The Moral Virtues in St. Thomas
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As is well known, St. Thomas after developing his theory of habit and virtues in general in the Prima Secundae presents a detailed exposition of the Theological and Cardinal Moral Virtues in the Secunda Secundae. The present article aims to provide a convenient summary of the main lines of St. Thomas' teaching on Prudence, Fortitude and Temperance as contained in the passages of the Summa just referred to.
Prudence: II-II, qq. 47-56
Man lives rightly by following reason and the Eternal Law. It is Prudence's office to formulate and impose the correct dictates of reason upon a man. To do this, it must take counsel; judge; and finally command. Since taking counsel involves an inquiry into means to end, Prudence is in the practical intellect. To command is the principal act of Prudence, for, inasmuch as it is the closest of these three acts to the human act, it is most influential in man's conduct. Since a man will be influenced in his judgment by the bent of his affections, to have Prudence one must have the other moral virtues, in order that his affections be inclined in the right way and so do not deflect his judgment from the truth.
Prudence presupposes the ends of the moral virtues and steers a course that will attain these ends. By fixing correctly on these means, the mean of the various virtues (their respective ends) is attained.
Since Prudence must direct man in the actual affairs of human life, the prudent man is in need of a knowledge both of the general principles of practical reason and of the manifold variety of contingent singular events to which he applies them. Prudence, of course, is concerned with regulating future conduct, since the past and the present are fixed.
In order to cope with practical decisions, the prudent man has need of many acts (Prudence's integral parts). He must employ memory to recall the past, and thus to foretell the future, by forming his estimate upon what generally happens. He must understand first principles in order to reason correctly about actions to be performed; because of the quasi-infinite variety of contingent matters he will require instruction from the wise and so he must be docile. On his own, he must be discerning in order to proceed swiftly to a right estimate of what means will procure an end. From truths grasped he must be able to reason, since taking counsel requires passing from the known to the unknown. Since he must arrange contingent future events as means to an end, he must foresee these. Since circumstances can render an otherwise good course of action, evil or ineffectual of the end, one must regard these by circumspection. As evil often lies mixed with good, one must cautiously guard against it.
The command of Prudence may regard one's own conduct merely (Monastic Prudence); or that of the family one rules (Domestic Prudence); or that of the entire community one governs (Regnative Prudence) or that whereby one obeys his ruler reasonably (Political Prudence); finally, it may concern the defense of the state by armed resistance (Military Prudence). Such are Prudence's Species or Subjective Parts.
Prudence's own proper act is to command well. This is an act of reason whereby one intimates to the powers of execution what they are to do, but it presupposes an act of the will still influencing, in virtue of which the command effects the obedience of the powers of execution. Now, one is in a position to command only after having judged aright. Hence a subordinate and allied virtue is required to regulate judgment; in fact, two such are needed: the first to assist one in judging by the ordinary laws (Synesis); the other to aid in judging by extraordinary laws (Gnome). Judgment itself, if it is not to be precipitate, must follow on due inquiry. Hence another virtue insuring proper inquiry is also presupposed, scil. that of Good Counsel (Euboulia).
Every virtuous act shares in Prudence in that, it is directed by Prudence. Similarly every vicious act contains a deficiency of due Prudence in that Prudence fails effectively to direct aright. This privation of Prudence (or lack of the Prudence), that one could and ought to have, can be divided more specifically according to the various acts of reason needed for Prudence, to which the potential parts of Prudence (Euboulia, Synesis, Gnome) and Prudence Proper correspond. Thus one fails in the principal act of Prudence (Command) either through failing to solicit the intellect to command as it should and when it should (Negligence or lack of due solicitude); or by failing to carry out the execution of the command (Inconstancy). Inconstancy is attributable to an inordinate desire for pleasure, which seduces one from his good resolution. Thus Lust (whereby one is debauched by the most engrossing of all pleasures: venereal sensations) is especially corruptive of Prudence. In the stages anterior to command, one may fail to make due inquiry by taking proper counsel (Precipitateness). By Precipitateness one is borne into a conclusion by an impulse of will or passion, instead of proceeding in an orderly fashion by the steps already indicated in the integral parts of Prudence. Again, if after taking Counsel, one were to fail to pass judgment on the means, he would be defective in Prudence by Inconsiderateness.
Since Prudence concerns not ends but the means to ends (whereas the decalogue regards ends chiefly), no special commandment was given regarding Prudence. Nevertheless, Prudence's necessity is implicitly inculcated in enjoining the ends.
Since a lower principle is aided by its corresponding higher principle, the Gift of Counsel (whereby one is made amenable to the guidance of the Holy Spirit) corresponds to the virtue of Prudence. The infused virtue of Prudence is in all who have grace.
If one takes as the end of human life some false end, he is said to have a false or counterfeit Prudence. Thus those who make fleshly pleasure life's end are said to be "prudent according to the Flesh." This is, of course, a grave deordination. Prudence of the Flesh is a mortal sin if fleshly pleasure is made the end of life in its entirety; venial, if one seeks pleasure in a portion of life with some excess. The proper care of the body for a true end of life, however, is not prudence of the flesh.
Thinking out wrong ways of getting one's end pertains to craftiness; effecting these, to deceit. Fraud, too, can effect crafty plans-- but by deeds only.
Solicitude can be sinful if we (1) take temporal good as life's end; (2) allow excessive concern over temporal affairs to withdraw us from spiritual; (3) have too much fear (as when, even after due care, one is yet anxious lest he lack temporal goods). This the Lord excluded for three reasons: (1) God has given greater goods; (2) God cares for lesser beings; (3) Divine Providence.
Fortitude: II-II, qq. 123-140
When danger threatens, two passions are aroused in man and they struggle for supremacy: fear and daring. The one dictates flight from the evil; the other dictates a counterattack upon the threatening evil. The accomplished brave man knows how to moderate these tendencies and follow a reasonable course employing his well-governed passions in achieving this end. Such self-control is no accident; nor is it acquired in a day. It derives from reason plotting out a course and imposing it upon lower appetite, where the passions reside. When this is done again and again, finally lower appetite is bent to obey reason in this matter. The virtue of Fortitude has been induced into lower appetite through the insistent requirements of reason's command, Prudence's chief act.
It is the part of the brave man in the face of threatening evils to withstand fear and moderate daring. Fortitude requires, therefore, both that one endure the onslaught of apprehended evil, and that he resist the evil forcibly but not rashly. Controlling fear by resisting the impulse to surrender or flee pertains more to Fortitude than does holding daring in check. For the latter is largely effected by the threatening evil itself, whereas the former must derive from one's own vigor of soul.
As virtues render a man and his work good, the principal field of this virtue concerns itself with what most of all opposes it: danger of death. Furthermore, these dangers must be undergone for some virtuous end, v.g., to defend one's country in a just war, or to resist danger in pursuing some private good (as when one does not desist from caring for a sick friend despite danger of mortal infection). Thus in one or the other sense, the danger withstood by Fortitude is incurred in the carrying on of a warfare.
One who practices Fortitude suffers in the body because of the hardships endured there; hence on the level of the bodily appetite there is sadness. But in the will one has reason to be glad in that he is practicing virtue. Since the bodily pain can neutralize the joy of soul in doing virtuous deeds, it is not required that the brave man positively rejoice: it suffices that he be not sad; for the delight of virtue overcomes his sadness in that it makes him elect the good.
Sudden occurrences are especially manifestative of Fortitude; for virtue acts like a new nature and is exhibited particularly in surprising events when one acts without premeditation, by reason of the facility possessed by the good habit. But electing to cultivate Fortitude requires deliberation. Moreover, even the brave man, if time serves, will strengthen his soul by foreseeing danger he may encounter.
The employment of passions in accord with reason pertains to virtue. Hence the man of courage utilizes anger, moderated according to reason, for the practice of Fortitude.
Those virtues are called cardinal, which possess in a pre-eminent way some characteristic that pertains to all virtue. Firmness is such a characteristic and it is possessed outstandingly by Fortitude. This is evident since the man of Fortitude adheres to virtue's path, although it lead him to confront the most appalling of all dangers-- that of death.
In determining the relative excellence of one of the moral virtues, the test is: Which possesses more fully man's good (which is that of reason)? Prudence has this most of all among the moral virtues, since it possesses it essentially; next comes Justice, which affects the good of reason in human affairs. Then comes Fortitude, which resists the greatest obstacles to reason's good, scil., dangers of death. Next follows Temperance.
Martyrdom evinces the good of Fortitude in an eminent degree. It endures the greatest of evils, even death itself, to attest the truth of the Faith. Such toleration of death shares in the worth of the virtuous end to which it is ordered. Hence if commanded by Charity, the greatest virtue, Martyrdom is the supreme act of virtue in that it evinces the greatest love of God. For love is greater as we are willing to give up more good or suffer more odious evil for its sake. "Greater love than this no man hath than that he lay down his life for his friend" (John 15:13).
Fear is but the reverse of love: one fears the loss of the good one loves. Fear is sinful only if it is unreasonable: scil., if one flies what one ought not to fly. If such fear takes place in the sense appetite only, then at most a venial sin can occur, scil. --when reason could and ought to have prevented it. But if it reach the will, then it can be serious--scil., when one, for fear's sake, foregoes the observance of a gravely binding law of God.
It is licit through fear to avoid what is more evil by tolerating a lesser evil. So one might give goods to robbers to avoid death. Apart from the fear, some sin would be present here in bestowing gifts on evil men while passing over the good in need. In any case, fear somewhat diminishes guilt in that what is done through fear is less voluntary than what is done without fear.
By having too small a love for certain goods, v.g., life or health, one can fall into a deficiency of fear of the loss of these goods. Such a lack of proper fear is against Fortitude, to which it pertains to moderate fear in accordance with reason. A cause inducing such deficiency of fear is Pride: one presumes that such danger cannot befall him. In like manner one can be excessively daring. This involves a sin contrary to Fortitude, which regulates daring as well as fear.
There are, moreover, certain acts, which must concur in order that Fortitude be practiced. It is the part of Fortitude both to attack and to withstand evil, as we have already seen. In order to attack aright, one must have his mind prepared by Confidence, whereby he trusts to achieve his good. Furthermore, he stands in need of Enterprise (Magnificentia) to see through the execution of what he undertakes. If these attitudes are confined to Fortitude's proper subject matter (dangers of death), they are regarded as its quasi-integral parts. If they are extended to include other less difficult subject matter, they are regarded as its potential parts (Magnanimity and Enterprise).
Enduring evil likewise requires two attitudes of mind. One must resist the sadness that evils cause, so as not to fail of his purpose. Patience supplies this need. Moreover, the longer evil lasts, the more wearing it is; to bear this weariness so as not to give up pertains to Perseverance. As applied to Fortitude's proper subject matter, these attitudes of mind are the quasi-integral parts of this virtue; as applied to other less difficult matter, they are the potential parts of Fortitude.
Passions can resist reason; some do so by reason of themselves; others do so in virtue of the stimulus they receive from external goods such as richness or honors. Since the sense appetite is naturally subject to reason, passions that oppose reason in virtue of themselves do so only when vehement; hence the virtues which are required to govern these regard only the advanced stage of passion --Temperance with respect to the great pleasures of the touch; Fortitude with respect to great fear and daring; Meekness with respect to great anger. Passions concerned with external things need a two-fold virtue, one to govern the response to great external things, v. g., great honors (Magnanimity) and great expenditures (Enterprise); a pair to govern the response to lesser honors (Philotimia: inclining one to merit such honors when this is reasonable; and Aphilotimia: inclining one to disregard the attraction of such honors, when that is reasonable); yet another to govern outlay of lesser sums (Liberality).
The stretching forth of the soul, purposing some great act worthy of great honor) forms the special matter of Magnanimity. Greatness here is taken absolutely: not great merely for the talent of the one in question, but great for men in general. Hence this virtue belongs to men of great talent only; Magnanimity is related to Fortitude as secondary to chief virtue since it applies the same attitude of mind (Firmness) to a subject less difficult than Fortitude's, scil., deserving great honors, as opposed to dangers of death in combat.
Magnanimity requires that a man have Confidence: a hope auguring success, based on some promising quality which he perceives in himself, or in some friend who will help him, or in both. Since the goods of fortune can be made organically to serve the ends of Magnanimity, they have a bearing on this virtue.
Magnanimity inclines one to aspire to some great achievement that is proportionate to the power of the aspirant. This accords with the law of nature, which assigns accomplishments to proportionate powers. This excludes presumption, which aims at what is beyond one's power.
As what is honorable in a man is given to him by God, the attestation of this excellence (honor) is due primarily to God. Moreover, honor is useful in that it makes one to be of service to others. Hence one can have an inordinate appetite for honor (ambition) in three ways: (1) by seeking honor that is not due to him; (2) by not referring the honor to God; (3) by not referring it to the neighbor's utility.
Glory is the proclaiming of something as decorous. One is not forbidden to acknowledge his own worth: Cf. I Cor. 2:12: "Now we have not received the spirit of the world, but the spirit that is from God, that we may know the things that have been given us from God"; or to desire that others know it: Cf. Matt. 5:6: "Even so let your light shine before men in order that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father in Heaven." Desiring empty glory is vicious; desire for glory is empty if: (1) one seeks to be glorified when no true basis exists for glory; (2) one seeks glory at the hands of those unable to appraise one's worth; (3) one fails to refer the glory to God's honor and our neighbor's good.
Such empty or vainglory is opposed to Magnanimity, which regulates one's attitude towards honor (since glory ensues upon honor). It would be against Charity, and a serious sin, if one were to make his own glorification his ultimate end. Vainglory can also be serious if one takes glory in offending God.
Vainglory fulfills the notion of a capital vice: one with a special subject matter, for the sake of which men are prone to commit other sins. Examples of such sins are: vaunting one's accomplishments, whether real or fanciful; presuming to innovate customs in order to arouse men's admiration or even falsifying one's achievements hypocritically; holding too strongly to one's own opinions in order not to appear less than others (pertinacity); refusing to accede to others' desires (discord); opposing others loudly in speech (contention); refusing to submit, to authority (disobedience).
Every natural agent tends to achieve what is proportionate to its powers; this is assured by Magnanimity; the pusillanimous man falls short in this. This may be due to ignorance of one's capacities or fear of failing in what one erroneously regards as beyond his powers. The result is that the pusillanimous man is impeded from the great achievements, which he could accomplish.
Taking Enterprise (Magnificentia) as a special virtue, its field covers great achievements outside the agent. Such great external accomplishments require a sizeable outlay of funds. These funds themselves, or the spending of them, or the affection for them which the enterprising man does not allow to withhold him from great achievements, can be regarded as the special subject matter of Enterprise (Magnificentia).
Enterprise is like Fortitude, in aspiring to some goal which is hard to get; unlike it, in that its matter (laying out large sums for some external achievement of magnitude) is less difficult than that of Fortitude, which is withstanding dangers of death. It is therefore classified as a potential part of Fortitude.
If one foregoes a great achievement because of excessive love of money (which he is unwilling to part with for the venture), he is deficient in Enterprise (Magnificentia) and may be called niggardly. On the other hand, one may be all too ready to expend money: throwing sums away on unworthy projects: wasteful.
One obstacle to moral achievement is sadness. Conserving the good of reason against sadness pertains to Patience. Now one supports pain only for the sake of a good, which he loves more than he detests the pain. Only Charity can bring it about that one loves the Divine good more than he detests the evils, which temporal things can inflict. Thus Charity is required to support Patience: "Charity is patient" (I Cor. 13:4). Now Charity is given to us by God with grace: "The Charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit Who has been given to us" (Rom. 5:5). Hence Patience requires sanctifying grace. If Patience be considered as supporting with equanimity evils befalling us from without--evils less than the dangers of death (Fortitude's proper field)--it is classified as a potential part of Fortitude.
By Longanimity one inclines toward a good as yet far off. Since the very deferring of a hoped for good engenders sadness, Patience (which resists sadness) applies here and can be said to include Longanimity.
Similarly the labor entailed in the long drawn out performance of a good work can give rise to sadness. Constancy in such work can be seen to derive from Patience, therefore. In fact, all difficulties deriving from sources other than sheer delay in the pursuit of good are overcome by Constancy.
Withstanding delays in the doing of good pertains to Perseverance. Insofar as this doing of good does not require that one confront the danger of death (Fortitude's proper subject), Perseverance is a potential part of Fortitude, for it gives one an attitude similar to the principal virtue (Firmness of mind) but in respect to less difficult subject matter. Considered as an infused moral virtue, Perseverance is a concomitant of sanctifying grace. Opposed to Perseverance by way of deficiency is Softness: a defect whereby one is induced to cease striving for good just because pleasures are lacking. The pertinacious man through vainglory adheres overmuch to his own opinion and so fails by excess in the virtue of Perseverance.
There is, besides the virtue of Fortitude, the Gift of the same name. This is a habit whereby one is disposed to be amenable to the Divine Spirit's influence in bringing a man to terminate a work well and avoid evils. Since man does not suffice for this he requires the divine aid: God infuses a certain confidence that all will be well herein.
Temperance
(As contained in the Summa Theologica, II-II, qq. 141-170.)
Temperance is a virtue since it inclines man to seek his good, which is that of reason. Temperance can be understood as a general virtue in that moderation is a requisite of all virtuous activity. As a special virtue with a special subject matter, it aims to keep the pursuit of those goods that give passionate pleasure and whose lack causes passionate sorrow under the governance of reason and thus impose moderation. Temperance (antonomastically) concerns the greatest pleasures, which are connected with more necessary ends--scil. food for self-preservation and sexual intercourse for race maintenance. Sight, smell and especially taste provide secondary matter for Temperance's restraining. Temperance's rule is the needs of this life since this is the end, which the goods that pleasure accompany, must serve. Since Temperance has an outstanding praiseworthiness based on an element found in all virtue, in that it is concerned with restraining the most imperious appetites, it is a cardinal virtue.
Since it is nobler to seek the good of the many than the one, Justice and Fortitude excel Temperance.
Two inner forces must concur for Temperance: Shamefacedness and Honor. Shamefacedness shrinks from the disgrace attendant on intemperance. Shamefacedness is more concerned with the opinions of those close at hand in that these persons know us more and their disapproval is more keenly felt. It is present in the virtuous only hypothetically: were they to fall into any disgraceful act they would feel ashamed. Honor inclines one to the beauty of virtue: its proportion joined with the brilliance reason admires. Such are Temperance's Integral Parts.
In connection with its chief subject matter--the tendencies to sense pleasure which are hardest to avoid because most natural and necessary for the maintenance of the individual and the race --Temperance admits of division into species or subjective parts. Thus to moderate the desire for food in accordance with reason, by having due regard for one's associates, one's person and the requirements of health, there is Abstinence. Its principal act is Fasting. Fasting is required by the natural law as far as it is needed to attain its threefold purpose: (1) to bridle the lusts of the flesh; (2) to enable the mind to rise more freely to contemplate Divine Reality; (3) to satisfy for one's sins. Fasting aims to check concupiscence while safeguarding natural needs. To this end the Ecclesiastical Law of Fasting allows but one full meal a day.
Opposed to abstinence is Gluttony: the inordinate craving and sating of one's appetite for food. This is not a mortal sin unless one would be prepared to violate God's law gravely for the pleasure of eating. In that it has a very desirable end for which other sins are committed it fulfills the notion of a capital vice. One is sumptuous in seeking costly food; dainty in seeking it well prepared; greedy in seeking too much of it. Gluttony leads to dullness of mind, loquaciousness, scurrility, uncleanness, unseemly joy and jocularity.
The use of intoxicating drinks is regulated by Sobriety, a virtue especially necessary to the young and women, because of their proneness to yield to concupiscence, as well as to those who counsel others, and so are in special need of clearmindedness, v.g., the aged and the clergy, and also those whose drinking would cause scandal. Ordinarily the use of intoxicants is not altogether forbidden but it can be if: (1) one is easily the worse for drinking; (2) one has a vow not to drink; (3) others would be scandalized if one drank.
Opposed to Sobriety is Drunkenness. The suspension of reason induced by excessive drinking is the penal effect of that excess. Inducing this state of intoxication is gravely sinful if this is done knowingly through an inordinate desire for pleasure in the use of intoxicants; for in this way reason, the guide of moral action, is suspended and one chances sinning. Drinking that is immoderate but not intoxicating does not exceed venial sin. Even sinful drunkenness diminishes culpability for ensuing sins, since voluntareity is lessened. (It is supposed that one did not get drunk in order to sin.)
Marital Chastity governs the desire for venereal pleasure by ordering it to its end, race maintenance. Virginity consists formally in the will never to seek venereal pleasure. Virginity is lawful since the goods of the soul excel those of the body and among the goods of the soul the contemplative excel the active. Hence one may licitly renounce the bodily good of venereal pleasure in order to give himself more fully to contemplation.
In fact, Virginity is a virtue, since it is a greater thing wholly to renounce venereal pleasure than just to give up what is inordinate in it; this latter pertains to marital Chastity.
Virginity is more excellent than marriage in that it furthers the highest goods of the soul, scil., contemplation of God, whereas marriage seeks a bodily good and commits man and wife to the active life.
The order of reason is that everything be directed toward its end. Lust seeks venereal pleasure out of due relation to its end, scil., race maintenance. It is a capital vice since men are led to other sins for its end. As a result of lust, which involves the violent and disordered excitements of the lower passions, the higher powers are weakened. Thus reason's understanding is blighted by blindness of mind; its counsel by rashness; its judgment by thoughtlessness; its command by inconstancy. The will is led to disordered self-love through its desire for disordered pleasure and is even induced to hate God for forbidding it. A man falls into love of this world and despair of a future world.
In addition to marital chastity, which regulates the desire for sexual intercourse, another virtue, Prudent Reserve, is needed to order the lesser signs of love, v.g. kissing, fondling, etc. In kissing and touching specifically, i.e., as such--no sin is found. They are sinful, however, if ordered to a bad end, scil., any venereal pleasure outside of marriage and complete venereal pleasure by married persons outside of marital intercourse.
There are various illicit ways of procuring venereal pleasure. The most serious of all is that which violates the very principle of venereal acts, which is nature. This can occur in several ways;
(a) by pollution without intercourse: effeminancy;
(b) by pollution through intercourse with one of the same sex: sodomy;
(c) through pollution with a beast: bestiality;
(d) by not observing the natural order in copulation: undue means and monstrous ways of copulation.
Of sins contrary to chastity, next in order of seriousness is incest, in that due respect for one's relatives is lacking. The grounds for condemning incest are: (a) respect would be defeated by allowing among close relatives acts one is naturally ashamed of; (b) there would be so great opportunity in family life for venereal acts that the race would be enervated; (c) social ties would be too narrow; (d) too ardent would be the love resulting both from consanguinity and marital union.
Adultery is more serious than the violating of a virgin, which is called seduction. For it is graver to negate the husband's claim than the father's authority. Adultery is against the good of the adulterine children since the woman is already married. It is also against the good of her legitimate children since it renders paternity uncertain and divides her energies taking some of them away from the upbringing of her legitimate children.
Seduction (the violation of a virgin) has a special malice in that it renders marriage difficult and tends to encourage wantonness from which the desire to preserve the seal of virginity had until now preserved her. It is also a violation of paternal authority.
Fornication--intercourse between the unmarried--is gravely against the good of the child. Even in the animal kingdom, we observe that the mates stay together as long as this is required for the good of the young. Now the human child stands in great need of both parents for a long time. Hence their task of bringing up children is a life-long one, so too ought their union be. Further, promiscuity renders the paternity uncertain.
Rape adds the malice of violence and sacrilege (that of irreligion) to the already existing evils of seduction, adultery or fornication.
Continence resists vehement motion of passions that tend to seek venereal pleasure. It is in the will, therefore, and is a virtue less perfect than Temperance, which subjugates not only the will, but likewise the sense appetite to reason. The incontinent man's reason dictates resistance by the will, but the will yields.
Incontinence is in the soul (more precisely in the will) and is a sin of yielding to evil passion. It is not as great a sin as intemperance. For it is a yielding to a passing passion on the will's part; the incontinent man repents immediately. But the intemperate man has a habit of indulging evil passion and rejoices in having sinned.
One incontinent in anger is not guilty of an act as bad in itself as incontinence in desire. For desire for revenge has some likeness to reason's good; anger is more due to bodily dispositions; the incontinent in desire works with pleasure, the incontinent in anger, with annoyance; the incontinent in desire works clandestinely, the incontinent in anger openly. But the results of anger are usually more injurious to the neighbor.
Meekness, which restrains anger, contributes to the same effect as Clemency, which moderates external punishment. Both are virtues in that each moderates, according to reason, anger and the meting out of punishments, respectively. These are potential parts of Temperance since they imitate its mode (restraint) in secondary matter.
These virtues of Meekness and Clemency withdraw from evil and so are lesser than those, which incline toward good such as Faith, Hope and Charity, Prudence and Justice. Yet Meekness has special excellence. For anger is a great obstacle to virtue because of its impetuousness. Hence Meekness, above all virtues, makes a man self-possessed. Since, however, the pleasures of touch harass more constantly, Temperance is properly regarded as the principal virtue. Clemency, as preventing our neighbor's evil, seems to draw closest to Charity.
Some passions are of their nature evil, v.g. envy whereby one sorrows over the neighbor's good; anger is not such. For revenge can be good or evil. Anger if evil is so by exceeding reason's measure. Anger in accord with reason is deserving of praise.
If one desire revenge for a good end, he is zealously angry. But anger can fail to be reasonable when one desires that another be punished for a non-existent fault or excessively respecting a true fault or out of keeping with legal order and punishment's end: the maintaining of Justice and the correction of faults. Again, the mode of anger can be unreasonable by being immoderately fierce.
Anger which desires disproportionate revenge is in the genus of mortal sin as being against Charity and Justice. Yet because anger anticipates reason's (full) control, or because what one wills to befall another is only a trivial evil, the sin can be venial.
Anger sinful in its mode is not by its nature a mortal sin but it can become such if through anger one depart from the love of God or of the neighbor.
Regarded from the point of view of the evil willed, anger seems to be the least sin, since one desires the neighbor's evil not for his harm as one who hates or out of inordinate self-love as one who envies, but under the aspect of just revenge. But regarding the inordinateness of its mode, anger seems to be the worst sin since it moves so quickly and powerfully.
Anger can proceed from a choleric disposition whereby one is prone to anger; or it can occur because its cause is too long remembered--thus one is sullen and grievous to himself; or because one desires revenge too persistently--thus ill-tempered and stern people refuse to lay aside anger until they are avenged.
Anger is considered a capital vice for two reasons: (1) because its object, desired under the aspect of good, leads to many sins; (2) because through its mode, which is impetuous, it plunges the mind into all kinds of inordinate acts.
Anger begets many faults: by thinking about the unworthiness of the one who affronted him, one works up indignation; by devising modes of getting even, he falls into swelling of the mind. Speech can become disorderly or confused: mere ranting or even injurious to God (blasphemy) or to the neighbor (contumely). Angry deeds can lead to fights.
The will's passionless movement, seeking that evil be punished, is reasonable and virtuous. A natural consequence of this is anger. A total lack of anger, therefore, would denote a slackness of the will and accordingly would be vicious.
Cruelty is opposed to clemency as the raw to the smooth. It is not the same as bestiality since it is a human vice: for it exceeds in punishing.
Wherever a virtue arises to regulate man's life in a more difficult sphere, another is required to dispose him in the less difficult. Temperance does the former, restraining the desires for the pleasures of food and sex. The following series of virtues, which some authors comprise under Modesty, moderate man's desire for good in the less difficult fields. Humility restrains the movement of the soul toward some excellence. Studiousness, opposed to the vice of curiosity, regulates the desire for knowledge. Gravity and Eutrapeleia govern bodily motions and actions in seriousness and play, respectively. Contentedness and Simplicity are concerned with the desire for outward show in dress. We will say more about each of these virtues now.
The difficult good attracts as good) and arouses hope. This must be guarded against excess (presumption) by Humility. As difficult, it tends to cause despondency; this is corrected by Magnanimity.
Humility resides in the appetite wherein the movement to be restrained takes place. True, a knowledge of one's shortcomings is presupposed to enable one to refrain from aspiring to what is above him.
We ought to distinguish in ourselves what is from God: our good, and what is from ourselves: our sin. We ought put the neighbor above ourselves if we compare what he has from God with what we have from ourselves. But comparing what the neighbor has from God with what we have ourselves from God we need not prefer him. Nor need a man think that what good is his from himself is less than what all others have from themselves. Else each one would have to think himself the greatest sinner. Yet one may consider that some other has a gift from God, which he has not, or is free of some defect from himself, which he has from himself, and thus subject himself to him.
Any virtue, which moderates impetuous motion, is a potential part of temperance; this includes humility. Cicero lists this virtue, which restrains hope as part of Modesty.
Humility has a special excellence, since it subjects man to legitimate ordinances in all things, whereas other virtues have a special subject matter. Hence after the theological virtues (more excellent in that they order man to the end), and after the infused virtues, especially Prudence (which regards reason itself) and Justice, especially Legal Justice (which directs man to the means to the end). Humility is first.
Humility makes a man fear God and bear all his commands in mind, for Humility shows reverence for God, in that one does not presume to aspire beyond his endowments. In order not to aim inordinately at one's own excellence, a man does not follow his own will; he regulates his conduct by his superior's judgment, and is not deterred by difficulties. Humility requires that one estimate his own deficiencies; this requires that he acknowledge and avow his shortcomings, and deem himself unworthy of (too) great things, and put others before himself. Outwardly Humility will appear by not departing from the ordinary way in one's work, in not being too quick to speak, or immoderate in speech, and by avoiding haughty looks, checking laughter and other signs of senseless mirth.
Reason requires that a man tend to what is proportionate to him. Pride aspires inordinately at excellence, i.e., at excellence beyond one's reach, and so is a sin. As having this special object, Pride is a special sin. As spurring on to all vice, it is general, since any sin can be done out of contempt and so involve pride. But weakness also gives rise to some sins; hence not every sin always actually springs from pride.
One's own excellence (the object which pride seeks inordinately) is a good that is hard to attain. Hence Pride pertains to the irascible appetite of both the sense and the spirit, since its object is both sensible and intelligible.
False boasting betrays a tendency to what is above one's competence. To think of a good which one has from another (whether as efficient or meritorious cause) as if it were from himself, is making it greater than it is, and so belongs to Pride (False Attribution); by being singularly conspicuous, one--by the manner of possessing a good--may seek to excel unduly, and so be guilty of pride.
In itself Pride is a mortal sin, since it is against due subjection of self to God. Of course, if sufficient reflection or full consent be lacking, the sin is venial only. Every sin involves a conversion to a mutable good and an aversion from the Immutable: God. In the former way, Pride is not the most serious sin, since being excellent is a good; but in the latter way it is the most grave since, whereas other sins can occur through ignorance or weakness. Pride always occurs through unwillingness to subject oneself to God. It is evident therefore, that Pride is the most serious of sins. Pride, too, by its nature causes an aversion from God: an essential to mortal sin. Hence Pride is the beginning of all sin. As a special vice, Pride is a capital one, since for its end other sins are committed. As exercising a general influence over all sins, it is the Queen of all the vices, even the capital ones.
Virtues deal with the matter that primarily concerns them. This in the case of studiousness is knowledge, since one seeks knowledge itself before seeking what is governed by knowledge.
Studiousness is a potential part of Temperance to which it pertains to moderate the natural desire for good--in this case knowledge. Desire for knowledge is a desire for a good. But one can render it evil by taking pride in it or putting it to bad use. The desire for knowledge can be inordinate also if: (1) One seeks to know what is less profitable, to the neglect of what is obligatory: "We see priests forsaking the gospel and the prophets, reading stage plays and singing the love songs of pastoral idyls" (St. Jerome); (2) one seeks to learn from a forbidden teacher, v.g. the demons; (3) one seeks to know the truth about creatures without referring the knowledge to its due end, God; (4) when one seeks to know what exceeds his capacity, for thus many have fallen into error.
Seeking sensible knowledge can be sinful in two ways: first, by seeking it when it is useless or harmful; secondly by directing it to an evil end, v.g.--looking at a woman to promote lust, or minding other's affairs to contribute to detraction. But the ordinate seeking of sensible knowledge to sustain nature (by avoiding what is harmful and getting what the body needs), or for intelligible truth, is virtuous.
External movements are subject to virtue, since they are comprised within human matters, which can be subjected to reason. Reason demands that such actions be adapted to other persons and to all external surroundings.
Weariness of the soul is induced by intense application, especially intellectual. This is dispelled by the soul's rest: pleasure. The soul's tension of study must be slackened by some pleasure. Words and deeds, wherein nothing else is sought but the soul's delight, pertain to play. Indecent and injurious games should be eschewed. Nor may one lose the balance of his mind altogether while at play. Circumstances of persons, time, place, etc. must be taken into account. A habit moderating the desire for Fun is a virtue: eutrapeleia or Playfulness.
If deeds or words cause serious injury to the neighbor, they are mortal sins; where circumstances make play unfitting, if one would persist even to the point of grievously offending God, a mortal sin occurs.
The lack of the proper spirit of playfulness is boorish. Here one neither contributes to mirth himself nor participates by approving the efforts of others. Yet a deficiency herein is less serious than an excess, since relaxation exists for achievement. "A little sweetness suffices to season the whole of life."
One can be immoderate in using apparel: (1) by violating custom; (2) by excessive pleasure in the use of clothes due either to vainglory or excessive concern for the body's pleasure; (3) by too much solicitude about raiment. Hence humility to correct vainglory; Contentedness to see and be content with what is suitable; and Simplicity, which excludes excessive solicitude, are indicated here.
A deficiency in due concern in the use of clothes can occur: (1) by not enough care: effeminacy, and (2) by ostentatious neglect.
A woman may licitly adorn herself to please her husband. But to do so to gratify other men lustfully is a mortal sin; to dress to please other men out of mere frivolity or from vanity is not always a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial.
The end of the Commandments is Charity toward God and the neighbor. Intemperance through adultery seems most opposed to this. Hence the decalogue forbids it.
The virtues annexed to Temperance directly perfect one’s self, and so are not immediately related to Charity toward God or the neighbor. But in their effects they can be; thus the lack of meekness can lead to murder or to disrespect toward one's parents. Again, lack of humility can cause disrespect of God or parent. These effects are punishable by divine law.
This item 3140 digitally provided courtesy of CatholicCulture.org
