1246; Hao et al. 2006, p. S513; Parens and Knowles 2003; Illmensee et al. 2006a, pp. 1112-1120 ; Illmensee et al. 2006b, pp. 1248-1260; Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 1989, pp. 25, 102ff; Irving 2004a, pp. 1-31; Irving 2008b, pp. 1-10; Katagiri et al. 2004, p. S10; Yoko Kato et al. 1999, p. 1823; A. Liu 2005, pp. 369-378; H.C.C. Liu et al. 2004, p. S308; H. Liu et al. 2005a, p. S368; H. Liu et al. 2005b, p. S370; National Science Foundation and U.S. Dept. of Commerce 2002; Neri et al. 2004, p. S281; Neri et al. 2005a, pp. S400-S401; Neri et al. 2005b, p. S384; New Zealand 2003; Schieve et al. 2004, pp. 1154-1163; Tesarik et al. 2003, pp. 677-681; The Twins Foundation 1994; Valiotis et al. 1993, p. 48; Wolfson 2003, pp. 376-396).
In sum, the immediate product of both sexual and asexual human reproduction is a new, living, genetically unique, single-cell human being, human embryo, human organism, human individual, who immediately directs his/her own specifically human functions, activities, and development. Thus, there is a great deal at stake in debates involving the human embryo; for example, abortion, the use of abortifacients (drugs and devices that kill the new embryo before implantation), IVF and other artificial technologies (ARTs), prenatal genetic diagnosis, human embryo research, human cloning, human embryonic stem cell research, human genetic engineering, and drug and biological/chemical testing and development. Further, arguments for "delayed personhood" have been reversed and then transferred to end of life issues, such as euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, organ transplantation, withholding/withdrawing food and hydration (Irving 1995). Consequently, the Church has addressed these related issues quite seriously in her teachings.
The Church has always taught that the intentional direct killing of innocent human beings is morally evil and that "no one can claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being" (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum vitae 1987). As Vatican Council II notes, "Divine law and natural reason ... exclude all right to the direct killing of an innocent man" (Pope Paul VI, Professio fidei 1968, p. 436; Gaudium et spes, in O'Rourke and Boyle 1989, p. 38).
The Church's teachings with respect to the inherent dignity of all human beings, including human embryos, is grounded in the philosophical anthropology upon which those teachings rest: "Teachers, catechists and theologians have the task of emphasizing the anthropological reasons upon which respect for every human life is based" (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, par. 82).
According to philosophical natural law, known through the light of reason, a human being is a "unified totality." A human nature is "at the same time corporal and spiritual." By virtue of its substantial union with a spiritual soul, "the human body cannot be considered as a mere complex of tissues, organs and functions, nor can it be evaluated in the same way as the body of animals; rather it is a constitutive part of the person who manifests and expresses himself through it" (Donum vitae 1987, Introduction 3, emphasis added).
Consequently, the natural moral law expresses and lays down the purposes, rights, and duties that are based on the unified and single bodily and spiritual nature of the human person. This is precisely why "an intervention on the human body affects not only the tissues, the organs, and their functions, but also involves the person himself on different levels." In the body and through the body, "one touches the person himself in his concrete reality." To respect the dignity of man consequently amounts to "safeguarding this identity of the man 'corpore et anima unus'", as the Second Vatican Council says (Gaudium et spes 1965, p. 14, par. 1; Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, Introduction 3).
Through revelation the Magisterium of the Church also confirms the concurrent theological anthropology of the unified nature of the human being. That is, "from the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has wished for himself" (Gaudium et spes 1965, p. 24). The spiritual soul of each person is "immediately created by God" (Pope Paul VI, Professio fidei 1968, p. 436; Pope Pius XII, Humani generis 195, p. 575), and his whole being bears the image of the Creator. Human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves "the creative action of God" (Pope John XXIII, Mater et magistra: 1961, p. 447; Pope John Paul II, Responsible Procreation 1983, p. 562). Thus no person comes into existence by chance; he or she is always the result of the creative love of God, "and remains forever in a special relationship with the Creator, who is its sole end" (Gaudium et spes 1965, p. 24). God alone is the Lord of life from its beginning until its end: "no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the right to destroy directly an innocent human being" (Pope Pius XII, Discourse to the Saint Luke Medical-Biological Union 1944: Discorsi e Radiomessaggi VI 1944-1945, pp.191-192). Further, human procreation requires on the part of the spouses "responsible collaboration with the fruitful love of God" (Gaudium et spes 1965, p. 50). The gift of human life must be actualized in marriage through the specific and exclusive acts of husband and wife "in accordance with the laws inscribed in their persons and in their union" (Gaudium et spes 1965, p. 51; Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, Introduction, par. 5).
Thus violations of the inherent dignity of human beings are immoral. In formally rejecting teleological theological moral theories such as proportionalism, utilitarianism, bioethics, communitarianism (a mini-form of secular bioethics), and such, the Church explains that, "There exist acts which per se and in themselves, independent of circumstances, are always seriously wrong by reason of their object." Examples of such acts include "whatever is hostile to life itself, such as any kind of homicide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and voluntary suicide." Additional examples are "whatever violates the integrity of the human person"; for example, "mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; whatever is offensive to human dignity, such as subhuman living conditions, arbitrary imprisonment, deportation, slavery, prostitution and trafficking in women and children; degrading conditions of work which treat laborers as mere instruments of profit, and not as free responsible persons." All of these and similar acts are a disgrace, and "so long as they infect human civilization they contaminate those who inflict them more than those who suffer injustice" (Pope John Paul II, Veritatis splendor 1993, pars. 75-78, 90, 96, 97).
Likewise, contraception (Pope Paul VI, Humanae vitae 1968, par. 14); the use of abortifacients (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, par. 61), including the "morning-after" pill (Pontifical Academy for Life 2000b); in vitro fertilization and the use of other artificial reproductive techniques (ARTs) (Pope Pius XII, "Fertility and Sterility" in O'Rourke and Boyle 1989, pp. 164-165; Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, Parts A and B); the freezing of spare IVF embryos (Pope Pius XII, "Fertility and Sterility": in O'Rourke and Boyle 1989, pp. 164-165); germ-line cell genetic engineering (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, I6); surrogate motherhood (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, IIA, par. 3); and prenatal diagnosis (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, par. 14) are inherently immoral. The same anthropological considerations bear on the immorality of the use of human embryos in destructive research.
Aside from some independent scholars and theologians who speak only for themselves, historically the intentional and direct killing of all innocent human beings by means of abortion (Irving 2000a, pp. 45-55) has always been formally condemned by the Church since its beginning. This teaching has never changed: "The tradition of the Church has always held that human life must be protected and favored from the beginning, just as at the various stages of its development& . . . .The same Paul VI, speaking on this subject on many occasions, has not been afraid to declare that this teaching of the Church 'has not changed and is unchangeable'" (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1974, II, par. 6). Regardless of laws to the contrary, "human law can abstain from punishment, but it cannot declare to be right what would be opposed to the natural law, for this opposition suffices to give the assurance that a law is not a law at all" (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1974, V, par. 21). And, as so clearly stated by Pope Pius XI, "Whether inflicted upon the mother or upon the child, [direct abortion] is against the precept of God and the law of nature: 'Thou shalt not kill.' The life of each is equally sacred, and no one has the power, not even the public authority, to destroy it." Those who hold the reins of government must remember that "it is the duty of public authority by appropriate laws and sanctions to defend the lives of the innocent," especially those whose lives are endangered and assailed and cannot defend themselves, "among whom we must mention in the first place infants hidden in the mother's womb" (Pope Pius XI, "Encyclical Letter on Christian Marriage," in O'Rourke and Boyle 1989, pp. 35-36). Thus even appeals to choice are not morally valid: "It is true that it is not the task of the law to choose between points of view or to impose one rather than another. But the life of the child takes precedence over all opinions. One cannot invoke freedom of thought to destroy this life" (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1974, V).
More people have become aware of these truths, particularly as science has uncovered the accurate facts of human embryology and human genetics over the centuries. Even considering genuine burdens as well as misperceptions of the quality of the new life, direct abortion remains inherently immoral:
We do not deny these very great difficulties. It may be a serious question of health, sometimes of life or death, for the mother; it may be the burden represented by an additional child, especially if there are good reasons to fear that the child will be abnormal or retarded; it may be the importance attributed in different classes of society to considerations of honor or dishonor, of loss of social standing, and so forth. We proclaim only that none of these reasons can ever objectively confer the right to dispose of another's life, even when that life is only beginning. (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1974, V)
The same clear principles for the respect and dignity of the early human being can also be found in the situation where vaccines are produced using the cells and tissues from aborted babies or derived by culturing in vitro. The corpses of human embryos and fetuses, "whether they have been deliberately aborted or not," must be respected just as the remains of other human beings. (Donum vitae, 1987, Introduction 5). The Pontifical Academy for Life also addressed the question, "Is it morally licit to use ES [embryonic stem] cells, and the differentiated cells obtained from them, which are supplied by other researchers or are commercially obtainable?", responding that, "The answer is negative, since: Prescinding from the participation — formal or otherwise — in the morally illicit intention of the principal agent, the case in question entails a proximate material cooperation in the production and manipulation of human embryos on the part of those producing or supplying them" (Pontifical Academy for Life, "Declaration on the Production and the Scientific and Therapeutic Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells", Liberia Editrice, Vaticana, p. 17). And in a statement specifically explaining the various degrees of complicity that would be involved, the Pontifical Academy for Life concluded:
As regards the preparation, distribution and marketing of vaccines produced as a result of the use of biological material whose origin is connected with cells coming from foetuses voluntarily aborted, such a process is stated, as a matter of principle, morally illicit, because it could contribute in encouraging the performance of other voluntary abortions, with the purpose of the production of such vaccines. Nevertheless, it should be recognized that, within the chain of production-distribution-marketing, the various cooperating agents can have different moral responsibilities. ... However, there is another aspect to be considered, and that is the form of passive material cooperation which would be carried out by the producers of these vaccines, if they do not denounce and reject publicly the original immoral act (the voluntary abortion), and if they do not dedicate themselves together to research and promote alternative ways, exempt from moral evil, for the production of vaccines for the same infections. Such passive material cooperation, if it should occur, is equally illicit (Pontifical Academy for Life, Moral Reflection on Vaccines Prepared From Cells Derived From Aborted Human Foetuses, June 2005)
What is clear in these various Church teachings is that the fact of being a human being is sufficient reason to proscribe abortion: "'Human life is sacred,' Pope John XXIII recalled; 'from its very inception it reveals the creating hand of God'"(Pope Paul VI, Humanae vitae 1968). "From the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that God has 'wished for himself' and the spiritual soul of each man is 'immediately created' by God; ... no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the right directly to destroy an innocent human being" (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, Introduction 5). As will be noted below, the precious term "conception" has now been so deconstructed to mean "implantation", especially in the law, that it is now very problematic to use, as are the terms "fertilization" and "natural death".
C. Ensoulment and the "Personhood" Arguments
The issue of when the immaterial human soul (and thus personhood) is initially present in the early human being has been a source of some disagreement in the tradition, leading to different conclusions and impacting several current related bioethics issues, especially abortion and human embryo research. Some argue for immediate personhood, others for delayed personhood. But the Church has consistently held that the critical criterion remains the fact that there is a human being present, based on teachings of the human being's unitary nature:
Some people try to justify abortion by claiming that the result of conception, at least up to a certain number of days, cannot yet be considered a personal human life. But in fact, 'from the time that the ovum is fertilized, a life is begun which is neither that of the father nor the mother; it is rather the life of a new human being with his own growth. It would never be made human if it were not human already& . . . '
Even if the presence of a spiritual soul cannot be ascertained by science, the Church insists, the results of scientific research on the human embryo provide 'a valuable indication for discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of a human life: how could a human individual not be a human person?' Furthermore, the mere probability that a human person is involved would suffice to justify a prohibition of any intervention aimed at killing a human embryo.
Precisely for this reason, over and above all scientific debates and those philosophical affirmations to which the Magisterium has not expressly committed itself, the Church has always taught and continues to teach that the result of human procreation, from the first moment of its existence, must be guaranteed that unconditional respect which is morally due to the human being in his or her totality and unity as body and spirit. (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, par. 60; Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, 1987, I, 1)
The Pontifical Academy for Life has also agreed to the possibility of reasoning to an immediate personal presence in the human embryo: "Judgment — as an act of the human mind — on the personal nature of the human embryo springs necessarily from the evidence of the biological datum which implies the recognition of the presence of a human being with an intrinsic active capacity for development, and not a mere possibility of life." Affirming once more the unitary conception of a human being, the Academy states: "The ethical exigency of respect and care for the life and integrity of the embryo, demanded by the presence of a human being, is motivated by a unitary conception of man (Corpore et anima unus), whose personal dignity must be recognized from the beginning of his physical existence." Therefore the duty of respecting the human embryo as a human person "derives from the reality of the matter and from the force of rational argumentation, and not exclusively from a position of faith." Still, the mere presence of a human being is the critical criterion: "From the juridical point of view, the core of the debate on the protection of the human embryo does not involve identifying earlier or later indices of 'humanity' which appear after insemination, but consists rather in the recognition of fundamental human rights by virtue of the presence of a human being. Above all, the right to life and to physical integrity from the first moment of existence, in keeping with the principle of equality, must be respected" (Pontifical Academy for Life 1997a).
Those in the tradition who argue for immediate personhood also point to the advances in science and to the Church's anthropological teachings on the unitary nature of a human being, or hylomorphism. That is, a human being is not composed of two different separate substances (dualism, or "mind/body" split), but rather is a single individual composite substance of a rational nature. Thus the rational soul is not a thing itself separate from the human body or vice versa, and the soul always contains virtually all three powers of the soul — the vegetative, sensitive, and rational. The soul does not rest in any one place in the body, but rather is present throughout it and is why "an intervention on the human body affects not only the tissues, the organs, and their functions, but also involves the person himself on different levels" (Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1987, Introduction, 3). The material body and immaterial soul of a human being must always exist coextensively from the beginning of a human being's existence. Thus, as the realist philosopher Thomas Aquinas states, the word "person" does not refer just to the rational part of the immaterial soul, nor to the whole immaterial soul alone, but to the entire composite human substance. This is why, for Thomas Aquinas, the formal definition of "a human being" must be inclusive of all these aspects of the composite human being, including "undesignated matter" (Aristotle, Physica 2.1.193b 3-5; 2.2.194b 12-14; 2.2.193b 33-37; De anima 1.5.411b 14-18; 1.5.411b 24-28; Metaphysica 3.2.997b 18-998a10; 11.1.1059a 34-1059b14; Boethius, pp. 84, 85, 101, 103; Klubertanz 1953, p. 312; Klubertanz 1963, pp. 98-100, 116; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae Ia, q.45, a. 4 ad 2; Ia, q.29, a.1 ans. ad 2, 3, 5; Ia, q. 29, a. 2 ans; Summa theologiae IIIa, q.19, a.1, ad 4,; Summa theologiae Ia, q. 75, a. 4, ans; On Being and Essence Chap. 2; The Division and Method of the Sciences, p. 14, 29, 39, 40; Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics Bk. VIII, lect.1, Cathala, nos. 1688-1689; Wilhelmsen 1956, pp. 78-79 and 103-105).
It is worth noting that there are some who still attempt to appeal to the authority of Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle to support an argument for "delayed personhood". However, a thorough read of the major works of these philosophers indicates that, had the required epistemological starting point for their realist philosophical analyses been the accurate objective facts of human embryology and human molecular genetics as known today, as realist philosophers they would have necessarily had to argue for "immediate personhood" themselves. Indeed, as Aristotle himself noted, "... the least deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousandfold" (Aristotle, in De coelo, 1.5.271b, 9-10), often paraphrased by Thomas Aquinas as "a small error in the beginning leads to a multitude of errors in the end." It is hardly a new academic insight that the Aristotle of the De Anima is and has been for centuries highly problematic and contradictory to his own main-stream systematic metaphysical doctrines on substance and anthropology (Mary Louise Gill 1989, esp. p. 173; Marjorie Grene 1963, esp. p. 175; Charlotte Witt 1989). In Aristotle's main theory, material substance is a composite of two principles — form and matter — the pre-dominant theory in his Categories, Physics, the first half of the Metaphysics, and even in many parts of his De Anima. Aristotle's odd theory of substance as form alone, or even as only the "rational" part of the form, and the succession of souls — still used by some to argue for "delayed personhood" — is found only in the second half of his Metaphysics and in parts of the De Anima — which contradicts his former theory. (See extensive 150-page philosophical analysis in Appendix A, "Aristotle: A question of substance", in Irving doctoral dissertation, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo, 1991, pp. 296-381). There is also some degree of contradiction in Thomas Aquinas, whose major theory held that material substances are composed of three principles — form, matter and esse (act of existing). Yet Thomas (who was not a scientist) sometimes "unblushingly" followed Aristotle's odd theory of separate form (see, for example, the differences between the definition of a human being and that of a human soul in the De Ente et Essentia, Chapter Two and Chapter Four). It is important to reiterate that for both of them the state of knowledge about human embryology and human genetics when they wrote was still rather primitive (e.g., both still held for only 4 physical elements total in the material world — air, earth, fire and water) (Irving 1993, pp. 2-19).
In arguing for immediate personhood today, if the human being begins to exist when the sperm penetrates the oocyte at fertilization in sexual reproduction as documented for many decades in the Carnegie Stages and for over a hundred years in the work of Wilhelm His, then so too must the human soul (Klubertanz 1953, p. 312). The same would be true for asexual human reproduction (as in twinning). There is, so to say, no early "non-human being" or "non human person", no "intermediate human being" or "intermediate human person", no "seed", or no "being-on-the-way", no "human vegetable", nor "non-human animal" (Aristotle, Metaphysica, 3.2.997b 18-998a10; 11.1.1059a34-1059b 14; Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 45, a. 4 ad 2). Indeed, this is an empirical fact of human genetics. Further, if there is a human body whose cells possess 46 chromosomes and specifically human cells, tissues and organs continuously unfold, then there must also simultaneously be a human soul that is directing those specifically human biological functions and activities. Thus from the beginning of his/her existence the human embryo is a person, whose rights and protections may not be violated for any greater good (Bracken 2001, pp. 62, 66; Cottier 2006, p. 32; Doran 1989, p. 39; Heaney 1992, p. 36; Hershenov and Koch 2005, pp. 753-754; Irving 1993a, pp. 7-8; Johnson 1995, p. 743; Nelson 2007, pp. 299-301; Regan 1992, p. 122; Rossini 2006, p. 820; Schmitz 1978, p. 3).
Still, the Pontifical Academy for Life hesitates that such philosophical knowledge of when personhood begins is not definite: "[S]ince this is a philosophical interpretation, the answer to this question cannot be of a 'definite kind,' but must remain open, in any case, to further considerations" (Pontifical Academy for Life 2006, p. 6). The same, however, could be said for the philosophical presuppositions of those in the tradition who argue for delayed personhood. Isn't it a question, rather, of which philosophical system can withstand serious scrutiny and which cannot, and of which philosophical matches reality? Some philosophical systems do stand the test; many do not.
In general, advocates for delayed personhood claim that either there is no human being immediately present or, if there is, it is not a human person yet. Examples of these claims include those that ground their arguments on the false scientific myth of the pre-embryo and its various substitutes, the biogenetic law (ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny), or the insistence that the early embryo is not an organism but just a ball of cells, a seed or being-on-the-way (Bedate and Cefalo 1989, p. 641; Bole 1989, p. 647; Bole 1990, p. 637; Curran 1978, pp. 17-26; Cefalo 1991, p. 41; Cahill 1988, pp. 85-98; Donceel 1988, pp. 48-53; Engelhardt 1974, p. 226; Engelhardt 1985, p. 111; Ford 1988, p. 298; Grobstein 1985, pp. 213-236; Grobstein 1988, p. 33; Guenin 2004a, p. 805; Guenin 2004b, p. 1215; Hare 1988, p. 214; Hellegers 1970, p. 9; Hellegers 1978; Jones and Schroder 1987, p. 192; Kinsley 2000, p. A17; Kuhse and Singer 1985, p. 138; Kuhse and Singer 1986, pp. 149-153; Lockwood 1985, p. 10; Lockwood 1988, pp. 187-213; McCormick 1975, pp. 34-35; McCormick 1991, pp. 1-15; McLaren 1984, pp. 101-120; McLaren 1986, p. 49; Moussa and Shannon 1992, pp. 30-37; Ramsey 1970, p. 75; Ramsey 1975, pp. 35-36; Robertson 1986, pp. 53-70; Robertson 1991, p 301; Robertson 1995a, pp. 37-38; Robertson 1995b, pp. 13-24; Sass 1989, pp. 45-59; Shannon and Wolter 1990, p. 615; Singer 1981, p. 118; Singer and Kuhse 1987, pp. 13-14; Singer et al. 1990, pp. 3-4, 6-12, 14-24, 43-50, 59-60, 66-72, 96-106, esp. 252; Suarez 1990, pp. 627-635; Tauer diss. 1982; Tauer 1988, pp. 54-84; Tooley 1974, pp. 59, 64; Varmus 1999; Wallace 1989, pp. 23-53; Warnock Report 1984, pp. 27, 63; Weissman 2003; West 2001 and 2007; Wildes 2001, pp. 3-33; British House of Lords 2001; Commonwealth of Australia 1986; U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare 1979, p. 101; American Fertility Society 1986, 46: 27S; National Academy of Sciences 2002a,b; National Institutes of Health 1994, February 2 meeting, pp. 27, 31, 50-80, 85-87, 104-106, February 3 meeting, pp. 6-55, February 51 meeting, pp. 9-41; New Zealand 2003; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1986 and 1989).
In response it is argued that the scientific claims used to ground these delayed- personhood arguments have been variously rejected by the international nomenclature committee in human embryology for decades, as well as by other individual scientific fields themselves. For example, it is known empirically that the immediate product of both sexual and asexual human reproduction is already a whole individual human being, a human organism, a human embryo. Consequently, it is argued, the empirical scientific starting points for delayed personhood are scientifically inaccurate and erroneous, and therefore philosophical conclusions based on them are invalid. Another problem plaguing these claims is that any delay in personhood (or dualism) inherently contains a philosophical mind/body split that has proven theoretically and practically indefensible for centuries in the academy — especially since there can be no communication or interaction between the two independent and separate substances. Further, if only those human beings who actively express rational attributes or sentience are persons (Engelhardt 1984 and 1985; Kinsley 2000; Kuhse and Singer 1985, 1986; Robertson 1986, 1991, 1994, 1995; Singer 1981; Singer and Kuhse 1987; Singer et al. 1990), then the following list of human beings are not persons and thus have no ethical or legal rights and protections: the mentally ill and retarded, drug addicts, alcoholics, the frail elderly, the physically disabled, the comatose, and those with brain or nerve damage — or even adult humans when asleep, as pointed out centuries ago by Mersenne contra Decartes infamous and totally academically indefensible philosophical mind/body split (Smith 1902, pp. 1-276; Gilson 1930, pp. 1-336; Boas 1967, pp. 344-354; Irving 1993a, pp. 18-46; Irving 1993b, pp. 243-272; Irving 1995, pp. 193-215; Garber and Wilson 1998, pp. 833-867; Hatfield 2002, esp. pp. 3ff).
Although the Church has made it clear that the abuse of early human beings is not permissible regardless of the ensoulment debates, there is still some ambiguity expressed about whether the term "personhood" applies only to sexually reproduced human embryos (i.e., the union of sperm and oocyte) or if it applies also to asexually reproduced human embryos as well (as in naturally occurring human monozygotic identical twins in vivo or in vitro as well as human embryos cloned or genetically engineered in vitro). For example, in the various citations from the Church above, sometimes the phrase "from the first moment of its existence" is used; yet sometimes the phrase "from the moment of conception" is used. However, one phrase is not coextensive with the other. The former phrase would embrace both sexually and asexually reproduced human embryos; the latter, only sexually reproduced embryos, since conception has traditionally referred only to fertilization (sexual reproduction). Indeed, the term "conception" is often mis-defined now, even in major professional reports and literature, government regulations, and state, national, and international law as meaning "implantation", which is actually 5-7 days post-fertilization. (see Miller-Keane Encyclopedia & Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing & Allied Health 2003, p. 406; O'Rahilly and Müller 1994, p. 19; Oxford Companion to Medicine 1986, p. 254; Peters 2006, pp. 199-228; Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 1992, p. 131; Spahn and Andrade 1998, pp. 261, 295). Often this scientific mis-information is based on the erroneous "scientific" term "pre-embryo" or any of its various "substitutes" (Bedate and Cefalo 1989, p. 641; Bole 1989, p. 647; Bole 1990, p. 637; Curran 1978, pp. 17-26; Cefalo 1991, p. 41; Cahill 1988, pp. 85-98; Donceel 1988, pp. 48-53; Engelhardt 1974, p. 226; Engelhardt 1985, p. 111; Ford 1988, p. 298; Grobstein 1985, pp. 213-236; Grobstein 1988, p. 33; Guenin 2004a, p. 805; Guenin 2004b, p. 1215; Hare 1988, p. 214; Hellegers 1970, p. 9; Hellegers 1978; Jones and Schroder 1987, p. 192; Kinsley 2000, p. A17; Kuhse and Singer 1985, p. 138; Kuhse and Singer 1986, pp. 149-153; Lockwood 1985, p. 10; Lockwood 1988, pp. 187-213; McCormick 1975, pp. 34-35; McCormick 1991, pp. 1-15; McLaren 1984, pp. 101-120; McLaren 1986, p. 49; Moussa and Shannon 1992, pp. 30-37; Ramsey 1970, p. 75; Ramsey 1975, pp. 35-36; Robertson 1986, pp. 53-70; Robertson 1991, p 301; Robertson 1995a, pp. 37-38; Robertson 1995b, pp. 13-24; Sass 1989, pp. 45-59; Shannon and Wolter 1990, p. 615; Singer 1981, p. 118; Singer and Kuhse 1987, pp. 13-14; Singer et al. 1990, pp. 3-4, 6-12, 14-24, 43-50, 59-60, 66-72, 96-106, esp. 252; Suarez 1990, pp. 627-635; Tauer diss. 1982; Tauer 1988, pp. 54-84; Tooley 1974, pp. 59, 64; Varmus 1999; Wallace 1989, pp. 23-53; Warnock Report 1984, pp. 27, 63; Weissman 2003; West 2001 and 2007; Wildes 2001, pp. 3-33; British House of Lords 2001; Commonwealth of Australia 1986; U. S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare 1979, p. 101; American Fertility Society 1986, 46: 27S; National Academy of Sciences 2002a,b; National Institutes of Health 1994, February 2 meeting, pp. 27, 31, 50-80, 85-87, 104-106, February 3 meeting, pp. 6-55, February 51 meeting, pp. 9-41; New Zealand 2003; Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 1986 and 1989; in addition, see also those references noted in the bibliography with the symbol "*").
If today the term "fertilization" does not include those human beings who are asexually reproduced, and if the term "conception" now even legally often means "implantation", then it would seem unwise to use such dubious phrases as "from the moment of conception", or "from the moment of fertilization". The same concerns apply to the use of the phrase "until natural death", since especially if used in legislation it would not cover those human beings who die "unnatural" deaths, e.g., suicide, murder, accidents, removal of food and hydration, etc.. (Irving 2007, pp.1-4; Irving 2008c, pp. 1-6; Irving 2008d, pp. 1-6; Irving 2008e, pp. 1-7; Irving 2008f, pp. 1-2).
Since asexually reproduced human embryos are now being used in experimental infertility treatments and implanted for reproductive purposes (American Fertility Society 1986, p. 27S; American Medical Association 1994, pp. 1-9; American Society of Reproductive Medicine 2000, pp. 873-876; American Society for Reproductive Medicine 2004, pp. S256-257; Commonwealth of Australia 1986; Commonwealth of Australia 2001; Barr 2003; Escriba et al. pp. 149-161; German National Ethics Council 2004, pp. 18, 19, 41; Gordon and Ruddle 1981, pp. 1244-1246; Hao et al. 2006, p. S513; Parens and Knowles 2003; Illmensee et al. 2006a, pp. 1112-1120 ; Illmensee et al. 2006b, pp. 1248-1260; Institute of Medicine and National Research Council 1989, pp. 25, 102ff; Irving 2004a, pp. 1-31; Irving 2008b, pp. 1-10; Katagiri et al. 2004, p. S10; Yoko Kato et al. 1999, p. 1823; A. Liu 2005, pp. 369-378; H.C.C. Liu et al. 2004, p. S308; H. Liu et al. 2005a, p. S368; H. Liu et al. 2005b, p. S370; National Science Foundation and U.S. Dept. of Commerce 2002; Neri et al. 2004, p. S281; Neri et al. 2005a, pp. S400-S401; Neri et al. 2005b, p. S384; New Zealand 2003; Schieve et al. 2004, pp. 1154-1163; Tesarik et al. 2003, pp. 677-681; The Twins Foundation 1994; Valiotis et al. 1993, p. 48; Wolfson 2003, pp. 376-396), as well as being used for research purposes, it would seem that the issues of abortion and research have merged and need to be addressed inclusive of each other as well as inclusive of both sexually and asexually reproduced human embryos. Otherwise, some teachings on sexually reproduced human beings will not apply to asexually reproduced human beings.
D. Human Embryonic "Stem Cell" Research, Human Cloning, Human Genetic Engineering, Etc.
The use of living human embryos (through 8 weeks post-inception) and fetuses in destructive research is hardly new. However, especially as human embryos became available through in vitro fertilization and other techniques, their exploitation has dramatically increased. As noted by the Pontifical Council for the Family: "This evaluation of the morality of abortion is to be applied also to the recent forms of intervention on human embryos which, although carried out for purposes legitimate in themselves, inevitably involve the killing of those embryos." This is the case with experimentation on embryos, increasingly widespread in the field of biomedical research and legally permitted in some countries. Regardless of legality, the Church states that "& . . . the use of human embryos or fetuses as an object of experimentation constitutes a crime against their dignity as human beings who have a right to the same respect owed to a child once born, just as to every person." This moral condemnation "also regards procedures that exploit living human embryos and fetuses — sometimes specifically 'produced' for this purpose by in vitro fertilization" either to be used as biological material or to provide organs or tissue for transplants in the treatment of diseases. "The killing of innocent human creatures, even if carried out to help others, constitutes an absolutely unacceptable act" (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, par. 63). Thus, intentional violations of the life and dignity of human embryos in such exploitive research is not morally permissible: "Respect for the dignity of the human being excludes all experimental manipulation or exploitation of the human embryo" (Pontifical Council for the Family 1983, art. 4).
The same is true for the use of sexually reproduced human embryos for the production of embryonic stem cells. As explained by the Pontifical Academy for Life on the basis of a biological analysis, the living human embryo is "from the moment of the union of the gametes — a human subject with a well defined identity, which from that point begins its own coordinated, continuous and gradual development, such that at no later stage can it be considered as a simple mass of cells." Thus, the removal of the inner cell mass of the embryo at the blastocyst stage "is a gravely immoral act and consequently is gravely illicit," adding that "a good end does not make right an action which in itself is wrong." For the same reasons the academy specifically states that "this prohibition applies equally to the removal of stem cells from cloned [asexually reproduced] human embryos." Further, the tradition of "probabilism" cannot be appealed to because "moral theology has always taught that in the case of 'jus certum tertii' the system of probabilism does not apply." Nor is it morally licit to use embryonic stem cells or their progeny supplied by others, as this would constitute formal or material cooperation in evil. Instead, already clinically proven adult and cord blood stem cells could probably ethically be used (Pontifical Academy for Life 2000a).
Again, the Pontifical Academy for Life also sees that halting the human cloning project is a moral duty that must be translated into cultural, social, and legislative terms. "In a democratic, pluralistic system, the first guarantee of each individual's freedom is established by unconditionally respecting human dignity at every phase of life, regardless of the intellectual or physical abilities one possesses or lacks." In human cloning the necessary condition for any society - "that of treating man always and everywhere as an end, as a value, and never as a mere means or simple object" — begins to collapse. At the level of human rights, the possibility of human cloning represents a violation of the two fundamental principles on which all human rights are based: the principle of equality among human beings and the principle of non-discrimination. "Contrary to what may appear at first sight, the principle of parity and equality among human beings is violated by this possible form of man's domination over man, and the discrimination that comes about through the whole selective-eugenic dimension inherent in the logic of cloning" (Pontifical Academy for Life 1997a).
Several other Church documents similarly address the institutions and laws that foster the misuse of asexually reproduced human embryos. In an appeal to the United Nations to ban human cloning based on human rights, the Vatican Mission noted, "If human rights are to mean anything, at any time, anywhere in the world, then surely no one can have the right to do such a thing. Human rights flow from the recognition that human beings have an intrinsic dignity that is based on the fact that they are human. Human embryos are human, even if they are cloned." If the rest of us want to have the rights that flow from the recognition of this dignity, "then we must act to ban cloning in all its forms" (Vatican Mission to the United Nations 2003b, emphasis added).
The Vatican Mission points out that not only does human cloning violate the inherent dignity and human rights of the cloned embryo; it also "objectifies human sexuality and turns the bodies of women into commodities." Women are also deprived of their innate dignity "by becoming suppliers of eggs and wombs." Furthermore, other persons and technological powers "could easily exercise undisputed dominion over the duration of this person's life or his or her unique identity." As fellow human beings we are "called to further the common good for the present and future generations across the globe. We do this to protect all who share and participate in the human condition." But if some human beings are destined to serve interests that do not take into account these fundamental principles of human nature that are at the center of the UN's concern, "they are reduced to a servile status that denies them the fundamental claim to life and self-determination guaranteed to all." Noting the false distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, supposedly based on the purpose or goal of the research, the Vatican Mission insists that to clone a human being, regardless of the goal, "is to deny this person's basic ontological claim that unites him or her to the rest of the human family." This human being has no hope of a self-determining future "because his or her individuality will be destroyed to further some research purpose or to enhance the narcissism of a person who has already existed." In either case, the document continues, "the cloned human being is reduced to enslavement that contravenes the fundamental nature of human existence — to be free and to live as a unique individual capable of contributing to the development of the self and society" (Vatican Mission to the United Nations February 2003a).
The Church's envoys boldly and directly confront the false distinction made between so-called therapeutic and reproductive human cloning, rejecting both as inherently immoral, reiterating the stand that a human embryo's humanity per se is sufficient. Thus the Holy See rejects the false distinction between reproductive and therapeutic human cloning "as devoid of any ethical and legal ground." It might also be stated that it is devoid of any scientific ground. The Church's envoy continues by pointing out that reproductive cloning of human beings contravenes the law of nature, as does the cloning of the human embryo that is slated for research purposes. For the same reasons, all forms of human cloning are morally illicit: "The early but unavoidable result of both embryo splitting and nuclear transfer cloning is the reproduction of a human being at its embryonic stage of development." Even if there is no destruction of the cloned human embryo and it is allowed to mature to adulthood, "this activity is still an affront to the dignity of the human person." As a form of unnatural asexual reproduction, "it represents a radical manipulation of the constitutive relationship and complementarity that are at the origin of human procreation as a biological act and an exercise of human love" (Vatican Mission to the United Nations 2003c).
The Vatican Mission further points to the United Nation's own precepts, which should prohibit all human cloning, noting that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reiterates the sanctity of all human life and the need to protect it from harm. "In this regard, Article 3 of the Declaration asserts that everyone has the right to life." The Universal Declaration confirms that "each human being is an entity who is guaranteed a future filled with the hope of self-determination." Therefore, conditions, such as cloning, that degrade any human being with servitude and deny the fundamental rights to life and self-determination are reprehensible (Vatican Mission to the United Nations 2003a).
Such research, the Vatican Mission notes, would also violate international law: "Various international instruments acknowledge that the dignity of the human person is at the center of international law. Regardless of the objective for which it was done, human cloning conflicts with the international legal norms that protect human dignity." International law guarantees the right to life to all, not just some, human beings and adds that involuntary medical and biological experimentation on human beings is morally wrong. Human cloning also "poses great threats to the rule of law" by enabling those responsible for cloning to select and propagate certain characteristics such as gender or race and eliminate others. This, the Vatican Mission states, would be akin to the practice of eugenics leading to the institution of a "super race." Inevitable discrimination against those born through the natural process would follow. Human cloning also denies international rights to due process and equal protection of the law for human subjects who come into being for research purposes (Vatican Mission to the United Nations 2003a).
Similarly, in an address to the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Pontifical Academy for Life also rejects the false distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, a distinction supposedly based on the goal or purpose of the research, reminding them that any type of cloning is illicit "which implies the creation or splitting of embryos, no matter what techniques are used or what aims are pursued because it is not licit to do evil even to bring about good." Thus the Academy astutely observes that the prohibition of reproductive cloning only in Article 11 is not sufficient. "Regrettably, this formulation does not exclude human cloning, equally unacceptable, for other purposes, e.g. research or therapy" (Pontifical Academy for Life 1997b). Simply put, "No circumstance, no purpose, no law whatsoever can ever make licit an act which is intrinsically illicit, since it is contrary to the Law of God which is written in every human heart, knowable by reason itself, and proclaimed by the Church" (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, par. 62).
The Church has formally made Herself quite clear on the abuse of both sexually and asexually reproduced human embryos for any purposes. The debate is still out, however, on attempts to "ethically" create human embryonic stem cells for research and patient "therapies" (e.g., various recent cell de-differentiation methods used in research involving OAR, ANT, iPS, etc.). Is such research accomplished without involving the deaths of human embryos or human fetuses whose cells and tissues may be used in the materials and methods, or without involving new human embryos who might be asexually reproduced in the process, or without causing serious, even deadly, immune responses in patients in clinical trials? Are these new scientific studies really either ethical or scientifically successful (Wollert and Drexler 2005, pp. 151-163; Cyrannoski 2008, pp. 406-408; Irving 2008a, pp. 1-9)?
E. Correct Formation of Conscience
As Aristotle so wisely noted over two millennia ago, if we are to be able to think straight, our empirically derived concepts of the material world should correspond with it. If they do not then we are precluded from thinking critically — we will have lost the Categories (Aristotle, Analytical Posteriora 2.19, 100a 3-9, quoted in McKeon 1941). Similarly, if people cannot even accurately know the empirical reality involving the human embryo addressed above, how then can they think critically or rationally about issues involving the human embryo, or reliably form their consciences correctly regarding it? Their consciences are truly darkened, leading not only to immoral personal decisions (Irving 1994a, pp. 42-62; Irving 1999a, pp. 22-47; Irving 1999b, pp. 203-223), but to immoral professional, political, public policy and legal decisions as well (Irving 1993b, pp. 243-272; Irving 1993c, pp. 77-100; Irving 1994b, pp. 82-89; Irving1999a, 22-47; Irving 2000a, pp. 44-55; Irving 2001a, pp. 1-24; Irving 2001b, pp. 1-12; Irving 2001c, pp. 1-17; Irving 2001d, pp. 1-32; Irving 2002a, pp. 1-22; Irving 2004, pp. 1-31).
As extensively noted, violations of the dignity of these early human beings are usually accompanied by the use of erroneous science and deceptive linguistic jargon in the attempt to justify these immoral actions. This use of contrived rhetoric to refer to the newly created human embryo or fetus is now amazingly extensive; for example: a pre-embryo vs. an embryo; a being on the way vs. an already existing one; a seed vs. an organism; a phase sortal vs. a substance sortal; information content there vs. information capacity there; a biological individual vs. an ontological individual; a transient nature vs. a stable human nature; a biologically integrated whole vs. a psychologically integrated whole; a biological life only vs. a personal life; an unconscious biological life vs. a conscious personal life; a lower-brain life vs. a cortical-brain lif"; no one home vs. some one home; a zoe vs. a bios; a possible or potential human being vs. an actual human being; a possible or potential person vs. an actual human person; an object vs. a subject; an evolving member of the human species vs. an actual member of the human species; no rational attributes or sentience there vs. rational attributes or sentience there; no human cognition vs. human cognition, a ball of cells vs. an organism. Politicized terms such as spare or left-over embryos or products of conception are often used. Further rhetoric includes the false distinction between therapeutic and reproductive cloning, the deconstruction of therapeutic cloning to mean stem cell research, and the deconstruction of totipotent to mean pluripotent (Biggers 1990, pp. 1-6; Denker 2008, pp. 1656-1657; Irving 1991, pp. 1-400; Irving 1993a, pp. 18-46; Irving 1994a, pp. 42-62; Irving 2003a, pp. 1-42; Irving 2004a pp. 1-31; Irving 2005 1-36; Kischer and Irving 995, pp. 4-13, 129-184, 224-247, 248-257, 267-282). As noted above, even the centuries-old honored term "conception" itself has now been erroneously redefined as beginning at implantation rather than at fertilization, even in the law.
Fortunately, the international nomenclature committee on human embryology formally rejected the false term pre-embryo. To quote O'Rahilly and Müller (2001, p. 88), the term:
(1) is ill-defined because it is said to end with the appearance of the primitive streak [about 15 days] or to include neurulation [formation in the early embryo of the neural plate (Stage 8, about 23 days) followed by its closure with the development of the neural tube (beginning at Stage 10 through Stage 12, about 32 days)]; (2) is inaccurate because purely embryonic cells can already be distinguished after a few days, as can also the embryonic (not pre-embryonic!) disc; (3) is unjustified because the accepted meaning of the word embryo includes all of the first 8 weeks; (4) is equivocal because it may convey the erroneous idea that a new human organism is formed at only some considerable time after fertilization; and (5) was introduced in 1986 "largely for public policy reasons."
The term was also eventually clarified in a statement by the Pontifical Academy for Life (although the term remains in the "Foreword" of Donum vitae):
From a biological standpoint, the formation and the development of the human embryo appears as a continuous, coordinated, and gradual process from the time of fertilization, at which time a new human organism is constituted, endowed with the intrinsic capacity to develop by himself into a human adult. The most recent contributions of the biomedical sciences offer further valuable empirical evidence for substantiating the individuality and developmental continuity of the embryo. To speak of a pre-embryo thus is an incorrect interpretation of the biological data. (Pontifical Academy for Life 1997a)
Yet new, clever and ever erroneous scientific claims and linguistic rhetoric continue to confuse and darken the human conscience. Josef Pieper, a contemporary Catholic philosopher and theologian, recently wrote an amazing small book concerning the advertising and communications industries, The Abuse of Language - Abuse of Power, that is astonishingly applicable to the rhetoric found in these related debates about the human embryo today. Such rhetoric, he notes, is not new. Plato attributed it to the Sophists whom he described as, "highly paid and popularly applauded experts in the art of twisting words; able to sweet-talk something bad into something good and to turn white into black." The truth itself cannot in all honesty be the decisive concern of those who aim at verbal artistry, he notes. Rather, as Plato forces Gorgias to admit, "such sophisticated language, disconnected from the roots of truth, in fact pursues some ulterior motives." Language is thus invariably turned into an instrument of power. "The place of authentic reality is taken over by a fictitious reality; my perception is indeed still directed toward an object, but now it is a pseudo-reality, deceptively appearing as being real, so much so that it becomes almost impossible any more to discern the truth." This is precisely what bothered Plato with his own contemporary Sophists. What makes the sophists so dangerous, said Plato, is that they "fabricate a fictitious reality." That the real world in which we all live can be taken over by pseudo-realities whose fictitious nature threatens to become unnoticed is truly a depressing thought. And yet this Platonic nightmare possesses an alarming contemporary relevance, for the general public is being reduced to a state where people not only are unable to find out about the truth but also become unable even to search for it. (Pieper 1992, pp. 7, 18-20, 34-35).
This darkening of the human conscience on these various but related issues concerning the early human being is of considerable concern to the Church:
The end result of this is tragic: not only is the fact of the destruction of so many human lives still to be born or in their final stage extremely grave and disturbing, but no less grave and disturbing is the fact that conscience itself, darkened as it were by such widespread conditioning, is finding it increasingly difficult to distinguish between good and evil in what concerns the basic value of human life. ... [W]e need now more than ever to have the courage to look the truth in the eye and to call things by their proper name, without yielding to convenient compromises or to the temptation of self-deception. ... Perhaps this linguistic phenomenon is itself a symptom of an uneasiness of conscience. But no word has the power to change the reality of things: procured abortion is the deliberate and direct killing, by whatever means it is carried out, of a human being in the initial phase of his or her existence (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, pars. 4 and 58).
What is needed, the Church recognizes, is a cultural transformation: "The first and fundamental step towards this cultural transformation consists in forming consciences with regard to the incomparable and inviolable worth of every human life." It is especially important to "re-establish the essential connection between life and freedom" and "between freedom and truth," because when freedom is detached from objective truth "it becomes impossible to establish personal rights on a firm rational basis." In turn, this lays the ground for society "to be at the mercy of the unrestrained will of individuals or the oppressive totalitarianism of public authority." In particular, "there is a need for education about the value of life from its very origins" (Pope John Paul II, Evangelium vitae 1995, par 96).
For clarity, the listings for Science, Bioethics/Medical Ethics/Law, Organizations and Institutions, Philosophy and Theology, and Church Teachings will be separate. Note that the symbol * denotes those individuals and organizations who specifically use the erroneous scientific term pre-embryo, or any of its various "substitutes", as "scientific" justification for a multitude of inherently unethical actions. The use of this erroneous science automatically renders any conclusions (scientific, philosophical, theological, public policy, etc.) based on it as invalid.
Beverly W. Baron, Dennis W. Shermeta, Mahmoud A. Ismail, et al., "Unique Anomalies in Cephalothoracopagus Janiceps Conjoined Twins With Implications for Multiple Mechanisms in Abnormal Embryogenesis," Teratology 41, no. 1 (January 1990): 9-22.
J.D. Biggers, "Arbitrary Partitions of Prenatal Life," Human Reproduction 5, no. 1 (1990): 1-6, available from http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/5/1/1 (accessed February 4, 2008).
Erich Blechschmidt, Der Menschliche Embryo (Stuttgart, Germany 1963).
Erich Blechschmidt, Die Pränatalen Organsysteme des Menschen (Stuttgart, Germany 1973).
Erich Blechschmidt, "Zur Personalität des Menschen," Internationale Katholische Zeitschrift 11, no.22 (1982): 171-181.
Peter R. Brinsden, "Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology: The UK Experience," in Peter R. Brinsden, ed., A Textbook of in vitro Fertilization and Assisted Reproduction, 2nd ed. (New York 1999): 415-446.
M.G. Bulmer, The Biology of Twinning in Man (Oxford 1970).
Bruce M. Carlson, Human Embryology and Developmental Biology, 2nd ed. (St. Louis 1999).
Kyung H. Chang, Jeong M. Lim, Sung K. Kang, et al., "An Optimized Protocol of a Human-to-Cattle Interspecies Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer," Fertility and Sterility 82, no. 4 (October 2004): 960-962, available from http://www.fertstert.org/article/PIIS0015028204012919/abstract (accessed February 5, 2008).
G.W. Corner, "The Observed Embryology of Human Single-Ovum Twins and Other Multiple Births," American Journal of Obstetrics and. Gynecology 70, no. 5 (1955): 933-951.
Gavin de Beer, Embryos and Ancestors, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1958).
David Cyrannoski, "Things to know before jumping on the iPS bandwagon", Nature 452, no. 27 (March 2008):406-408, available from http://www.nature.com/news/2008/080326/full/452406a.html.
Hans-Werner Denker, "Totipotency/Pluripotency and Patentability," Stem Cells 26, no. 6 (June 2008):1656-1657, available from http://stemcells.alphamedpress.org/cgi/content/full/26/6/1656.
*R.G. Edwards, J. Crow, S. Dale, M.C. Macnamee, et al., "Pronuclear, Cleavage and Blastocyst Histories in the Attempted Preimplantation Diagnosis of the Human Hydatidiform Mole," Human Reproduction 7, no. 7, (1992): 994-998, available from http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/7/7/994 (accessed February 5, 2008).
Alan E.H. Emery, Elements of Medical Genetics, 6th ed. (New York 1983).
M.J. Escribá, D. Valbuena, J. Remohí, et al., "New Techniques on Embryo Manipulation," American Journal of Reproductive Immunology 55, no 1 (May-June 2002): 149-161, available from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=12062830 (accessed February 5, 2008).
Raymond Gasser, "Stage One," in Virtual Human Embryo, by Louisiana State University Health Sciences Center (New Orleans, 2003), available from http://virtualhumanembryo.lsuhsc.edu/demos/Stage1/Intro_pg/Intro.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
J.P. Geraedts, G.M. de Wert, "Cloning: Applications in Humans 1: Technical Aspects," Nederlands tijdschrift voor tandheelkunde 108, no. 4 (April 2001): 145-150, available from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=pubmed&dopt=Abstract&list_uids=11383357 (accessed February 5, 2008).
J.W. Gordon and F.H. Ruddle, "Integration and Stable Germ Line Transmission of Genes Injected Into Mouse Pronuclei," Science 214, no. 4526 (December 11, 1981): 1244-1246.
*Clifford Grobstein, "The Early Development of Human Embryos," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 10, (1985): 213-236.
*Clifford Grobstein, Science and the Unborn: Choosing Human Futures (New York 1988), 33.
J. Hao, J. Pareja, N. Zaninovic, "P-1022: Derivation of Embryonic Stem Cells From Individual 2-Cell Mouse Embryos: Model for Blastomere Totipotency and Embryo Splitting," Fertility and Sterility 86, no. 3 (September 2006): S513.
Wilhelm His, Anatomie Menschlicher Embryonen: I. Embroyonen des Ersten Monats (Leipzig, Germany 1880).
H. Holtzer, J. Biekl, and B. Holtzer. "Induction-Dependent and Lineage-Dependent Models for Cell-Diversification Are Mutually Exclusive," Progress in Clinical Biological Research 175, (1985): 3-11.
Robert Hutton, "U.K. Approves Human Hybrids for Stem Cell Research," Bloomberg.com (September 5, 2007), available from http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601085&sid=a0mbP92YIfAc&refer=europe (accessed February 5, 2008).
Karl Illmensee, Khalied Kaskar, and Panayiotis M. Zavos, "in vitro Blastocyst Development From Serially Split Mouse Embryos and Future Implications for Human Assisted Reproductive Technologies," Fertility and Sterility, 86, no. 4 (September 7, 2006a): 1112-1120, available from http://www.fertstert.org/article/PIIS0015028206010776/abstract (accessed February 5, 2008).
Karl Illmensee, Mike Levanduski, and Panayiotis M. Zavos, "Evaluation of the Embryonic Preimplantation Potential of Human Adult Somatic Cells Via an Embryo Interspecies Bioassay Using Bovine Oocytes," Fertility and Sterility 85 (April 2006b): 1248-1260, available from http://www.fertstert.org/article/PIIS0015028205042032/abstract (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (a), "'New Age' Embryology Text Books: 'Pre-Embryo,''Pregnancy' and Abortion Counseling; Implications for Fetal Research," The Linacre Quarterly 61, no. 2 (May 1994a): 42-62, PubMed ID: 11652337, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_50newagetextbook1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (b), "Testimony Before the NIH Human Embryo Research Panel," The Linacre Quarterly 61, no. 4 (November 1994b): 82-89, PubMed ID: 11652834, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_32individualtestimony.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "The Immediate Product of Human Cloning is a Human Being: Claims to the Contrary are Scientifically Wrong," Scientific Panel on "Cloning: Legal, Medical, Ethical, and Social Issues," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Health and Environment of the Committee on Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, (February 12, 1998), also in The Linacre Quarterly 66, no. 2 (May 1999): 26-40, available from http://www.uffl.org/irving/irvhouse.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "When Does a Human Being [Normally] Begin? 'Scientific' Myths and Scientific Facts," International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 19, no. 3/4 (February 1999): 22-47, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_01lifebegin1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "NIH and Human Embryo Research Revisited: What is Wrong With This Picture?" The Linacre Quarterly 67, no. 2 (May 2000): 8-22, PubMed ID: 11817406, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_31nih_and_her1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "What Human Embryo? Funniest Mental Gymnastics from Medicine and Research" (October 14, 2004), 1-31, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_82whathumanembryo1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "Framing the Debates on Human Cloning and Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Pluripotent vs. Totipotent" (July 23, 2005), 1-36, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_100debatecloning1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (a), "The Carnegie Stages of Early Human Embryonic Development: Chart of all 23 Stages, and Detailed Descriptions of Carnegie Stages 1 - 6" (April 22, 2006a), 1-33, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_123carnegiestages2.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (b), "If Snuppy is Cloned by 'Nuclear Transfer', Then There Must Be No 'Virtual Genetic Identity'" (January 7, 2006b), 1-3, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_114snuppy.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (a), "Ethical and Scientific Concerns About Induced Pluripotent Stem Cell Research — Yamanaka and Thomson" (June 1, 2008a), pp. 1-1-4, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_127concerns.html.
Dianne N. Irving (b), "So You Think That 'Reproductive Cloning' Isn't Done Yet? Guess Again" (July 18, 2008b), pp. 1-10, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_130reproductivecloning.html.
Y. Katagiri, T. Takeuchi, Q.V. Neri, et al., "Imprinted Gene Expression in Cloned Blastocysts," Fertility and Sterility 82 (September 2004): S10.
Yoko Kato, W.M. Rideout, K. Hilton, et al., "Developmental Potential of Mouse Primordial Germ Cells," Development 126, no. 9 (January 5, 1999): 1823-1832.
C. Ward Kischer and Dianne N. Irving, The Human Development Hoax: Time To Tell The Truth!, 2nd ed. (Clinton Township, Mich. 1997), esp. 4-13, 129-184, 224-247, 248-257, 267-282.
G. Kollias, J. Hurst, E. deBoer, et al., "The Human Beta-Globulin Gene Contains a Downstream Developmental Specific Enhancer," Nucleic Acids Research 15, no. 14 (July 1987): 5739-5747.
William J. Larsen, Essentials of Human Embryology (New York 1998).
Jacob Levron, Santiago Munne, Steen Willadsen, et al., "Male and Female Genomes Associated in a Single Pronucleus in Human Zygotes," Biology of Reproduction 52, (1995): 653-657, available from PubMed #7756458.
Benjamin Lewin, Genes III (New York 1983).
A. Liu, "Human Embryo Cloning Prohibited in Hong Kong," Journal of Assisted Reproductive Genetics 22, no. 11-12 (December 2005): 369-378, available from PubMed #16331533.
H.C.C. Liu, Z.Y. He, and Z. Rosenwaks, "Ovarian Tissue Cryopreservation Did Not Compromise Its Potential to Produce Competent Oocytes for Nuclear Transfer," Fertility and Sterility 82 (September 2004): S308.
H. Liu, Z. He, W. Wang, et al., "Demiembryo Viability Can Be Improved by Symmetric Embryo Splitting," Fertility and Sterility 84 (September 2005a): S368.
H. Liu, Z. He, W. Wang, and Z. Rosenwaks, "Strategies for Monozygotic Twinning by Embryo Splitting," Fertility and Sterility 84 (September 2005b): S370.
W. Patrick Luckett, "Origin and Differentiation of the Yolk Sac and Extraembryonic Mesoderm in Presomite Human and Rhesus Monkey Embryos," American Journal of Anatomy.152, no. 1 (1978): 59-97.
*Anne McLaren, "Why Study Early Human Development?", New Scientist 1986, 24:49.
*Anne McLaren, "Where to Draw the Line?", Proceedings of the Royal Institute of Great Britain 1984, 56:101-120; note that McLaren's suggestion of the use of the false scientific term "pre-embryo" was subsequently adopted by the British Warnock Report, and used since then as their "scientific" justification for various sorts of human embryo research.
H.W. Michelmann, A. Bonhoff and L. Mettler, "Chromosome Analysis in Polyploid Human Embryos," Human Reproduction 1, no. 4, (1986): 243-246, available from PubMed # 3558764.
*Miller-Keane Encyclopedia & Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing & Allied Health, 7th ed. (Philadelphia, Penn. 2003), p. 406; Erroneously defines "conception" as "the onset of pregnancy, marked by implantation of the blastocyst".
*Keith Moore and *T.V.N. Persaud, The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented Embryology (6th ed. and later only) (Philadelphia, Penn. 1998) Note: The 5th ed. of this text was admitted by authors to have serious systematic scientific errors, including extensive use of the term pre-embryo; see Irving 1994a. Moore continues, however, to use the Islamic term "nuthah" as a "pre-embryo substitute" in another of his human embryology textbooks, with co-author Azzindani, Abdul Majeed A., The Developing Human. Clinically Oriented Embryology with ISLAMIC ADDITIONS [emphasis in original], 3rd Ed., Dar Al-Qiblah and W.B. Saunders. [This textbook is still available on-line at: http://www.onlineislamicstore.com/b6147.html (accessed September 15, 2008). Also see Moore's suggestion to replace the Carnegie Stages: "& . . . it is proposed that a new system of classification could be developed using the terms mentioned in the Quran and Sunnah ...," in "This is the Truth," pp. 10-11; see video, "The Video Clips of the Scientists' Comments on the Quran; Professor Keith L. Moore, Comment 2," available from http://www.islam-guide.com/truth.htm (accessed February 5, 2008); quoted in "The Quran on Human Embryonic Development," available from http://www.islam-guide.com/frm-ch1-1-a.htm. For some trenchant rebuttals of this specific "modern embryology", see: Dr. Yusuf Needham and Dr. Butrus Needbeer, "Qur'anic Embryology", at: http://www.geocities.com/freethoughtmecca/embryo.html; also, "The Qur'an and Modern Science: Extracts from the video 'The Truth', http://www.islam101.com/science/quran_sc_tv.html; also, at http://www.scotland.com/forums/showthread.php3?threadid=18165.
Harland W. Mossman, "Comparative Morphogenesis of the Fetal Membranes and Accessory Uterine Structures," Contribution to Embryology 26, (1937): 129-246.
National Museum of Health and Medicine: The Carnegie Collection of Embryology, Human Developmental Anatomy, available from http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/anatomy.htm, http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/Stages_Table.htm, and http://nmhm.washingtondc.museum/collections/hdac/Select_Stage_and_Lab_Manual.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Q.V. Neri et al., "Genomic Expressions in the Cloned Blastocyst," Fertility and Sterility 82 (September 2004): S281.
Q.V. Neri et al., "Devising a Method to Reprogram Somatic Nuclei for Nuclear Transplantation Procedures," Fertility and Sterility 84 (September 2005): S400-401.
Q.V. Neri et al., "Gene Expression in ESCs Derived from Cloned Blastocytes," Fertility and Sterility 84 (September 2005): S384.
Ronan O'Rahilly, "Part A: Embryos of the First Three Weeks: Stages 1 to 9," in Developmental Stages in Human Embryos, including a survey of the Carnegie Collection (Washington, D.C. 1973).
Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Müller, Human Embryology & Teratology (New York 1994).
Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Müller, Developmental Stages in Human Embryos: Including a Revision of Streeter's "Horizons" and a Survey of the Carnegie Collection (Washington, D.C. 1987).
Ronan O'Rahilly and Fabiola Müller, Human Embryology & Teratology (New York 2001).
*Pia Saldeen and Per Sundström, "Nuclear Status of Four-Cell Preembryos Predicts Implantation Potential in In Vitro Fertilization Treatment Cycles," Fertility and Sterility 84, no. 3 (September 2005): 584-589, available from http://www.fertstert.org/article/PIIS0015028205010952/abstract (accessed February 5, 2008).
A.H. Sathananthan, I. Kola, J. Osborne, et al., "Centrioles in the Beginning of Human Development," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 88, no. 11 (June 1, 1991): 4806-4810.
Laura A. Schieve, Sonja A. Rasmussen, Germaine M. Buck, et al., "Are Children Born after Assisted Reproductive Technology at Increased Risk for Adverse Health Outcomes?" Obstetrics and Gynecology 103, no. 6, (June 2004): 1154-1163, available from PubMed #15172847.
Lee Silver, Remaking Ede: Cloning and Beyond in a Brave New World (Avon Books 1997), p. 107.
*Richard Sloane, Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary, 1992 Supplement (St. Paul 1992), p. 131; Erroneously defines "conception" as "the onset of pregnancy, marked by implantation of the blastocyst."
Tom Strachan and Andrew P. Read, Human Molecular Genetics, 2nd ed. (New York 1999).
G.L. Streeter, "Developmental Horizons in Human Embryos: Description of Age Group XI, 13 to 20 Somites, and Age Group XII, 21 to 29 Somites," Contributions in Embryology 30, (1942): 211-245.
G.L. Streeter, "Developmental Horizons in Human Embryos: Description of Age Group XIII, Embryos of 4 or 5 Millimeters Long, and Age Group XIV, Period of Identification of the Lens Vesicle," Contributions in Embryology Carnegie Institute 31, (1945): 27-63.
G.L. Streeter, "Developmental Horizons in Human Embryos: Description of Age Groups XV, XVI, XVII, and XVIII," Contributions in Embryology Carnegie Institute 32, (1948): 133-203.
G.L. Streeter, "Developmental Horizons in Human Embryos: Description of Age Groups XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, and XXIII," prepared for publication by C.H. Heuser, and G.W. Corner, Contributions in Embryology (1951): 165.
J. Tesarik, F. Martinez, L. Rienzi, et al., "Microfilament Disruption Is Required for Enucleation and Nuclear Transfer in Germinal Vesicle But Not Metaphase II Human Oocytes," Fertility and Sterility 79, Supplement 1 (March 2003): 677-681, available from PubMed # 12620476.
University of Fribourg, Faculty of Science, Department of Medicine, Unit on Anatomy, Fribourg, Switzerland, Swiss Virtual Campus, "Human Embryology," available from http://www.embryology.ch/anglais/iperiodembry/planmodperiod.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
*M.C. Valiotis, *O. Lacham-Kaplan and *A.O. Trounson, "Pronuclei Formation and Embryo Cleavage Following Electrofusion of Round Spermatids with Oocytes from the Mouse," Proceedings of the Australian Society for Reproductive Biology 25, (1993): 48.
*Dr. Harold Varmus, Director of the National Institutes of Health, Congressional Testimony Before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies (January 26,1999), available from http://stemcells.nih.gov/policy/statements/statement.asp (accessed February 5, 2008).
*John Walton, *Paul B. Beeson, *Ronald Bodley, eds. Oxford Companion to Medicine (Oxford 1986), p. 254; Erroneously defines "conception" as "the fertilization of an ovum by a spermatozoon and the implanting of the resulting zygote."
*Irving Weissman, *J.M. McCune, *B. R. Namikawa, *L.D. Shultz, et al., "The SCID-hu Mouse: Murine Model for the Analysis of Human Hematolymphoid Differentiation and Function," Science 241, no. 4873 (1988): 1632-1639.
*Irving Weissman, "A Message from the Director of the Institute of Cancer/Stem Cell Biology and Medicine at Stanford," The Stanford Report (January 22, 2003), available from http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2003/january22/message.html (accessed April 3, 2008).
*Irving Weissman, "Understanding the Institute of Cancer/Stem Cell Biology and Medicine," in The Stanford Report (Jan. 22, 2003), available from http://news-service.stanford.edu/news/2003/january22/weissman.html (accessed April1, 2008).
*Irving Weissman, in "The Other Stem-Cell Debate," by Jamie Shreeve, The New York Times (April 10, 2005), available from http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/10/magazine/10CHIMERA.html?ex=1189224000&en=b4019cb924a8ac0b&ei=5070 (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Michael D. West, as quoted by Stuart Derbyshire in, "Stop Stemming the Research," (November 29, 2001), available from http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/845/ (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Michael D. West, President & CEO, Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., (*Ronald Green, Chair of Ethics Committee) definition of "blastocyst" as a "pre-embryo" and "ball of cells" (Sept. 2007), available from http://www.advancedcell.com/glossary/ (accessed February 5, 2008).
Harris Hawthorne Wilder, "Duplicate Twins and Double Monsters," 1904, American Journal of Anatomy 3: 387-472.
Ian Wilmut, A.E. Schnieke, J. McWhir, et al., "Viable Offspring Derived From Fetal and Adult Mammalian Cells," Nature 385, (February 27, 1997): 810-813; also in Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 7, (Spring 1988): 138.
Kai C. Wollert and Helmut Drexler, "Clinical Applications of Stem Cells for the Heart," Circulation Research 96 (2005):151, available from http://circres.ahajournals.org/cgi/content/full/96/2/151-163; also available from http://www.avmbiotech.com/Assets/Wollert&DrexlerClinicalApplicationsofStemCells.pdf.; also available from http://www.cogforlife.org.
*N. Zaninovic, * R. Bodine, * R.G. Gosden, et al., "The Secret Lives of Human Preembryos: From Fertilization to Hatched Blastocyst," Fertility and Sterility 84, (September 2005): S476.
B. Bioethics/Medical Ethics/Law
*Tremane Barr, "Analysis of the New Zealand Government's Proposals to Amend the Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill" (2003) available from http://www.gefree.org.nz/cloning.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Carlos Bedate and * Robert Cefalo, "The Zygote: To Be or Not Be a Person," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14, no. 6 (December 1989): 641-645.
*Thomas J. Bole, III, "Metaphysical Accounts of the Zygote as a Person and the Veto Power of Facts," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14 (1989): 647-653.
*Thomas J. Bole, "Zygotes, Souls, Substances, and Persons," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (1990): 637-652.
*Senator Sam Brownback, "A True, Complete Ban," National Review Online (February 26, 2003), available from http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-brownback022603.asp (accessed February 5, 2008). See also: Congressman David Weldon, Senator Sam Brownback, Human Cloning Bans: [Rep. David Weldon, FL] Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, HR 1644 IH, 107th CONGRESS, 1st Session, April 26, 2001; as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:2:./temp/~c1073WGJB2:: The Senate version of the bill was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Brownback; as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:1:./temp/~c1073WGJB2::
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 (Introduced in the Senate), S 790 IS, 107th CONGRESS, 1st Session, "To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit human cloning". Newer versions of these same bills, still containing the same erroneous formal scientific definitions, were introduced in 2007; [Rep. David Weldon, FL] Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007, HR 2564 IH, 110th CONGRESS, "To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit human cloning", June 5, 2007, as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.2564:; [Sen. Sam Brownback] Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007 (Introduced in Senate), S 1036 IS, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session, "To amend the Public Health Service Act to prohibit human cloning", March 29, 2007, as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.1036:
See Irving analysis of these cloning bills, "University Faculty for Life: Letter of Concern to Sen. Brownback and Congressman Weldon Re the 'Human Cloning Bill 2001'"; written as UFL Board Member on behalf of UFL; submitted to Sen. Brownback and Congr. Weldon, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. (May 27, 2001), at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_52weldonbrownback1.html; see also Irving, "Playing God by manipulating man: Facts and frauds of human cloning" (October 4, 2003), available at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_22manipulatingman1.html; also Irving, "What Human Embryo? Funniest Mental Gymnastics from Medicine and Research" (Oct. 14, 2004), available at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_82whathumanembryo1.html; also Irving, "Analysis of Legislative and Regulatory Chaos in the U.S.: Asexual Human Reproduction and Genetic Engineering" (Oct. 20, 2004), available at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_81chaosasexgen1.html.
*Lisa Sowle Cahill, "Abortion, Autonomy, and Community," in Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate, edited by Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas Shannon (New York 1988), 85-97.
Paula Campbell, Gina Maranto, Charles R. Cantor, et al., "Gene Therapy: Legal, Financial and Ethical Issues," Boston University Journal of Science & Technology Law (March 20, 1997), available from http://www.bu.edu/law/scitech/volume4/4jstl03.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Robert C. Cefalo, "Book Review: Embryo Experimentation, Peter Singer et al., eds., 'Eggs, Embryos and Ethics'," Hastings Center Report 21, no. 5 (September-October 1991): 41.
*Charles E. Curran, "Abortion: Contemporary Debate in Philosophical and Religious Ethics," in Encyclopedia of Bioethics 1, edited by W.T. Reich (London 1978), 17-26.
*Joseph F. Donceel, "A Liberal Catholic's View," in Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate, edited by Patricia Beattie Jung and Thomas Shannon (New York 1988), 48-53.
*H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "The Ontology of Abortion," Ethics 84, no. 3 (April 1974): 217-234.
*H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., The Foundations of Bioethics (New York 1986).
*Norman M. Ford, When Did I Begin?: Conception of the Human Individual in History, Philosophy, and Science (New York 1988).
* Louis M. Guenin, "The Morality of Unenabled Embryo Use-Arguments That Work and Arguments That Don't," Mayo Clinic Proceedings 79, no. 6 (June 2004a): 801-808.
* Louis M. Guenin, "Unenabled Embryo Use-Reply," Mayo Clinic Proceedings 79, no. 9 (September 2004b): 1215.
*Richard M. Hare, "When Does Potentiality Count? A Comment on Lockwood," Bioethics 2, no. 3 (1988): 214-225.
*Andr E. Hellegers, "Fetal Development," Theological Studies 31, no. 1 (March 1970): 3-9.
*Andre E. Hellegers, "Fetal Development," in Tom L. Beauchamp, ed., Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1978), pp. 194-199. See also exposition of and agreement with Hellegers' position in Paul Ramsey (author), William Werpehowski (editor), and Stephen Crocco (editor), The Essential Paul Ramsey: A Collection (Yale University Press, 1994), p. 161, footnote 11, available from http://books.google.com/books?id=ukctSo1O5-wC&pg=PA161&lpg=PA161&dq=%22Andre+Hellegers%22+%22fetal+development%22&source=web&ots=SsvlJGZJhH&sig=a4uN4RU8wwGhtiKqauGMJXRDsXQ&hl=en.
Dianne N. Irving (b), "The Impact of 'Scientific Misinformation' on Other Fields: Philosophy, Theology, Biomedical Ethics, Public Policy," Accountability in Research 2, no. 4 (1993b): 243-272, PubMed ID: 11652144, available from http://www.uffl.org/irving/irvimpact.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving and Adil E. Shampoo (c), "Which Ethics for Science and Public Policy?" Accountability in Research 3, no. 2-3 (January 7, 1993c): 77-100, PubMed ID: 11652298, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_42whichethics1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "Academic Fraud and Conceptual Transfer in Bioethics: Abortion, Human Embryo Research, and Psychiatric Research," in Life And Learning IV: Proceedings of the Fourth University Faculty for Life Conference, edited by Joseph W. Koterski (Washington, D.C. 1995), 193-215, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_10fraud1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (b), "The Woman and the Physician Facing Abortion: The Role of Correct Science in the Formation of Conscience and the Moral Decision Making Process," presented at "The Scientific Congress, The Guadalupan Appeal: The Dignity and Status of the Human Embryo," Mexico City (October 28-29,1999b); published in Un Appello Per La Vita: The Guadalupan Appeal: Dignita E Statuto dell'Embryione Umano (Vatican 2000), 203-223; also in The Linacre Quarterly (Nov./Dec. 2000), 21-55, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_03facing1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (c), "Which Medical Ethics for the 21st Century? A Comparison of 'Secular Bioethics' and Roman Catholic Medical Ethics," The Linacre Quarterly (March 14, 1999c), PubMed ID 14587485, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_02ethics1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (a), "University Faculty for Life: Submission of Concern to the Canadian CIHR Re the 'Human Stem Cell Research Recommendations 2001'"(2001a), 1-24, available from http://www.uffl.org/irving/irvcihr.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (b), "University Faculty for Life: Submission of Concern to the British House of Lords Re the 'Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001'"(2001b), 1-12, available from http://www.uffl.org/irving/irvlords.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (c), "University Faculty for Life: Letter of Concern to Senator Brownback and Congressman Weldon Re the 'Weldon/Brownback Human Cloning Bills'"(2001c), 1-17, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_52weldonbrownback1.html and http://www.uffl.org/irving/irvbrownback.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (d), "The Impact of International Bioethics on the 'Sanctity of Life Ethics' and the Ability of Ob Gyn's to Practice According to Conscience," Rome (2001d), 1-32, available from http://frblin.club.fr/fiamc/03events/0110gyneco/gyntexts/irving.htm, and http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_40bioandconscience01.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (a), "The Early Human Embryo: 'Scientific' Myths and Scientific Facts: Implications for Ethics and Public Policy: A One Act Drama," Brussels (October 20, 2002a), 1-22, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_11oneactdrama1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (b), "What Is 'Bioethics'?," in Joseph W. Koterski, ed., Life and Learning X: Proceedings of the Tenth University Faculty For Life Conference (Washington, D.C. 2002b), 1-84, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_36whatisbioethics01.html (accessed February 5, 2008); extensive analysis and evaluation of the new "birth" of bioethics, with scientific, historical and bioethics references; note, Irving was a member of the first formal graduate class of this new bioethics at the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
Dianne N. Irving, "Playing God by Manipulating Man: The Facts and Frauds of Human Cloning" (October 4, 2003), 1-42, available from http://www.uffl.org/irving/irvplayinggo.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (b), "Analysis of Legislative and Regulatory Chaos in the U.S.: Asexual Human Reproduction and Genetic Engineering" (October 20, 2004b), 1-65, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_81chaosasexgen1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving (c), "Open Letter to U.S. Catholic Church Hierarchy on Human Cloning and Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research" (February 20, 2004c), 1-2, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_46openletter.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "Problems With the Phrase, 'From Conception/Fertilization Through Natural Death'" (August 8, 2007), pp. 1-4, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irvi/irvi_67coloradoinitiative.html
Dianne N. Irving (c), "Irving Comments: 'Wisconsin Bishops' Pastoral Letter On Stem Cell Research'" (May 2, 2008c), pp. 1-6, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_125wisconsinbishops.html
Dianne N. Irving (d), "Problems With Colorado's 'Personhood' Amendment: The Phrase, 'From the Moment of Fertilization'" (May 31, 2008d), pp. 1-6, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_126colorado.html
Dianne N. Irving (e), "Neither, Nor: Bryne's and Willke's Pseudo-Battle Over Human Embryonic Stem Cells" (June 19, 2008e), pp. 1-7, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_129bryneandwillke.html
Dianne N. Irving (f), "Irving Comments: 'CRTL Acknowledges Irving's Scientific, Moral and Legal Arguments on 'Personhood'" (July 17, 2008f), pp. 1-2, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_131personhoodandcrtl.html
*Howard W. Jones and *Charlotte Schroder, "The Process of Human Fertilization: Implications for Moral Status," Fertility and Sterility 48, no. 2 (August 1987): 192.
Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New York 1998), 90-122.
Leon Kass, The Chicago Tribune, July 31, 2001, quoted by Dave Andrusko in, "Averting a Catastrophe," NRLC News, available from http://www.nrlc.org/news/2001/NRL08/editA.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Michael Kinsley, "Reason, Faith and Stem Cells," Washington Post Aug. 29, 2000 p. A 17; also available from http://slate.com/id/88862.
*Helga Kuhse and *Peter Singer, Should the Baby Live? The Problem of Handicapped Infants (Oxford 1985).
*Helga Kuhse and *Peter Singer, "For Sometimes Letting-and Helping-Die," Law, Medicine, and Health Care 3, no. 4 (1986): 149-153.
*Michael Lockwood, "When Does Life Begin?" in Moral Dilemmas in Modern Medicine, edited by Michael Lockwood (New York 1985), 9-31.
*Michael Lockwood, "Warnock Versus Powell (and Harradine): When Does Potentiality Count?" Bioethics 2, no. 3 (1988): 187-213.
*Richard A. McCormick, S.J., Testimony, in National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research; Report and Recommendations; Research on the Fetus; U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (Washington, D.C. 1975), 5.
*Richard A. McCormick, SJ, "Who or What Is the Preembryo?" Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1 (1991): 1-15.
*Mario Moussa and *Thomas A. Shannon, "The Search for the New Pineal Gland: Brain Life and Personhood," Hastings Center Report 22, no. 3 (1992): 30-37.
Richard Neuhaus, "The Best Bioethicists That Money Can Buy," First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life (March 1, 2002): 71-72.
*Erik Parens and *Lori P. Knowles, "Reprogenetics and Public Policy: Reflections and Recommendations," The Hastings Center Report (HCR) Special supplement (July 1, 2003), available from http://www.thehastingscenter.org/research/reprogenetics-public-policy.asp (accessed April 2, 2008).
Philip G. Peters, Jr. "The Ambiguous Meaning of Human Conception," University of California Davis Law Review 40, no. 1 (2006): 199-228, available from http://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/Vol40/Issue1/DavisVol40No1_Peters.pdf. See also the abstract, at Social Science Research Network (SSRN), available from http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=694102; also available from Westlaw and Lexisnexis.
*Paul Ramsey, "Reference Points in Deciding About Abortion," in The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, edited by John T. Noonan, Jr. (Cambridge, Mass. 1970), 60-100.
*Paul Ramsey, Testimony, in National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research: Report and Recommendations: Research on the Fetus, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1975).
Margaret Foster Riley and Richard A. Merrill, "Regulating Reproductive Genetics: A Review of American Bioethics Commissions and Comparison to the British Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority," The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review 1, no. 6 (August 26, 2005), available from http://www.stlr.org/html/volume6/riley.txt (accessed March 31, 2008).
*John Robertson, "Extracorporeal Embryos and the Abortion Debate," Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy 2, no. 53 (1986) 53-70.
*John Robertson, "What We May Do with Preembryos: A Response to Richard A. McCormick," Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 1, no. 4 (December 1991): 295-302.
*John A. Robertson, "The Question of Human Cloning," Hastings Center Report 24, no. 2 (March/April 1994): 6-14.
*John A. Robertson, "Symbolic Issues in Embryo Research," Hastings Center Report 25, no. 1 (January/February 1995a): 37-38.
*John A. Robertson, "The Case of the Switched Embryos," Hastings Center Report 25, no. 6 (November/December1995b): 13-24.
David J. Rothman, Strangers at the Bedside: A History of How Law and Bioethics Transformed Medical Decision Making (New York 1991), 168-189.
William Saletan, "The Ethicist's New Clothes," Slate (August 17, 2001), available from http://slate.msn.com/?id=113959& (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Hans-Martin Sass, "Brain Life and Brain Death: A Proposal for Normative Agreement," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 14, no. 1 (February 1989): 45-59.
*Thomas A. Shannon and *Allan B. Wolter, "Reflections on the Moral Status of the Pre-Embryo," Theological Studies 51 (1990): 615.
*Peter Singer, "Taking Life: Abortion," in Practical Ethics, edited by Peter Singer (London 1981), 106-126.
*Peter Singer and *Helga Kuhse, "The Ethics of Embryo Research," Law, Medicine and Health Care 14 (1987): 13-14.
*Peter Singer, *Helga Kuhse, *Stephen Buckle, et al., eds., Embryo Experimentation (Cambridge, U.K. 1990), 3-4, 6-10, 14-24, 43-50, 59-60, 66-72, 96-106, esp. 252.
*Elizabeth Spahn and *Barbara Andrade, "Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in Religion, Science, and Law," University of San Francisco Law Review 32, (1998): pp. 261-295; Erroneously defining "conception" as "implantation."
*Antoine Suarez, "Hydatidiform Moles and Teratomas Confirm the Human Identity of the Preimplantation Embryo," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 15 (1990): 627-635.
*Carol Tauer, The Moral Status of the Prenatal Human (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1982), available from University Microfilms International (Doc. #8302778), http://wwwlib.umi.com/dxweb/gateway.
*Carol Tauer, "The Tradition of Probabilism and the Moral Status of the Early Embryo," in Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate, edited by Patricia B. Jung and Thomas A. Shannon (New York 1988), 54-84.
*Michael Tooley, "Abortion and Infanticide," in The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, edited by Marshall Cohen, Thomas Nagel, and Thomas Scanlon (Princeton, N.J. 1974).
*William A. Wallace, "Nature and Human Nature as the Norm in Medical Ethics," in, Catholic Perspectives on Medical Morals, edited by Edmund D. Pellegrino, John P. Langan, and John Collins Harvey (Boston 1989), 25-53.
*Congressman David Weldon, "Human Cloning Facts" (2005), available from http://www.nrlc.org/killing_embryos/Weldoncloningfacts022603.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Congressman David Weldon, *Senator Sam Brownback, Human Cloning Bans: [Rep. David Weldon, FL] Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001, HR 1644 IH, 107th CONGRESS, 1st Session, April 26, 2001; as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:2:./temp/~c1073WGJB2:: The Senate version of the bill was introduced in the Senate by Sen. Brownback; as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?c107:1:./temp/~c1073WGJB2::
Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2001 (Introduced in the Senate), S 790 IS, 107th CONGRESS, 1st Session, "To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit human cloning". Newer versions of these same bills, still containing the same erroneous formal scientific definitions, were introduced in 2007; [Rep. David Weldon, FL] Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007, HR 2564 IH, 110th CONGRESS, "To amend title 18, United States Code, to prohibit human cloning", June 5, 2007, as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:H.R.2564:; [Sen. Sam Brownback] Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007 (Introduced in Senate), S 1036 IS, 110th CONGRESS, 1st Session, "To amend the Public Health Service Act to prohibit human cloning", March 29, 2007, as posted on THOMAS at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c110:S.1036:
See Irving analysis of these cloning bills, "University Faculty for Life: Letter of Concern to Sen. Brownback and Congressman Weldon Re the 'Human Cloning Bill 2001'"; written as UFL Board Member on behalf of UFL; submitted to Sen. Brownback and Congr. Weldon, U.S. Congress, Washington, D.C. (May 27, 2001), at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_52weldonbrownback1.html; see also Irving, "Playing God by manipulating man: Facts and frauds of human cloning" (October 4, 2003), available at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_22manipulatingman1.html; also Irving, "What Human Embryo? Funniest Mental Gymnastics from Medicine and Research" (Oct. 14, 2004), available at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_82whathumanembryo1.html; also Irving, "Analysis of Legislative and Regulatory Chaos in the U.S.: Asexual Human Reproduction and Genetic Engineering" (Oct. 20, 2004), available at: http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_81chaosasexgen1.html.
*Kevin Wildes, "Book Review: Human Life: Its Beginning and Development," Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 26, no. 1, http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713658121~db=all~tab=issueslist~branches=26 - v26Supplement 1 (February 2001): 3-33.
Joel Rothstein Wolfson, "Social and Ethical Issues in Nanotechnology: Lessons from Biotechnology and Other High Technologies," Biotechnology Law Report 22, no. 4 (August 1, 2003): 376-396; Describes possible "nano-cloning" of human beings, available from http://www.liebertonline.com/doi/abs/10.1089/073003103769015906 (accessed February 5, 2008).
C. Organizations and Institutions
*American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, "Ethics", in Obstetrics and Gynecology, 2nd ed., No. 97 (2004), pp. 957, 958; Erroneously defines "preembryo" as "product of fertilization before 14 days and arrival of primitive streak."
*American Fertility Society, Ethics Committee, "Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies," Fertility and Sterility 46, Supplement 1 (September1986): 27S, (name changed to American Society of Reproductive Medicine in 1990s; still publish their scientific journal, Fertility and Sterility; chairs of ethics committees included Richard McCormick, S.J. and Clifford Grobstein).
*American Medical Association, Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, CEJA Report 1-I-94, "Pre-Embryo Splitting" (1994), available from http://www.ama-assn.org/apps/pf_new/pf_online?f_n=browse&doc=policyfiles/HnE/E-2.145.HTM (accessed February 5, 2008); Endorses "pre-embryo splittting" as infertility treatment.
*American Society of Reproductive Medicine, Ethics Committee Report, "Human Somatic Cell Nuclear Transfer," Fertility and Sterility 74, no. 5 (November 2000): 873-876, available from http://www.asrm.org/Media/Ethics/cloning.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
*American Society for Reproductive Medicine, Ethics Committee, "Embryo Splitting for Infertility Treatment," Fertility and Sterility 82, Supplement 1 (September 2004): S256-7, available from PubMed #15363746.
*American Society of Reproductive Medicine, "Chapter 16: Experimentation on the Preembryo," Fertility and Sterility 87, no. 4, Supplement 1 (April 2007): S52-S58.
*British House of Lords, The Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001, no. 188, summary available from http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2001/20010188.htm (accessed February 5, 2008) (now out of print but can order photocopies; see Irving 2001b for details of the regulations, based on pre-embryo).
*California Advisory Committee, Cloning Californians: Report of the California Advisory Committee on Human Cloning (Sacramento, Calif. January 11, 2002); Chaired by Irving Weissman, terms "preembryo" and "ball of cells" to refer to the early embryo used throughout report, available from http://scbe.stanford.edu/conference/cloning_cali.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
Commonwealth of Australia, Senate Select Committee on the Human Embryo Experimentation Bill 1985, Official Hansard Report, Human Embryo Experimentation in Australia (Canberra 1986).
Commonwealth of Australia, The Cloning of Humans (Prohibition) Bill 2001 (Queensland 2001), available from http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/Bills/50PDF/2001/CloningB01.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
Council of Europe, Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, on the Prohibition of Cloning Human Beings, European Treaty Series no. 168 (1998), available from http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Word/168.doc (accessed February 5, 2008).
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1046 (1986): On the Use of Human Embryos and Fetuses for Diagnostic, Therapeutic, Scientific, Industrial and Commercial Purposes (1986), available from http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta86/erec1046.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Recommendation 1100 (1989): On the Use of Human Embryos and Foetuses in Scientific Research (1989), available from http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta89/EREC1100.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
Council of Research, Technology, and Innovation, German Research Foundation, Cloning of Humans: Biological Foundations and Ethico-legal Assessment, (April 1997), available from http://www.dfg.de/aktuelles_presse/reden_stellungnahmen/ archiv/download/klonierung_beim_menschen_97e.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Department of Health and Social Security, Select Committee on Science and Technology, "Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology" Warnock Report, Cmnd 9314 (July 1984): 4, 27, 63.
Food and Drug Administration, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health, Workshop on Evidence Based Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ART) (Washington, D.C. September 18, 2002), available from http://www.fda.gov/cber/minutes/art091802.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
German National Ethics Council, Cloning for Reproductive Purposes and Cloning for the Purposes of Biomedical Research (Berlin 2004), available from http://www.ethikrat.org/_english/publications/Opinion_Cloning.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Gerontology Research Group, GRG Editorial: "Let's Defuse the Rhetoric by Sharpening Our Vocabulary" (December 2001), available from http://www.grg.org/breakingnews2001.htm (accessed February 5, 2008).
*Institute of Medicine and National Research Council, Committee on the Basic Science Foundations of Medically Assisted Conception, Report of a Study and Workshop Papers, "Medically Assisted Conception: An Agenda for Research," (1989), available from http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=1433 (accessed February 5, 2008).
*National Academy of Sciences, Commission on Life Sciences, "Comparison of Stem Cell Production With Reproductive Cloning," in Stem Cells and the Future of Regenerative Medicine (2002a), available from http://books.nap.edu/books/0309076307/html/11.html#pagetop (accessed February 5, 2008).
*National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy, Scientific and Medical Aspects of Human Reproductive Cloning: How Is Reproductive Cloning Done? (2002b), available from http://books.nap.edu/books/0309076374/html/25.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
*National Bioethics Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (Rockville, Md. June 1997), p. 3.
*National Institutes of Health, Human Embryo Research Panel Meetings (Washington, D.C. 1994), using term "pre-embryo" in: February 2 meeting, pp. 27, 31, 50-80, 85-87, 104-106; February meeting. 3, 1994 meeting, pp. 6-55; April 11 meeting, pp. 23-41, 9-22.
*National Institutes of Health, Office of Science Policy Analysis, Cloning: Present Uses and Promises (Washington, D.C. January 29, 1998), p. 3; available from http://ospp.od.nih.gov/policy/cloning.asp (accessed February 5, 2008).
*National Institutes of Health, Office of Science Policy Analysis, Cloning: Present Uses and Promises (Washington, D.C. April 27, 1998), available from http://ospp.od.nih.gov/policy/cloning.asp (accessed February 5, 2008).
*National Science Foundation and U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science, edited by Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridge (Washington, D.C., June 2002), available from http://wtec.org/ConvergingTechnologies/1/NBIC_report.pdf (accessed February 5, 2008).
*New Zealand Parliament, "Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Bill (1996); Supplementary Order Paper 2003, no. 80, May 14, 2003, Bills Digest No. 972, available from http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/1FA29ADF-DB31-4186-AA33-AE523F9D2799/49206/972HumanAssistedReproduction3.pdf.
The President's Council on Bioethics, "Executive Summary: Fair and Accurate Terminology; Scientific Background," in Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry (Washington, D.C. July 2002), available from http://www.bioethics.gov/reports/cloningreport/execsummary.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
*The Twins Foundation, "New Ways to Produce Identical Twins-A Continuing Controversy" Research Update 9, no. 1 (1994), available from http://twinsfoundation.com/researchupdate/ru-v9n1-1994.htm; also, see details of this article that discusses the use of cloning by "twinning" in infertility treatments in: Dianne N. Irving, "Legally Valid Informed Consent: Individual Testimony Before the New Jersey State Senate Health and Human Services Committee on Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research, Ethical and Public Policy Considerations", New Jersey State Senate Committee on Health And Human Services, Trenton, New Jersey (Novermber 4, 2002), Footnote 19, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_14legalconsent1.html; also in Dianne N. Irving, "Framing the Debates on Human Cloning and Human Embryonic Stem Cells: Pluripotent vs. Totipotent" (July 23, 2005), pp. 27-28, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_100debatecloning1.html.
*U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Ethics Advisory Board, "Report and Conclusions: HEW Support of Research Involving Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer" Federal Register 44 (Washington, D.C. 1979): 35033-35058.
Aristotle, Analytica Posteriora, in The Basic Works of Aristotle edited by Richard McKeon (New York 1941), 2.19, 100a 3-9. See also: Aristotle, Categories, in Aristotle by Sir David Ross (New York: 1985), 20-21.
Aristotle, (a) Physica, (b) Metaphysica, (c) De Anima, in The Basic Works of Aristotle, edited by Richard McKeon (New York 1941).
George Boas, "Rene Descartes", in Paul Edwards (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1967); Vol. 1, pp. 344-354.
Boethius, "Contra Eutychen et Nestorium," in Boethius: The Theological Tractates and the Consolation of Philosophy, edited and translated by H.F. Stewart, E.K. Rand, and S.J. Tester (Cambridge, Mass. 1973).
W. Jerome Bracken, "Is the Early Embryo a Person?" The Linacre Quarterly 68, no. 1 (February 2001): 62, 66.
William Brennan, Dehumanizing the Vulnerable: When Word Games Take Lives (Niagra Falls, New York: Life Cycle Books, Ltd., November 2000).
Georges Cardinal Cottier, quoted by W. Redzioch, in Inside the Vatican 14, no. 4 (April 2006): 32.
Kevin Doran, "Person-A Key Concept for Ethics," The Linacre Quarterly 56, no. 4 (1989): 38-49.
Daniel Garber and Margaret Wilson, "Mind-body problems", in Daniel Garber, Michael Ayers, Roger Ariew, The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-century Philosophy, Vol. 1 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. pp. 833-867.
Mary Louise Gill, Aristotle on Substance (Princeton University Press, 1989), esp. p. 173.
Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur le role de la pensee medievale dans la formation du systeme cartesien, "Etudes de Philosophy medievale, XIII (Paris: J. Vrin, 1930), pp. 1-336.
Marjorie Grene, A Portrait of Aristotle (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), esp. p. 175.
Gary Hatfield, Descartes and the Meditations (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1-353, esp. pp. 3ff.
S. Heaney, "Aquinas and the Presence of the Human Rational Soul in the Early Embryo," The Thomist 56, no. 1 (January 1992): 19-48.
David B. Hershenov and Rose J. Koch, "How a Hylomorphic Metaphysics Constrains the Abortion Debate," National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 5, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 751-764.
Dianne N. Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Early Human Embryo (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1991): 1-400; addresses in painful detail the philosophical, scientific and logical errors prevalent in over 28 different bioetics arguments for "delayed personhood"; see especially "Appendix A", documenting line-by-line how Aristotle's odd "delayed personhood" conclusions (and thus also those of Thomas Acquinas, whose realist system of philosophy is similar to but also different from that of Aristotle, and who unfortunately follwed Aristotle in this Platonic streak) in a couple of his treatises directly contradicts the vast majority of his other treaties that would have required this realist philosopher/biologist to argue philosophically for "immediate personhood" instead, as also acknowledged and documented by many Aristotelean scholars for centuries (see works of Gill, of Witt, and of Greene listed in this bibliography). Obviously neither Aristotle nor Thomas had access to the current known accurate objective scientific facts of human embryology — the systematically required "starting point" for any realist philosopher — as documented now, e.g., in the work of Wilhelm His (1883), the Carnegie Stages of Early Human Embryonic Development, the many current human embryology text books listed above (in the section on "Science"), etc. Rather, both held that there were only four material elements in the material world: air, earth, fire and water. This has serious implications today for those who persist in using either Aristotle or Thomas to argue for "delayed personhood". "Appendix A" is in process of re-publication individually.
Dianne N. Irving (a), "Scientific and Philosophical Expertise: An Evaluation of the Arguments on 'Personhood'," The Linacre Quarterly 60, no. 1 (February 1993): 18-46; PubMed ID 16035170; (a mini-summary of her doctoral dissertation) available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_04person1.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Dianne N. Irving, "Abortion: Correct Application of Natural Law Theory," The Linacre Quarterly 67, no. 1 (February 2000a): 45-55, PubMed ID: 12199284, available from http://www.lifeissues.net/writers/irv/irv_08natlaw.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
George Peter Klubertanz, The Philosophy of Human Nature (New York 1953).
George Peter Klubertanz, Introduction to the Philosophy of Being (New York 1963): 293-298.
Thomas K. Nelson, "A Human Being Must Be a Person," The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 293-314.
Josef Pieper, Abuse of Language - Abuse of Power (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), pp. 7, 18-20, 34-35.
Jean Porter and Mark Johnson, "Quaestio Disputata-Delayed Hominization: Reflections on Some Recent Catholic Claims for Delayed Hominization," Theological Studies 56 (1995): 743-763.
Augustine Regan, "The Human Conceptus and Personhood," Studia Moralia 30 (1992): 122.
E. Rossini, "Engineering Embryos to Fail?" Catholic World Report 16, no. 9 (Oct. 2006): 26.
David L. Schindler, "Agere sequitur esse: What Does It Mean? A Reply to Father Austriaco," Communio 32, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 820.
K. Schmitz, "Immateriality Past and Present," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 52 (1978): 3.
Norman Kemp Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy (London: Macmillan 1902), revised (New York: Garland, 1987), pp. 1-276; see also, New Studies in the Philosophy of Descartes (London: Macmillan, 1952), revised (New York: Garland, 1987), pp. 1-369.
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Md. 1981).
Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, translated by Armand Maurer (Toronto 1983).
Thomas Aquinas, The Division and Method of the Sciences, translated by Armand Maurer (Toronto 1986).
Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bk. VIII, lect.1, edited by Cathala, Nos. 1688-1689, in Klubertanz 1963.
Frederick Wilhelmsen, Man's Knowledge of Reality: An Introduction to Thomistic Epistemology (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.1956).
Charlotte Witt, Substance and Essence in Aristotle (New York: Cornell University Press, 1989).
For extensive sources of Vatican documents, see Kevin D. O'Rourke and Philip Boyle, Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic Teaching (St. Louis, Mo. 1989).
Pontifical Academy for Life, Reflections on Cloning (September 1997a), available from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/ rc_pa_acdlife_doc_30091997_clon_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Pontifical Academy for Life, Observations on the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights (November 11, 1997b), available from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/ rc_pa_acdlife_doc_08111998_genoma_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Pontifical Academy for Life, Notes on Cloning (September 1998), available from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/ rc_pa_acdlife_doc_28091998_cloning-notes_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Pontifical Academy for Life, Declaration on the Production and the Scientific and Therapeutic Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells (August 25, 2000a), available from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/ rc_pa_acdlife_doc_20000824_cellule-staminali_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
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Pontifical Academy for Life, "Declaration on the Production and the Scientific and Therapeutic Use of Human Embryonic Stem Cells", (August 21, 2000c), p. 17, available from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_academies/acdlife/documents/ rc_pa_acdlife_doc_20000824_cellule-staminali_en.html.
Pontifical Academy for Life, Moral Reflection on Vaccines Prepared From Cells Derived From Aborted Human Foetuses, June 2005, available from http://www.cogforlife.org/vaticanresponse.htm.
Pontifical Academy for Life, "Final Declaration of the Twelfth General Assembly," in L'Osservatore Romano English edition 17.1941 (April 26, 2006), 6.
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Pope John XXIII, Mater et magistra, On Christianity and Social Progress (Encyclical, May 15, 1961), III: AAS 53 (1961), available from http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_xxiii/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Pope John Paul II, "Responsible Procreation" (June 8, 1984), Insegnamenti di Giovanni Paolo II, in The Pope Speaks, 29, no.3 (1984).
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of Human Life (Encyclical, March 25, 1995), available from http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_25031995_evangelium-vitae_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
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Between Faith and Reason (Encyclical, September 14, 1998), available from http://www.vatican.va/edocs/ENG0216/_INDEX.HTM (accessed February 5, 2008).
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Pope Paul VI, Professio fidei: AAS 60 (1968).
Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et spes, On the Church in the Modern World (Pastoral Constitution, December 7, 1965), available from http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/ vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Pope Paul VI, Humanae vitae, On the Regulation of Birth (Encyclical, July 1968), available from http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Pope Pius XI, Casti Connubii, On Christian Marriage (Encyclical, December 31, 1930), available from http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_31121930_casti-connubii_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
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Pope Pius XII, Humani generis, Concerning Some False Opinions Threatening to Undermine the Foundations of Catholic Doctrine (Encyclical, August 12, 1950) AAS 42, available from http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/pius_xii/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xii_enc_12081950_humani-generis_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
Pope Pius XII, "Fertility and Sterility" (May 19, 1956), The Human Body: Papal Teachings (1960), 387-390, in Medical Ethics: Sources of Catholic Teaching edited by O'Rourke and Boyle (St. Louis, Mo. 1989), 230.
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*Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Donum vitae, On Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Procreation (Instruction, February 1987), available from http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/ rc_con_cfaith_doc_19870222_respect-for-human-life_en.html (accessed February 5, 2008).
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© September 15, 2008 — Dianne N. Irving
This item 8541 digitally provided courtesy of CatholicCulture.org
