Religious Freedom and Human Rights
Professor Wolfe finds the discussion of religious freedom in The Pope, The Council, and the Mass,1 written by two officers of Catholics United for the Faith (CUF), incomplete in resolving difficulties which appear between the teaching in Dignitatis humanae of Vatican II and certain earlier papal teachings. We fully agree. The book was written primarily in response to questions raised by some Catholics who are confused about the official doctrine and discipline of the Church with regard to changes in the liturgy of the Mass following Vatican II. Certain other questions which have an indirect bearing on the liturgical questions were treated, as it were, in passing; the question of religious freedom was one of these. The basic thrust of Question 20 in The Pope, The Council, and The Mass is to show that different questions were being addressed by the Vatican II Declaration on Religious Liberty and by earlier papal teachings which seem to be in conflict with that Declaration. The earlier Popes were upholding the right of governments to oppose error; Vatican II was upholding the rights of the individual to worship God according to the right dictates of his conscience. In the book, CUF did not intend to give a definitive resolution to the difficulties which arise from the two teachings but only to show that there is not necessarily a contradiction and to indicate the direction in which a solution may be found.
Professor Wolfe presents two principles as setting general, but very definitive, limits to any discussion attempting to resolve the seeming conflict between the two different teachings. The first principle, he says, is that "individual men and societies have a duty to worship God as He has wanted to be worshipped, in the form of the Catholic religion, the only true religion." The second principle is that "no one may ever be compelled to acknowledge or accept the true religion." He then states that the question at issue is the following: "Should the ideal or best civil society, under the guidance of the teaching of the true Catholic Faith, prohibit a particular kind of religious freedom, namely public teaching and proselytism by those who hold to false religious belief (e.g., schismatic or heretical sects, or infidels)."
In stating the questions and principles in this way, Professor Wolfe seems to be drawing exclusively on a study of papal texts which appear to conflict with Dignitatis humanae. However, he fails to note that Dignitatis humane itself introduces new, more fundamental principles, and hence new limits to the discussion. As a matter of fact, it also proposes a different question: whether, in fact, "all men should be immune from coercion on the part of individuals, social groups and every human power so that, within due limits, nobody is impeded from acting according to his conscience in religious matters in private or in public, alone or in association with others"(DH, #2).
The above teaching of the Council rests upon three principles which are set forth in Dignitatis humane, #2. These principles are the following: "It is in accordance with their dignity that all men, because they are persons, that is, beings endowed with reason and free will and therefore bearing personal responsibility, are both impelled by their nature and bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth, especially religious truth"; "They are also bound to adhere to the truth once they come to know it and direct their whole lives in accordance with the demands of truth"; and, "men cannot satisfy this obligation in a ways that is in keeping with their own nature unless they enjoy both psychological freedom and immunity from external coercion."
For the sake of the present discussion we will assume that these principles are evident to all Catholics. Indeed, the obligation by which all men are bound to seek the true religion, and, finding it, to order their lives accordingly, is simply an extension of the more fundamental principles stated above that all men are bound by a moral obligation to seek the truth and to adhere to it. And the obligation of the state to not hinder men in their practice of the Catholic faith is an extension of its obligation not to hinder men from seeking and adhering to religious truth.
Some have taken a very narrow view of the controversy by presenting it in terms of the question "whether anyone has the right to believe and promote error." It would, of course, be absurd to defend such a proposition. But it is, in fact, right here that the dilemma arises; for, are not those who believe in, teach, and proselytize for non-Catholic religions believing and promoting error? Of course. And does not civil society have a right to oppose error, and an obligation to do so in matters affecting the common good? Indeed, it does. But what, then, of the Council's teaching that no one is to be impeded from acting according to his conscience in religious matters in public, whether alone or in association with others? Where religious error is involved, the rights and obligations of civil society seem to be in fundamental conflict with the rights and obligations of the individual.
In order to resolve this apparent conflict it is necessary to see the two different teachings in their proper perspective. For this, it is necessary to consider carefully the basis for the Vatican II teaching, viz.: "the right to religious freedom has its foundation not in the subjective attitude of the individual but in his very nature"(DH,4 2).
The Nature of a Right
What do we mean when we say that someone has a right to something? What constitutes a right? The answer to this question provides the key to understanding the whole doctrine on religious freedom and to resolving the difficulties presented by the apparent conflict between this doctrine and previous papal teachings.
No one can have a right to something unless it belongs to him in some way. No one has a right to something from the mere fact that he wants it, or that somebody else would like him to have it. This is most easily seen in the matter of material goods, where we hear it said, for example, that someone has a right to a certain piece of property. As St. Thomas Aquinas says in Summa Theologica: (Q.21, A. 1): "To each one is due what is his own"; that is, each one has a right to that which belongs to him.
In the same Question and Article of the Summa, St. Thomas says: ". . . it is due to a created thing that it should possess what is ordered to it." And he explains that where we are considering the works of God, "what is due to each thing is due to it as ordered to it according to the divine wisdom." Now whatever is ordered to man as belonging to his human nature is his by right. This is especially evident in the case of those things without which man could not achieve the purpose for which he was made. We thus say that every man has the right to life, the right to liberty (rightly understood), the right to choose his own vocation, and on the highest plane the right to worship God. And as man has a right to those things which belong to him in virtue of his human nature, he cannot have a right to what is opposed to his human nature.
Now the seat of our difficulty with the Decree on Religious Liberty is just this: error is in no way ordered to man. The intellect was given to man in order for him to know the truth, so he cannot have a right before God to belong to any church he chooses. Only one religion is ordered to man by God, as the Decree on Religious Liberty explicitly indicates. Therefore man has a right to practice only one religion: the true religion established by Our Lord Jesus Christ.
How, then, does one who does not practice the true religion have a right to religious freedom? Does this doctrine not imply that he has a right to believe error and to engage in false religious practices? Not at all! There are, in fact, two ways in which men who do not accept the true faith may yet exercise freedom of conscience in religious matters in perfect conformity with the rights accorded to human nature by the divine wisdom.
During the third session of the Second Vatican Council, when the draft of the proposed decree on religious freedom was being discussed, Cardinal Ottaviani drew a helpful distinction between what he called the objective right to religious freedom as opposed to the subjective right to religious freedom.2 The objective right, i.e., the right derived from the object toward which the right is directed, belongs only to those for whom the object is true. Where the object is a particular religion, only those who are members of the true revealed religion, which God Himself has ordained for the perfection of human nature, can have any right to religious freedom. One cannot have an objective right to practice a false religion, because insofar as it is false it is in no way ordered to him by God, who is the first principle of all that is ordered to men.
The subjective right to religious freedom, on the other hand, is derived from what God has ordered to man as belonging to his human nature itself; that is, subjective right pertains to the nature of the subject by whom the right is exercised. And God has given to all men conscience and free will. From this follows the right of every man who has attained the use of reason to choose his own actions freely in accordance with his conscience.
Not only has every man the right to follow his conscience, even in religious matters; he has the obligation to do so. This obligation to follow the directions of one's conscience is binding even when conscience is objectively in error, as St. Thomas teaches (S.T. I-II, Q. 19, A.5).
Every man is bound to act in accordance with what he believes to be morally good, and to act contrary to one's conscience is to act in a way one believes to be morally wrong, even if the action is objectively good in itself. For example, an orthodox Jew who embraced the Catholic faith while still believing in Judaism as the true religion would commit a grave offense against God, even though objectively he had renounced error and embraced the truth. Thus the Second General Council of Nicaea, in 787, legislated in one of its canons about Jews pretending to be Christians, but secretly keeping the Sabbath and other Jewish observances: "Such people must not be received into the communion, nor in prayer, nor in the Church, but let them be Hebrews openly, according to their own religion."3
In this sense, then, every man has a subjective right to religious freedom in worshipping God according to the directions of his conscience, even if objectively speaking his religious convictions may be in error. In granting the existence of this subjective right, however, we must also acknowledge the duty of individuals, groups and of civil society to hinder anyone from doing harm to himself or to others in following his conscience — even in religious matters. Thus, this right would not seem to conflict with the rights of civil society as expressed in the earlier papal teachings.
But let us take another look at the objective right to religious freedom. In his Encyclical Redemptor hominis Pope John Paul II says: "the curtailment and violation of religious freedom are in contrast with man's dignity and his objective rights" (#17). We have seen that no one can have an objective right to follow a false religion. How then can every man have an objective right to religious freedom, regardless of his religious beliefs, within the limits only of public order?
An objective right, as we have seen, refers to a true object. And the object of religion is the worship of God, which is the right and obligation of every man, whatever his religious beliefs. Even the atheist has this right and obligation (viz., to worship God). The Decree on Religious Liberty states that man must not be prevented from acting according to his conscience in religious matters "because the practice of religion of its very nature consists primarily of those voluntary and free internal acts by which a man directs himself to God," and adds: "Acts of this kind cannot be commanded or forbidden by any merely human authority"(#3). The words "any merely human authority" are important. Professor Wolfe phrased the question at issue, as he saw it, in terms of a civil society "under the guidance of the teachings of the true Catholic faith" — i.e. a divine authority.
The worship of God by any man, whatever his religious beliefs, is objectively a good and worthy action, and one commanded by God. This is true whether such worship be offered privately or publicly, whether alone or in association with others. Thus the Decree states: "The freedom or immunity from coercion in religious matters which belongs to individuals must also be accorded to them whey they act in community" (#4).4 Some English translations of this document render this incorrectly to read that religious freedom must be accorded to "men" when they act in community. But this seems to be imprecise. For it is not every community which has of itself a right to religious freedom but rather the individuals who make up the community have such a right, which is not the same thing. The only community which has of itself a right to religious freedom is the One True Church founded by Jesus Christ. Other communities have a right to religious freedom only in virtue of the right of individuals to worship God in common — a right which bears with it the obligation to seek the One True Church.
We must bear in mind that this religious freedom is based on the "dignity of the human person" (DH, #2) and not on any supposed dignity of the religious community. Insofar as any religion is not the true revealed religion it has no right even to exist. This does not, however, obstruct the right of the members of such a religion to worship God according to the right dictates of their consciences.
We have seen, then, that the right to religious freedom cannot imply freedom to believe or practice error. Moreover, we have seen that even one who is in error about the true religion has a right to worship God according to his conscience, objectively as well as subjectively: subjectively with respect to the dictates of his conscience, objectively with respect to God himself, and those aspects of his-religious beliefs which are true. The formal teachings of the Church condemning erroneous theses of religious freedom and freedom of conscience in religious matters should not, therefore, be misconstrued as a condemnation of the true doctrine set forth by Vatican II in the Decree on Religious Liberty. What was condemned by the Church in the past (and remains condemned) is the false doctrine that conscience is absolutely independent of any external objective guide; that the Catholic Church, therefore, has no right to direct the moral and religious activities of men; and that all religions are thus more or less equal in the eyes of the State.
Religious Freedom
This distinction between the true notion of religious freedom and the false notion of religious freedom was drawn by Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical Non Abbiamo Bisogno, in 1931, when he said:
. . . We have said recently that We are happy and proud to fight the good fight for the liberty of consciences, not (as some, perhaps by inadvertence, have made Us say) for liberty of conscience, which is an equivocal expression, and one too often abused to signify absolute independence of conscience, an absurd thing in a soul created and redeemed by God.5
Men have the right to follow their consciences without external interference. The conscience itself, however, is not free to ignore objective truth in making moral judgments. Indeed, the Council teaches that "in forming their consciences the faithful must pay careful attention to the sacred and certain teaching of the Church"(DH, #14). And so it was what Pope Leo XIII declared:
If when men discuss the question of liberty they were careful to grasp its true and legitimate meaning, such as reason and reasoning have just explained, they would never venture to affix such calumny on the Church as to assert that she is the foe of individual and public liberty.6
The Decree on Religious Liberty makes it quite clear that it is speaking about the true idea of religious freedom and freedom of conscience. Freedom, absolutely speaking, excludes the notion of ignorance and error. For freedom is the state of intelligent beings who are not hindered from fulfilling their responsibilities and exercising their rights (cf., DH, #6). The previous condemnations of religious freedom by the Church must therefore be understood to be referring to the false notion of freedom, which holds that the human will is not limited in its choices by any higher law.
What, then, of the obligations of the State to grant recognition and protection to all churches and religious communities? If only the true religion has of itself a right to exist, in what sense do other religions have a right to recognition and protection?
The Decree on Religious Liberty states that "the religious freedom which men demand in fulfilling their obligation to worship God has to do with freedom from coercion in civil society . . ." (#1). Pope Paul VI, speaking to the College of Cardinals on December 20, 1976, said with reference to the Decree on Religious Liberty: "It is a question of a right with regard to human authorities, in particular, that of the State; and of a right — which is at the same time, even more, a serious moral duty — which has as its object the search for the true religion . . ."7
If all men have a right, and a serious moral duty, to worship God, and to seek to find out how He wants to be worshipped, then the State has a moral obligation to protect this right of its citizens.
But does the State not have an obligation to give special protection and assistance to the true religion? Objectively speaking, yes. But this implies that the State already recognizes which religion is the true revealed religion of God, which the State cannot do by virtue of its natural powers alone. And the Second Vatican Council was addressing itself to the State as it is in itself, possessed solely of its natural power and authority. The Council thus taught that:
the private and public acts of religion by which men direct themselves to God according to their convictions transcend of their very nature the earthly and temporal order of things. Therefore the civil authority, the purpose of which is the care of the common good in the temporal order, must recognize and look with favor on the religious life of the citizens. But if it presumes to control or restrict religious activity it must be said to have exceeded the limits of its power (DH, #3).
And in his General Audience of August 1, 1971, Pope Paul VI said: ". . . man's relationship with God should neither be restricted nor forbidden by the external authority of the State which is incompetent in the religious field. This is the basic reason for the Conciliar Decree on religious liberty in civil society."8
We must bear in mind, however, that the right to religious freedom is not based on the incompetence of the State in the religious field, but on the right of every individual to seek God according to the right dictates of his conscience in order to know, love and serve Him as He wishes. Thus, the Council teaches that "If because of the circumstances of a particular people special civil recognition is given to one religious community in the constitutional organization of a state, the right of all citizens and religious communities to religious freedom must be recognized and respected as well" (DH, #6).
The Council teaches that men direct themselves to God not only by private acts but also by public acts, and that the right to religious freedom embraces both kinds of acts (cf., DH,#3,4). And it teaches that: "The exercise of this right cannot be interfered with as long as the just requirements of public order are observed" (D.H., #2). Some have objected that the obligations of the State extend not only to public order, but to the common good, which embraces public order. The Council does not deny this. Rather, the Council explicitly teaches that the common good requires protection of the right to religious freedom:
The common good of society consists in the sum total of those conditions of social life which enable men to achieve a fuller measure of perfection with greater ease. It consists especially in safeguarding the right and duties of the human person. For this reason the protection of the right to religious freedom is the common responsibility of individual citizens, social groups, civil authorities, the Church and other religious communities. Each of these has its own special responsibility in the matter according to its particular duty to promote the common good (DH, #6).
The Decree on Religious Liberty thus recognizes the right and obligation of the State to promote the common good, but stipulates that this cannot be done without protecting the right to religious freedom. The obligation of the State to protect religious freedom is not presented in terms of protecting a right to error, but rather in terms of protecting a right to seek and adhere to the truth, according to the right dictates of conscience. As we have seen, this right cannot be denied. But even here there are limits. The Council teaches that:
The right to freedom in matters of religion is exercised in human society. For this reason its use is subject to certain regulatory norms . . . Since civil society has the right to protect itself against possible abuses committed in the name of religious freedom, the responsibility of providing such protection rests especially with the civil authority (DH, #7).
The Council goes on in the same place to teach that in protecting society from possible abuses committed in the name of religious freedom the civil authority must act "in accordance with legal principles which are in conformity with the objective moral order." It states that such principles are necessary for the effective protection of the rights of all citizens and for all peaceful settlements of conflicts of rights; for adequate protection of a just public peace; and for the protection of public morality. The Council explains that this refers to that aspect of the common good called public order.
What is to be said, then, of the rights and obligations of civil society with regard to public teaching and proselytism by those who hold to false religious beliefs? As mentioned earlier, it is precisely here that the rights and duties of civil society seem to come into conflict with the rights of individuals to religious freedom.
It is interesting in this regard to note that in enumerating the rights which follow from the right to religious freedom the Council never mentions a right to proselytize — i.e., a right to make converts to one's religious beliefs. Since Our Lord commanded His disciples to teach and baptize all nations, His true Church certainly has a right and obligation to proselytize. The right of others religious communities in this regard, however, would seem to be largely subjective, i.e., based on a conscientious, but erroneous, conviction about God's will. Yet, who can deny that other (non-Catholic) Christian communities have an objective right to preach the Gospel and to baptize all who accept it (and have not been previously baptized)?
But while the Council does not defend a right to proselytize, it does defend a right to the religious actions involved in proselytizing. Specifically, it teaches that:
The search for truth . . . must be carried out in a manner that is appropriate to the dignity of the human person and his social nature, namely, by free enquiry with the help of teaching and instruction, communication and dialogue. It is by these means that men share with each other the truth they have discovered, or think they have discovered, in such a way that they help one another in the search for truth (DH, #3).
Since every man is obliged to seek religious truth, and this requires that he openly and freely communicate with and dialogue with others, every man has a right to such open communication and dialogue about religious matters. The fact that some men may teach error does not abrogate this right of all to open and free religious discussion.
The Council does caution that:
in spreading religious belief and in introducing religious practices everybody must at all times avoid any action which seems to suggest coercion or dishonest or unworthy persuasion especially when dealing with the uneducated or the poor. Such a manner of acting must be considered an abuse of one's own right and an infringement of the rights of others (DH, #4).
And a little further on in the same document the Council states that: "in exercising their rights individual men and social groups are bound by the moral law to have regard for the rights of others, their own duties to others and the common good of all"(#7).
Thus the Council condemns as an abuse any "coercion or dishonest or unworthy persuasion, especially when dealing with the uneducated or the poor," and it recognizes the right of the civil authority to protect society from such abuses (Cf. DH, #7). The Council thus established limits to the public promotion of religious beliefs — limits which apply as well to Catholics as to non-Catholics.
Conclusion
But the Church wishes to promote honest discussion of religious beliefs and religious questions among all men as a means of bringing them to the truth. She does not fear such discussions, since her teachings are supported not only by the force of human reason, but also by the power of the Holy Spirit. She is confident that such discussion can only be beneficial to men and women of good will who honestly seek the truth. She realizes that the religious truth which is possessed in some measure by other religious communities — and in no small measure by other Christian communities — can be very beneficial in preparing the ground for acceptance of the Catholic faith. Hence the Council teaches that "the principle of religious liberty contributes in no small way to the development of a situation in which men can without hindrance be invited to the Christian faith, embrace it of their own free will and give it practical expression in every sphere of their lives."(DH, #10).
In conclusion, therefore — and in answer to Professor Wolfe's key question — it would seem that according to Catholic doctrine the ideal or best civil society, under the guidance of the teaching of the true Catholic Faith, may not prohibit public teaching, whether oral or written, by those who hold to false religious belief as long as such teaching does not involve coercion or dishonest or unworthy persuasion such as may occur when such teaching is directed at the uneducated or the poor, and as long as such teaching does not involve the violation of the right of others or of that aspect of the common good called public order.
While this presentation may not answer all of the difficulties presented by the earlier papal teachings which seem to conflict with the Vatican II Decree on Religious Liberty, it should make clear that it is the earlier teaching, rather than the more recent teaching, which is in need of careful qualification. As indicated in The Pope, the Council, and the Mass, a careful contextual evaluation of 19th century Papal texts on religious freedom only reinforces the truth that Vatican II did not contradict the doctrinal teaching of earlier popes. We are convinced that such an evaluation made in the light of the above principles will vindicate the Council's claim to have presented the Church's authentic doctrine on religious freedom in the light of a fuller and richer development of traditional principles rooted in natural law and Revelation.
Notes
- James Likoudis and Kenneth D. Whitehead, The Pope, the Council, and the Mass: Answers to the Question the "Traditionalists" Are Asking (W. Hanover: The Christopher Publishing House, 1982.)
- Ralph Wiltgen, S.V.D., The Rhine Flows into the Tiber (New York: Hawthorne Books, Inc., 1967), p. 164.
- The Second General Council of Nicea, Canon 8; in The Christian Faith in the Doctrinal Documents of the Catholic Church, J. Neuner, S.J., and J. Dupuis, S.J., eds. (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, Inc., 1975), p. 267.
- ". . . etiam ipsis in communi agentibus agnoscanda est."
- Pope Pius IX, Encyclical Non abbiamo bisogno; in Papal Teachings: The Church, The Benedictine of Solesmes, eds.; (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1962), p. 479.
- Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Libertas praestantissimum; in The Church Speaks to the Modern World: The Social Teaching of Leo XIII, Etienne Gilson, ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1954), n. 14, p. 66.
- L'Osservatore Romano; December 30, 1976.
- L'Osservatore Romano; August 26, 1971.
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