Humani Generis and Natural Knowledge of God
In August 12, 1950, Pius XII issued the encyclical Humani Generis, "concerning certain false opinions which threaten to sap the foundations of Catholic teaching."1 For the Catholic theologian and philosopher, HG is perhaps the most significant document to come out of Rome in the last fifty years. Although the encyclical covers a broad expanse of modern philosophical and theological questions, the purpose of this article is limited to an inquiry into its positive teaching regarding the natural power of human reason to know God. Furthermore, this teaching will be studied in the light of HG's critique of existentialism. Thus our aim is to study the teaching of HG on man's natural power to know God, and on the existentialist approach to that knowledge.
Even a cursory account of the encyclical's remote background, found in Modernism, and its proximate occasion, furnished by the so-called "new theology" and other post-war trends in Europe, would make a study in itself.2 It will be enough here to note that most of the dangerous doctrines in the air originated from questionable philosophic positions.3 Consequently, a large portion of HG is devoted to these metaphysical and epistemological aberrations which supplied the basis for the censured theological theories. We shall treat in this article only of the principal philosophic trend, namely, existentialism.
Existentialism
Though it is often asserted that there is no existentialist "school of philosophy" but only individual existentialists, few would quibble at the nominal definition of existentialism as a "philosophy dominated by the idea of existence."4 Now, it is not existence in general that captivates the existentialist, but the existence of the concrete individual, of his own existence. As a result, the stress is on the subject, the individual human existent, unique in itself, in its liberty and in its destiny. Contrasted with the subject is the "object," something which confronts me, something outside of me, which I can abstract, conceptualize, universalize.
Traditionally, the field of philosophy has been "being," the whole order of being. In practice, however, this order seems to have often been identified with the order of objects.5 Truth is what can be universalized, abstracted, identical for all. But if being, the object of metaphysics is really transcendental, it must also include everything that is unique, incommunicable in the subject. Being must also take in the individual's subjective distinctiveness, which consequently becomes the concern of the metaphysician as well as of the poet, the dramatist and the mystic. Being can never be wholly objectified, since the existent being is both subject and object. The very description of objective being as something, which doesn't depend on the subject, introduces "subject" into the motion.
Mystery Of Being
Ontologically, then, being comprehends both subject and object. Both are different aspects of being, founded ultimately on the opposition between essence and existence in every created being.6 Hence in his epistemological approach, the philosopher cannot simply be a perfectly external, impartial observer, for he cannot isolate the idea of being either from the particular individualizations of beings which confront him, nor from his own act of affirming them. He cannot step back, as it were, out of the order of being, to observe it passively from the outside; willy-nilly he is caught inside. In the trenchant statement of the existentialist, being is a mystery, not a problem.7
For the existentialist, the act of affirming the existence of another being is ultimately founded in the existence of the subject. The subject can know another being not only as object, something confronting him, but also as a co-sharer in its own way in existence. Moreover, not only is the affirmation of another's existence rooted in the subject's own existence, but it is in that very affirmation that the subject knows and implicitly affirms its own existence.8 This latter truth has long been recognized by scholastic philosophers, and is actually just another way of stating that we do not have direct consciousness of our own existence. It is only in the act of affirming something else that the soul, by a natural reflection on its own act, comes to realize and know its own existence. Thus subjective and objective thought, i.e., the self-consciousness of the subject and his knowledge of objects, presuppose each other and mutually over-lap.
There is no question but that existentialists have brought about a new, deeper realization of the individual, the subject, the person.9 They have demonstrated the absolute necessity in philosophy of returning to concrete reality, and to the personal experience of that reality. By enlarging both the terms "concrete" and "experience" they have tried to integrate the a-rational elements of that experience within an enlarged concept of reason. This "reason" is ultimately equivalent to existence in the modern sense, i.e., every faculty, power and experience embraced by the individual's act of existence.10 In such wise have the existentialists attempted to solve the dilemma of keeping to the real, the individual and the singular, while still avoiding empiricism and voluntaristic subjectivism.11
Weaknesses Of Existentialism
Unfortunately, all is not sunny on the existentialist side of the street. With their emphasis on the subjective, and on knowledge of the personal and singular through interiority, there inevitably corresponds a deep distrust, if not outright denial, of the validity of conceptual knowledge. 12 By exalting knowledge of the subject as subject, by emphasizing it as the unique means of access to the true value of the individual subject, they have made objective, abstracted, conceptual knowledge appear as just so much straw. Ultimate reality, the existentialists assert, can never be attained through ordinary, abstractive, intellectual processes. For this abstraction misses by its very action what is most valuable to man: his incommunicable, personal existence. This total concentration on existence to the practical exclusion of essences, is taken up in HG:
The false evolutionary notions, with their denial of all that is fixed or abiding in human experience, have paved the way for a new philosophy of error. Idealism, immanentism, pragmatism, have now a rival in what is called "existentialism." Its method, as the name implies, is to leave the unchanging essences of things out of sight, and concentrate all its attention on particular existences. 13
This primacy of existence over everything, which is basic to existentialism, contains an equivocation. For being is at once objective as well as subjective. There is no such thing as pure subjectivity, i.e. pure existence without essence.14 Reality presents us with existent beings alone. Consequently, there is valid conceptual knowledge both of objects and of the subject's own experience; the subjective depth never cancels out its objective counterpart.
Excessive Criticism Of Conceptual Knowledge
Besides being motivated by their stress on the subjective, the existentialists have also been influenced by their identification in practice of all conceptual knowledge with rationalistic idealism. Concepts for them are something produced by the mind and then contemplated—thus separating rather than uniting the subject with reality.15 But this is certainly not an adequate understanding of the nature of the concept; rather it is a positive distortion and mis-representation of the whole idea of the concept as a means, an intellectual intentio by which the knower reaches reality, made intelligible for him by the concept.16
This denial of the validity of conceptual knowledge tends toward two basic philosophic errors: subjectivism and relativism.
Subjectivism
Once devaluated conceptual knowledge has been subtracted from the existentialist's "enlarged reason," the only forces left to supply the subject with knowledge are his will, emotions and affections. The consequent danger of falling into voluntaristic subjectivism is immediately evident.
Moreover, some existentialists have openly taught that the concrete, existing individual subject is the ultimate norm of all intelligibility and value. But because of the notoriety of an existentialist such as Sartre, who holds this opinion, the charge of this type of absolute subjectivism has been uncritically laid at the door of all existentialists. This generalization cannot be validly applied to the "open existentialism" of men like Marcel and Jaspers, who picture man as essentially "open" to the other, a "thou," and ultimately to a Transcendent Thou.17
Philosophic Relativism
The more basic error, which can arise from exclusive preoccupation with individual existences to the exclusion of unchanging essences, is relativism. For to have any permanently valid philosophy, there must exist absolute, permanent truth, and human reason must have the power to reach the truth. 18 In short, a valid metaphysics of being must be possible. The Church's position on this question is succinctly stated in HG:
What is the character of the philosophy, which the Church thus recognizes and receives? It upholds the real, genuine validity of human thought processes: it upholds the unassailable principle of metaphysics—sufficient reason, causality, and finality; it upholds the possibility of arriving at certain and unalterable truth.19
The validity of conceptual knowledge, then, necessary for any true, permanently valid metaphysics, is absolutely sustained in HG. Yet an important distinction must be introduced, revolving around the meaning of the phrase often used to describe this validity of our concepts, scil., "concepts are adequate." Now all existentialists are, justly or not, lumped together with those who deny that concepts can ever adequately express the true. This can mean one of two things. First, that the concept itself does not represent what is outside the mind—that there is no correspondence between the content of the concept and what exists in reality, and hence there is need for a constant changing of concepts. Or secondly, that the concept does not represent everything in the object,—that there is another type of knowledge based on human intuition which touches the real in a manner not within the scope of conceptual knowledge. This distinction is basic to any fair judgment of the existentialist criticism of conceptualization.20
Now it can be doubted if the existentialist often means anything more by his criticism of concepts than the second meaning given above, a meaning which is perfectly orthodox and traditional within scholastic philosophy. In fact it has been well pointed out that it is precisely the difference between conceptual knowledge on the one hand, dealing with the generic and specific character of the object, and intuitive knowledge on the other, touching the present, concrete, singular reality, that allows room for unlimited growth and progress in knowledge. 21
This distinction is indicated by HG when the possibility of progress and a perfecting of our knowledge is clearly stated. For example: "To be sure, all are agreed that terms representing certain ideas, however much they have been used in the schools, and even in the authoritative teaching of the Church, are nevertheless susceptible of further perfecting and polishing . . ."22 Yet the burden of HG's message is undeniably against those who would hold for a constantly changing conceptual knowledge. Thus the encyclical strongly condemns the "bolder spirits" who assert:
After all, the mysteries of the faith can never be expressed in terms which exhaust the truth—only approximate terms, perpetually needing revision, which adumbrate the truth up to a certain point, but suffer, inevitably, from a kind of refraction…23
Positively stated, the doctrine of HG is well exemplified in the following passage:
Truth, and the philosophic expression of truth, cannot change in a night. We are dealing with those principles of thought which impose themselves, in their own right, on the human mind; The mind of man, when it is engaged in a sincere search for truths, will never light upon one which contradicts the truths it has already ascertained. God is Truth itself; He it is who has created, and who directs, the human intellect. He does not mean it to be contrasting, each day that passes, some new point of view with one it has already solidly acquired. He means it to eliminate any error that may have entered into its calculations, and then to build up new truth upon the foundation of the old;…24
Natural Knowledge Of God
Coming now to the particular subject of this article, what is the existentialist position regarding man's natural power to know God? In seeking an answer, we are first confronted with those existentialists who deny not only human reason's natural power to know God, but God's very existence. "To be real," they say, is irreducibly contrasted with "to be known," since what makes up the reality of being is precisely that which hides it from our possession.25 The idea of God then becomes a contradiction.26
This irreducible conflict between being and intelligibility is directly opposed to the scholastic theory of knowledge, which can most adequately be described not as a theory of representation, but basically one of being and participation. For, all intelligibility rests squarely on being, and "to be is always to be in an intelligible way.27
Significant contributions come to light, however, once the atheist existentialists have been passed. For it is obvious how the penetrating, phenomenological studies of the existentialists on the individual subject can add to a better, more adequate knowledge of the psychological processes of faith in the convert. Any research into the actual progress taken by real persons toward the act of faith will be helped immeasurably by these existentialist investigations.
Besides their contribution to practical apologetics, the existentialists have exerted a positive, favorable influence on the more theoretical question of man's natural relation to God. For starting from their initial stress on existence, the existentialists see the deepest relationship between the creature and its Creator in the creature's act of existence, rather than in the order of essences.28 This harmonizes well with the traditional doctrine on creation, namely that the formal object of the act of creation is "esse."29 By highlighting this existential relationship to God, they have added a highly desirable new stress on the intrinsic reference of the creature to its Creator.
In regard to the question of "possibles" and the pre-existence in God of the human person before creation, the notion of subject as subject adds a new dimension. For, if man pre-exists in God, he must pre-exist as a subject, with all his subjective, individual, personal characteristics as well as his generic and specific traits. Now the only way a subject can contain another subject is by love,30 To the traditional doctrine of how possibles are present to God fundamentally and formally, there is now added the new stress on God's love, together with His thought, enveloping all creation.31
Inherent Difficulty In Existentialism
The negative criticism leveled by the existentialists at the traditional doctrine on man's natural power to know God, uncovers an inherent flaw in their own approach. For by their own principles, concrete experience is the unique access to the real. But God, the Transcendent, the "wholly Other" according to the existentialists themselves, is not an object of human experience. The only approach to Him, therefore, open to the existentialist, lies in some sort of intuition. Intuition here, if it means anything, can only signify that the human subject grasps the reality of God present in person. Now if this intuition is natural, God would lose the quality most emphasized in existentialist theology. His Transcendence. If the intuition is supernatural, then we are no longer in the area of the philosopher, but rather of the mystic.32
This refutation is admittedly an oversimplification. But the basic objection seems valid: either the existentialist must admit other means of knowledge besides experience, or he can never attain supra-experiential reality. Moreover, the same objection can be raised against the existentialists concerning the certain knowledge of any reality.33 For if the subject's conviction of attaining reality is to have any intellectually guaranteed validity, it must come either through an intellectual intuition or through metaphysical reasoning. Since most existentialists consistent with their principles deny both, there remains only a non-intellectual global sense of reality, a kind of wonderment, which defies translation into meaningful intellectual terms even for the subject himself. This wonderment may be an excellent preparation for philosophic study; it is not its term.
From the above sketch it seems clear that the existentialists must admit some intentional power in man to reach God. It is just such a power that HG takes up.
HG On Power Of Human Reason
Pius XII unequivocally asserts that human reason, without the help of grace of revelation, can demonstrate with certitude the existence of a unique, personal God.
Notoriously, the Church makes much of human reason, in the following connexions: when we establish beyond doubt the existence of one God, who is a personal Being; . . .34 The force of this proposition obviously hinges on what meaning is attached to the word "establish" (demonstrandam in the Latin). In the present context there would seem to be two extremes:
1. To take "establish" or "demonstrate" as a strict, categorical, mathematical proof, univocal with the type employed in the positive sciences; or,
2. To water down its meaning so that it comes to signify little more than to expose an opinion which is held to be reasonable by its author.
The first interpretation neglects entirely the nature of the knowledge in question, namely the existence of a unique, personal God Who makes demands upon us—a knowledge therefore which by its very nature demands a personal response. Thus HG:
The truths we have to learn about God and about the relations between God and man are truths which wholly transcend this visible order of things, and truths of this kind, if they are to be translated into human action and influence human action, call for self-surrender and self-sacrifice.35
The second interpretation is really none at all; it simply evacuates the statement of any real content.
Positively then, this natural power of man to come to some knowledge of God can be described as follows:
1. As in the Vatican Council, it is primarily a question not of the actual attainment of a knowledge of God in the practical order by individual men, but of the capacity of human reason in the abstract.36 This is well brought out both in the Vatican Council and in HG by the sections dealing with the moral necessity for divine revelation.
2. In HG this power of natural reason is asserted specifically against the modern philosophies of immanentism, evolutionism, pragmatism, historicism and existentialism. There is a further description of existentialism: the censure falls explicitly not only on atheistic existentialism, but also on any type, which would deny "the validity of metaphysical reasoning."37 Thus a better understanding of the Church's position may be gained by contrasting it with the general trends of these modern philosophies, which cannot "be harmonized with Catholic doctrines when you have added a few corrections, filled in a few gaps. "38
3. The rational, philosophical demonstration of God's existence does not depend for its certitude on the will or affections. Rather it is basically an affair of the intelligence, employing the metaphysical principles of causality, sufficient reason, and finality, and applying them to creation as we know it.39 It is essential here to distinguish the great part which the will and affections play in applying and opening the intellect to "see" higher truths, from the error of making the will and affections the ultimate criterion of truth and the source of certitude.40 Thus HG:
They [the innovators] attribute to our affections, to our appetitive nature, a kind of intuitive faculty, so that a man who cannot make up his mind what is the true answer to some intellectual problem need only have recourse to his will; the will makes a free choice between two intellectual alternatives. A strange confusion, here, between the provinces of thought and volition.41
The core of this position lies in this: you cannot reduce the demonstration of God's existence to merely the needs of the will, nor to an exposition of how faith responds to the needs of life.42
Objection—It may be objected that most of the traditional arguments for God's existence have proven to be singularly unmoving in apostolic work. But this misses the point. It is not primarily a question here of what are the most effective arguments in converting people, but rather of the metaphysical realities involved: the nature of human reason, the validity of metaphysical principles and discursive reasoning, and the application of both to the problem of God. The errors consequent upon a denial of any of these factors are only too well illustrated in the philosophies HG censures.43
Role Of The Will And Affections
One illustration of the balance displayed by HG is found in its treatment of the role, which the will and affections play in man's knowledge of God. After categorically affirming the power of reason, HG goes on to say:
…never did the Christian philosophy deny that a right disposition of the whole mind has a decisive value in helping us to penetrate and assimilate moral and religious truths. Indeed, it has always taught that the want of such dispositions can be the cause of error; the intellect is so blinded by the appetites and by prejudice that it cannot see straight.[44
…the human mind is hampered in the attaining of such truths, not only by the impact of the senses and the imagination, but by the disordered appetites which are consequences of the Fall.45
Thus HG clearly recognizes the real, often decisive it, which the will, emotions and affections play in the man's attainment of knowledge of God.46
Conclusion
HG forcefully re-affirms in the face of contemporary, subjective philosophies, the traditional doctrine of the Church asserting human reason's natural power to reach God. Yet it clearly manifests also an openness to supplement its traditional doctrine with the valid contributions these philosophies have to offer. "You may enrich it, if due caution be observed, with certain new elements which the progress of human thought has brought with it."47 The problem remains how to incorporate what is truly new and of permanent value in this more personal, subjective approach, into the traditional philosophy of the Church, without devaluating it by simply reducing it to old categories.
Joseph L. Roche
Endnotes
1. AAS 42 (1950) 561-578. We shall use the translation of Msgr. Knox, published in The Tablet 196 (Sept. 2, 1950) 187-190.
2. Cf. G. Weigel, S.J., "The Historical Background of the Encyclical HUMANI GENERIS," TS 12 (1951) 208-230.
3. Thus HG: "There would be no need to reprobate such errors, if the Teaching of the Church were as carefully observed as it ought to be in matters of philosophy . . . Philosophical tendencies, too, must come under its watchful care; otherwise the whole of Catholic doctrine may be undermined by false assumptions." Tablet, p. 190.
4. A. Dondeyne, "Les problemes philosophiques souleves dans L'Encyclique 'Human; Generis'," Rev. Phil. de Louvain 49 (1951) 5-56, 141-188, 293-356. Literature on existentialism is vast and well known; we cite here only a sampling: F. Copleston, S.J. Contemporary Philosophy (London, 1956); R. Harper, Existentialism (Cambridge, 1948); R. Troisfontaines, S.J., Existentialism and Christian Thought (London, 1950): J. O'Mara, S.J., "The Meaning and Value of Existentialism," Studies 40 (1951) 11-22.
5. J. De Finance, "Being and Subjectivity," Cross Currents 6 (1956) 163-164. This exceptional article supplied the basis for much of the analysis of existentialism in this article.
6. Ibid.. p. 176.
7. G. Marcel, The Mystery of Being (Chicago, 1950) 1, c. 10.
8. De Finance, op. cit., pp. 168-169. Cf. also E. Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto, 1949) p. 207.
9. O'Mara, op. cit., pp. 20-21. Cf. Copleston, op. cit., pp. 132-147, 201-217.
10. Dondeyne, op. cit., p. 182.
11. O'Mara, op. cit., p. 20, praises their fresh approach.
12. This criticism of existentialism is practically universal. Cf. Dondeyne. op. cit., pp. 183-188, 315-329; Copleston, op. cit., 222-227; W. Kaufmann, Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (New York, 1956) p. 18.
13. Tablet, p. 187.
14. De Finance, op. cit., p. 172; also Gilson, op. cit., pp. 193, 204, 209.
15. In this regard, cf. O'Mara, op. cit., p. 14: "Reason has always tended to abound in its own sense; to reduce the cat to a grin and then to take the grin for the cat."
16. Dondeyne, op. cit., pp. 183, 330-334; Gilson, op. cit., p. 206.
17. For a treatment of the "open existentialism," see V. Yanitelli, "Types of Existentialism," Thought 24 (1949) pp. 503-505. Also Copleston, op. cit., pp. 170-173; Dondeyne, op. cit., pp. 49-50.
18. Such relativism would entail as a corollary that various philosophies could be used in theology with equal validity, a position HG (Cf. Tablet, p. 189) and its commentators reject. Cf.. Crowley, "Humani Generis and Philosophy," ITQ 19 (1952) 27. Yet there is a distinction between immutability of dogma and that of philosophy; cf. R, Harvanek, "The Metaphysics," Thought 28 (1953) 375-412.
19. Tablet, p. 189.
20. Cf. Taymans. S.J., "L'Encyclique 'Humani Generis' et la theologie," NRT 73 (1951) 6 ff; Dondeyne, op. cit., pp. 40 ff; Gilson, op. cit. p. 202.
21. Taymans, op. cit., p. 6.
22. Tablet, p. 188.
23. Loc. Cit.
24. Ibid., p. 189. Cf. Hamell, "Humani Generis, Its Significance and Teaching," IER 75 (1951) 299.
25. Dondeyne, op. cit. pp. 320-321. Cf. J. Pieper, The Silence of St. Thomas (New York, 1957) pp. 52-53, where the author contrasts Sartre and Thomas in their approaches to nature as fashioned by thought. "Scientia Dei est mensura rerum…" S.T., 1, q.14, a.12, ad 3.
26. Dondeyne, op. cit., p. 321. Cf. also A. Cochrane, The Existentialists and God (Philadelphia, 1956) p. 12.
27. Gilson, op. cit., p. 209; he adds: "Reality is… a conceivable reality hanging on an act which itself escapes representation, yet does not escape intellectual knowledge, because it is included in every enunciation. We do more than experience existence; we know it through any judgment of existence about actual things. "Cf. also J. Maritain, Existence and the Existent (New York, 1956) p. 147.
28. De Finance, op. cit., p, 176.
29. Cf. S.T., 1, q. 8, a. 1 c. and ad lum; Gilson, Le Thomisme (5th ed.; Paris, 1944) pp. 174-186; De Finance, Etre et Aqir (Paris, 1945) p. ISO.
30. Maritain. op. cit., pp. 90-91.
31. De Finance, art. cit., p. 176. It would seem that what the existentialists add is a new formality under which the divine will is present to the ideas of creatures.
32. Dondeyne, op. cit., pp. 185-196. Cf. also F, Van Steenberghen, "Le probleme philosophique de l'existence de Dieu," Rev. Phil. de Louvain 45 (1947) 311-313.
33. O'Mara, op. cit., p. 21. Cf. also Maritain, op. cit., p. 136.
34. Tablet, p. 189.
35. Ibid., p. 187.
36. Ibid., p. 189: "A doubt is raised, whether the human reason, unaided by God's revelation and by His grace, can really prove the existence of a personal God by inference from the facts of creation. ., . All this is contrary to the declarations made by the Council of the Vatican. "Thus we have in HG an authentic interpretation of the Vatican Council's definition (DB 1806).
37. Tablet, p. 189.
38. Loc. cit.
39. Cf. B. Delfgaauw, "L'Encyclique "Humani Generis' et la philosophie," Documentation Catholique 47 (1950) col. 1314; M. Labourdette, O.P. Foi Catholique et Problemes Modernes (Tournai, 1953) p. 92.
40. Cf. Labourdette, op. cit., pp. 76-77, and p. 91: "Confusing the role of the affective dispositions (which is very great in making the intelligence apply itself to this demonstration and open itself to it), with the proper and objective value of rational procedure, [the existentialists] would wish to make even the certitude of reasoning depend on these very dispositions."
41. Tablet, p. 190
42. Cf. Tablet, p. 190.
43. "True, God has provided us with an amazing wealth of external evidence by which the divine origin of the Christian religion can be brought home beyond question, even to the unaided light of reason. But a man may be so blinded by prejudice, so much at the mercy of his passions and his animosity, that he can shake his head and remain unmoved..." Tablet, p. 187. Thus HG provides a concrete explanation to resolve this practical objection.
44. Tablet, p. 190.
45. Ibid., p. 187.
46. The will's positive influence on the knowing processes is exemplified in HG by St. Thomas's little known theory of knowledge through connaturality. Perhaps this is the most logical place for the Christian existentialist to introduce his knowledge through interiority, Cf. S.T., 2-2, q.l, a.4, ad 3um; q.45, a.2c.
47. Tablet, p. 189. The influence of modern existentialism on Catholic philosophers and theologians is clearly evidenced in the most recent works on man's natural knowledge of God: Maritain, Approaches to God (New York, 1954); Danielou, God and the Ways of Knowing (New York, 1957); Defever, La Preuve rede de Dieu (Brussels, 1953); Dumery, Le Probleme de Dieu (Paris, 1957).
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