Cuba: A Country in Chains
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Three years ago, the island republic of Cuba fell to Communism. The majority of the people in the United States were led, through erroneous reporting, into hailing this little country's "liberation." And two years later, many were still in doubt as to whether the revolution was "taken over" because of lack of support from the free world, or whether it was actually Communist from its inception.
Only the most naive can doubt, at this point, that Cuba is completely within the Communist orbit. But there is still great misunderstanding as to how this situation came about; and it is absolutely vital that the people of the United States understand it, if they are to prevent further conquests in this hemisphere. The techniques that were used by the Communists in Cuba will certainly be repeated in other Latin American republics.
The first mistaken impression that has gained wide acceptance in the United States is that Cuba is a poor country, and that the great majority of the Cuban people were living in misery and squalor when Fidel Castro Ruz came to power. This is not true.
The second erroneous idea that has taken root is that Castro was not originally a Communist; that he was merely a "social reformer," and that he was driven into the arms of the Communist powers because the United States government failed to support him. This is not true.
And third, there is the mistaken belief that Cuba has "gone Communist" with the consent and the approval of the majority of her people, who have welcomed the "reforms" put into effect by Castro. This is not true, either.
CUBAN PROSPERITY BEFORE CASTRO
Cuba had its share of poor people, it is true. So does every other country. But the statements that have been made in the United States as to the widespread poverty that existed in Cuba prior to 1959 are absolutely false. On the contrary, the Cuban standard of living was higher than that of most countries in Latin America. Its per capita income was the second highest—as high as that of Italy, and much higher than that of Japan. And since Cuba is a semi-tropical country, many of the basic necessities, and particularly clothing and shelter, were far less expensive than they are in those countries. This per capita income, therefore, went much farther than it might in a different locale.
Cuba's annual consumption of electricity was the second highest in Latin America. One out of every five Cubans owned a radio—the highest ratio in all Latin America except for Argentina. There was one automobile in Cuba for each 39 persons, as compared with one to 60 persons in Argentina. Cuba's foreign trade was quite large for the size of the country, amounting to $1,400,000 per year; and while the sugar industry was tremendous, it is incorrect to say that Cuba was a "one crop country." Its production was diversified. Tobacco was an important source of foreign revenue, and Cuba was also exporting increasing amounts of fresh and canned vegetables, rum, fish products, coffee, meats, copper, asphalt, shoes, rayon, and a number of other items.
The island was entirely self-sufficient in meat and diary products because of its thriving cattle industry. Most of this industry was owned by local capital. The country also had some 39,000 industries—a considerable number for a country of six and a half million people—and these provided employment for more than 60 per cent of the employable population. These industries produced fabrics, glass products, paper, steel products, ceramics, vegetable oils, hardwood products, wire, fertilizers, detergents, and various other items.
A LOOK AT THE RECORD
It will also come as a surprise to those who have been assured that the Cuban worker lived in poverty and in security to learn that Cuban labor legislation was so advanced as to be beyond that existing in the United States. This has been attested by Father John J. Kelly, O.S.A., former Rector of Willanueva University. Workers had sick leave and maternity benefits; they had a month's paid vacation per year, and this vacation was due them, according to law, when they had worked eleven months. Not only were there strong and independent labor unions, but there was legislation to protect the agricultural workers. Those in the sugar industry, for example, had a sort of profit-sharing arrangement through which their wages were related to the price obtained for the sugar. The average wage of the Cuban agricultural worker for an eight-hour day was $3.00, which compares very favorably with the figures for Belgium, Denmark, France, and West Germany, all of which are considered prosperous countries. It is true that the figure is less than the $5.80 that is estimated for the United States; but we must remember that in the United States the cost of living is higher.
All in all, Cuba was a prosperous, progressive little country at the time it was taken over, despite the unrest that had been caused by the terrorist tactics of the rebel forces. It had existed as an independent republic for only sixty years, and its standard of living had improved tremendously during that time. It is important for the people in the United States to understand that Cuba's economic situation was completely misrepresented by writers who sought to curry favor for the Castro regime in the early part of 1959.
The second error that was propagated—and the most dangerous one—was that Fidel Castro was not a Communist, but an idealistic reformer who sought to build a government based on a "Christian humanism." This has, of course, been contradicted beyond the slightest possibility of doubt by Castro's own statement that he had been a Communist since his student days. However, it was not necessary for anyone to wait until 1962 for this declaration to know that Castro was a Communist. It should have been obvious from his record. He was one of the agitators who provoked the riot in Bogota, Colombia, in 1948, which did an estimated 25 million dollars worth of damage, almost destroyed the center of the city, and cost many lives. He was denounced as a Communist agent at that time by President Ospina Perez of Colombia, and his participation in the riot was described in a book by Francisco Zandino Silva. Castro later boasted, in Havana, of his part in the riot.
When he attacked the Moncada Barracks in Santiago de Cuba in 1953, many men who took part in the attack were Cuban Communists; and anyone with a reasonable knowledge of Communist operations will know that they would not have taken part in such proceedings had they not been instructed to do so by the Party. They were later defended by a Communist attorney, Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who is at the present time in a high position in the Castro government.
When Fidel Castro Ruz landed on the southeast coast of Cuba in 1956, after training his men in Mexico with the aid of an exiled Spanish Communist army officer, he was accompanied by several well-known Reds, including his brother, Raul, and the Argentinean Che Guevara, whose background was established some years ago in Guatemala. (His mother is currently engaged in promoting support for Communist Cuba in Argentina.)
CASTRO'S SLIGHT OF HAND
With all this readily available record of Castro's past activities, the question arises: How was this man able to deceive the Cuban people, even many of the clergy and hierarchy, into believing that he was not a Communist? I am frequently asked this question, and I can answer it only by saying that the Cuban people were regrettably naive and too little informed as to the deceptive tactics that are employed by Communism.
First of all, Castro made use of the feeling of indignation that most Cubans felt toward Fulgencio Batista because of his taking over the government through a bloodless coup d'état in 1952, and because there undeniably was corruption in the Batista government. Castro set himself up as a symbol of "anti-Batista-ism." Then the Communists worked to gain the support of certain blocs, by making their chosen leader all things to all men. To the students he was presented as a young idealist-one of them. Certain politicians were guaranteed support in the next elections. (There were to be, of course, elections shortly after the revolution.) Army officers were promised that they would keep their positions under the new regime, if they shifted their support from the Batista government; and there was infiltration in the lower ranks as well.
But the most deceptive and most effective masquerade of all was the religious one. Cuba, of course, is predominantly Catholic. Castro and the other Communists around him were well aware that they must have the support of the Catholic population and, if possible, the support of the clergy itself. So it was plain that a pious front must be presented to the country at large. Churches were asked to collect rosaries, medals, holy pictures, statues, and catechisms for Castro's guerrilla army. Catholic catechists were permitted to go up into the hills to instruct the soldiers. Priests were provided as chaplains. The Sierra Maestra must contain enough medals and rosaries to supply all of Cuba, as the response to the campaign was all out of proportion of the size of Castro's small guerrilla army. When the Castro forces came down from the mountains, they were liberally decorated and equipped with religious articles.
It is imperative that the Catholics in all the Americas—and particularly the Catholic clergy—understand the techniques that were used in the takeover of Cuba. They will be repeated; there is no question but that they will be repeated in other Catholic countries.
There were, of course, Cubans who knew precisely what was going on; but they were voices crying in the wilderness. They were being "negative"; they were being "suspicious"; nobody wanted to listen to them. The most well-meaning of people were caught up in an emotional (and unthinking) spirit of optimism. And the naivete of the Cubans was, of course, implemented by the serious misrepresentations of influential sectors of the press in the United States, misrepresentations which continued long after many Cubans had realized the gravity of the situation that confronted them.
NOT BACKED BY WORKINGMEN
The greatest failure in obtaining support for Castro was with the working classes. Except in a few sections of the country where they were either persuaded or terrorized into lending their support, they refused to give it.
As for the theory that the United States might have prevented Cuba's "going Communist" by giving support to the new regime, it is untenable. Castro's Minister of the Treasury, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, who came to this country with him in 1959, has publicly stated that even discussion of U.S. assistance was strictly prohibited. Castro's policy from the beginning was to break down any existing ties with the United States; and he repeatedly refused to receive the United States Ambassador in Havana.
The utter ruthlessness of the Castro regime, moreover, was apparent from the very day that Castro came into power. While people in the United States and elsewhere were assured that "justice was being done" in Cuba, a barbaric and inhuman slaughter was taking place. On the very first day, Raul Castro executed 70 people in Santiago de Cuba without any trial at all. He simply lined them up and had them shot. The executions have never stopped; they continue to this day—some of them without benefit of trial, some with a trial before militia officers who have no knowledge of the law. And an attorney who intervenes puts himself in a very dangerous position.
The third misapprehension concerning the Castro regime in Cuba is the belief that the people have accepted it and have welcomed the "reforms." The fact of the matter is that the people are held in line by the fear of reprisals, both economic and physical. Officers who had not realized the true character of the regime they were supporting have been killed or have disappeared. Among them are three outstanding officers who were with Fidel in the mountains: Major Camilo Cienfuegos, Major Hubert Matos, and Captain Soutu. Labor has been put under the control of Communist leaders, and if a worker is not submissive and does not display "loyalty" to the regime, he is doomed to starvation. The "agrarian reform" which was to give land to so many farmers has turned out to be a scheme for government-directed collective farming. There is no private enterprise left to speak of, and almost no private property. Education, completely state-controlled, is atheistic.
As for the condition of the Church in Cuba, it is in a pitiable state. Hundreds of churches have been closed; about six hundred priests have been exiled, as have hundreds of nuns who were engaged in teaching and in charitable work. This leaves only a few priests for the entire population of the island. Church buildings and schools have been turned into warehouses and army barracks; in some instances altars have been desecrated. Morality is being destroyed among the children and the young people through the operation of Communist youth groups.
Cuba today is living proof that a country is not exempt from Communist take-over because it is Catholic—or because it is prosperous. Cuba was both. Nor is literacy a protection. It was not the illiterate people in Cuba who were responsible for its present condition; it was a segment of the middle-class and wealthy who were too preoccupied with their own pursuits, and too certain that their country could never be ruled by Communism, to bother to inform themselves about Communist techniques or to look into the background of the men they allowed to lead them.
All this will happen elsewhere!
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