Modernism: Then and Now

by John Young

Pope St. Pius X was the great opponent of modernism in the early years of this century. Because of that, some people see him as negative, reactionary, and decidedly embarrassing.

In fact, he was very positive—as one would expect of a saint. He urged the study of philosophy and theology for the enlightenment of the intellect. He implored the bishops to see that "the knowledge of Christian doctrine pervades and imbues fully and deeply the minds of all."¹ He stressed the need for a deep interior Christian life. He reduced the age for first Communion and encouraged daily Communion. He fostered devotion to Our Lady.

Because his outlook was positive he opposed that great negation of Christ's teaching which goes under the name of modernism. He urged the necessity of an interior Christian life, but he knew this involves intellect, not just the will. He declares: "... the will cannot be upright nor the conduct good when the mind is shrouded in the darkness of crass ignorance."² He insists that ". . . intellects are enlightened by continually preaching truth, and errors are best refuted by the principles of a true and solid philosophy and theology which employs genuine progress in historical criticism."³

In this article I want to say something first about the roots of modernism; secondly, to consider its essence; thirdly, to discuss St. Pius X's delineation of its subjective causes, its concrete manifestations, its modus operandi, and its remedies. While doing these things I will relate modernism as condemned by Pius X to the neo-modernism rampant today.

Roots of modernism

Philosophical errors are the main intellectual cause of modernism, especially errors associated with David Hume (1711-1776) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804); specifically, the empiricism of Hume and the subjectivism of Kant.

Hume reduced all human knowledge to sense knowledge. Impressions (by which he means sensations and current emotions) are the stuff from which all our ideas are composed. ". . . all our ideas or more feeble perceptions are copies of our impressions or more lively ones."⁴ It follows that ". . . it is impossible for us to think of anything, which we have not antecedently felt, either by our external or internal senses."⁵ We have no more insight into the relations between causes and effects than do the lower animals. Our general inferences are not explained by reason, but by custom or habit.

Morality is a matter of taste and sentiment rather than an object of the understanding.⁶ Virtue is defined by Hume as "whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator the pleasing sentiment of approbation."⁷ He held the Epicurean doctrine that pleasure is the highest good, and considered reason to be powerless: it is emotion that moves us. "Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."⁸

Hume's philosophy is derived from his basic error of reducing intellectual knowledge to sense knowledge. His influence, unfortunately, has been enormous. Most modern philosophers, partly because of his influence, do not clearly differentiate between these two orders of knowledge, and therefore are unable to explain how there can be objective moral principles, or how it would be possible to attain certainty about the existence and nature of God or of the human soul.

Immanuel Kant, strongly swayed by Hume, yet reacting against him, developed a philosophy which sharply distinguished between our knowledge and things in themselves. The things which affect our senses are totally unknown as they are in themselves. "What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility, remains completely unknown to us."⁹

We have a power of understanding, which is fed by the senses; but it, like the senses, is so constructed that it confers meaning on the things presented to it. "However exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say that the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such an assertion is none the less correct. . . ."¹⁰

Kant's doctrine shuts us up in a world of our own, a world we ourselves constructed. So far as our speculative intellect is concerned, the old arguments for God's existence, the soul's immortality, free will, are all invalid, for they suppose knowledge of noumena (things in themselves).

But Kant wanted to retain these beliefs. "I inevitably believe in the existence of God and in a future life, and I am certain that nothing can shake this belief, since my moral principles would thereby themselves be overthrown, and I cannot disclaim them without becoming abhorrent in my own eyes."¹¹ He concluded, therefore, that these do exist. They cannot be logically proved, but his experience of the moral law within himself guarantees their reality.

The enormous influence exercised on all subsequent generations by Hume and Kant goes far to explaining the empiricism, subjectivism and relativism so prevalent today. In such a climate of thought, modernism should come as no surprise.

Scientism, too, arose from philosophical errors, notably those we have just glanced at. It sees physical science as the highest scientific knowledge, and the criterion for judging other knowledges, including theology. The great advances of physical science encourage the notion that it is the supreme knowledge available to the human mind. The modern outlook is tainted with scientism, and consequently finds the world of faith an alien world. Hence the temptation, to which the modernists succumb, of denying the reality of the supernatural, including miracles.

Evolutionism has been dominant since the nineteenth century. Hegel (1770-1831) took Kant's subjectivism to its logical conclusion by denying the mysterious noumena (things in themselves), and posited spirit as the sole reality. In man, spirit becomes conscious of itself. It develops to ever higher forms by a dialectical process of thesis, antithesis and synthesis.

Hegel's evolutionary idealism was converted by Marx (1818-1883) into an evolutionary materialism which claimed to explain the progress of human society through the clash of labor and capital as man advanced towards the goal of the classless society. Then in 1859 Darwin's Origin of Species put forward the theory of natural selection, and in a short time biological evolution was the accepted dogma.

With the intelligentsia abandoning traditional beliefs and adopting evolutionary naturalism, it was inevitable that biblical studies would be radically affected. Hence the rise of the "higher criticism," with its reduction of Scripture's historical content and a determined resistance to the supernatural.

By the end of the nineteenth century an intellectual revolution had taken place. For many people, especially the intellectuals, the old world view no longer had any credibility. They saw it as depicting an imaginary world of angels and devils and divine interventions; a three-storeyed universe with heaven above us and hell below; a world where the supernatural mingled with the natural. Reality, they thought, is much more mundane. Scientific explanations are to be sought, and are increasingly found, to account for mysteries formerly attributed to supernatural causes. Man controls his own destiny to an extent never before envisaged.

The modernist "solution"

But some of those caught up in the new revolution had no wish to abandon religion. Their solution to the dilemma was to take Christian doctrines symbolically instead of literally. And that belongs to the essence of modernism. The resurrection of Christ is not seen as the return to life, in a glorified state, of the body that was buried in the tomb. The virginity of Mary is not biological. Stories like the raising of Lazarus are just that—stories: they didn't happen, but they have a spiritual meaning.

The "religious sense" is the driving force of modernism. Many modernists felt a deep need for religion. They were intensely aware that life has a spiritual dimension, while rejecting the literal truth of Christian doctrines. This religious consciousness of theirs proceeded to shape their beliefs; it became the criterion of doctrine.

As St. Pius X explains their position: "Authority, therefore, like the Church, has its origin in the religious consciousness, and, that being so, is subject to it."¹² From this it follows, as the Pope points out, that ecclesiastical authority should adopt a democratic form.

The Pope sees evolution as practically the modernists' principal doctrine. "To the laws of evolution everything is subject under penalty of death—dogma. Church, worship, the Books we revere as sacred, even faith itself."¹³ For the modernists, ". . . whether as authors or propagandists, there is to be nothing stable, nothing immutable in the Church."¹⁴

Despite the sharp dichotomy seen by the modernists between science, including history, and faith, they claimed that faith should be harmonized with science. For they saw the fundamental religious experience as something which is expressed in formulas, and these formulas fall under the control of science. So they insisted, as Pius X says, "that the religious evolution ought to be brought into accord with the moral and intellectual, or as one whom they regard as their leader has expressed it, ought to be subject to it."¹⁵ Further, man does not want a dualism within himself, so the believer feels "an impelling need so to harmonize faith with science that it may never oppose the general conception which science sets forth concerning the universe."¹⁶

It is difficult to pin down a subject so amorphous as modernism, but the following four propositions show its essence.

1. The supernatural is unknowable. Man seeks a religious "something" which his intellect cannot grasp. For all they know, the Pope suggests, this may be "the soul of the universe."¹⁷ 2. The "religious sense" is the source of Christian beliefs . 3. Doctrines in conflict with the modern scientific outlook are to be taken symbolically, not literally. 4. Evolution of beliefs is essential.

Looking at today's neo-modernism, we find that the above four characteristics apply substantially. The supernatural tends to be reduced to the natural, and its true essence is regarded as something unknowable. The "religious sense" is operative, in the form of subjective feelings rather than intelligent thought. Doctrines which clash with the modern outlook are taken symbolically. Christian beliefs are seen as constantly changing their nature in accord with advances in secular knowledge.

The modernist in action

St. Pius X sees the chief moral cause of modernism as pride: ". . . pride sits in modernism as in its own house... ."¹⁸ Pride, he continues, fills the modernists with self-assurance, rouses them to disobedience, makes them seek the reform of others but not themselves, and causes them to have no respect for authority.

The chief intellectual cause, he declares, is ignorance. He notes their ignorance of scholasticism, which has left them "without the means of being able to recognize confusion of thought and to refute sophistry. Their whole system, containing as it does errors so many and so great, has been born of the union between faith and false philosophy."¹⁹

Today, too, pride motivates the modernistic dissenters, while they show appalling ignorance of the perennial philosophy. An example of the latter, in connection with transubstantiation, is the apparent inability of many theologians to get more than a superficial grasp of the meaning of substance and accidents. The result can be a quite unnecessary strain on their faith, a strain which would be removed by a better grasp of the philosophical concepts involved.

One concrete manifestation of modernism is opposition to the magisterium. For the magisterium is seen as stifling the creativity arising from the religious consciousness, so opposition to it may be a duty. Today, of course, defiance of ecclesiastical authority, whether in doctrine or discipline, has become an epidemic. And some still delude themselves that it is their duty.

Another manifestation of modernism is the continual drive for change, with nothing remaining stable. Doctrines and practices alike must forever evolve, for we never reach a fixed truth, but are always searching. This, too, is happening now: the neo-modernists promote unending changes, whether in doctrine or practice. The liturgical revolution is the outstanding evidence of this: neo-modernism wants the liturgy to be in a state of permanent flux.

A third manifestation is ambiguity and vagueness in teaching and preaching. The modernist feels contempt for Catholic doctrines, for the Fathers, the councils, the magisterium. He therefore lacks a basis for solid teaching, even if he were prepared to teach orthodoxy. And he has to be cautious about expressing his real views, lest he get into trouble with Church authorities. He may also retain enough pastoral care for ordinary Catholics to be reluctant to disturb their "simple" faith. These facts help explain the pitiful catechetical situation today; priests and catechists imbued, to a greater or lesser degree, with neo-modernism can't—and don't want to—present the Faith in its fullness.

Pius X discusses the modus operandi of the modernists. When reprimanded, they express astonishment, for they contend that they are but expressing their conscientious beliefs, and that they understand things better than the authorities who condemn them. They claim they will eventually be vindicated, for authority cannot forever impede the evolution of doctrine.²⁰ "When one of their number falls under the condemnation of the Church the rest of them, to the disgust of good Catholics, gather round him, loudly and publicly applaud him, and hold him up in veneration as almost a martyr for truth. "²¹

How have they gained such acceptance? The Pope mentions the close alliance they form with each other, the way they applaud promoters of novelty, their conspiracy of silence against erudite opponents. If one of them makes a "discovery," the others applaud him, and the person who denies it "is decried as one who is ignorant, while he who embraces and defends it has all their praise."²² Catholics who fight for the Church are treated with bitterness and hate, they are insulted and charged with ignorance and obstinacy.²³

The modus operandi of current dissenters is the same; every point of St. Pius X's analysis noted in my last two paragraphs reads like a prophecy come true in our own time. This is obvious to orthodox Catholics engaged in the current struggle, yet our neo-modernists have so successfully masked the reality of what they are doing that most Catholics, including many priests and bishops, would say that the above description does not apply widely now.

Remedies

On the question of remedies, Pius X urges the importance of knowledge. In his motu proprio Sacrorum Antistitum he says that "all those who are ready to fight in this most holy and exceedingly difficult task must acquire a great wealth of doctrine."²⁴ Positive theology must be held in higher esteem than in the past, but without detriment to scholastic theology.²⁵ He is very insistent on the crucial importance of scholastic philosophy, ". . . which must be made the basis of the sacred sciences. . . . And let it be clearly understood that when We prescribe scholastic philosophy we understand chiefly that which the Angelic Doctor has bequeathed to us. . . ."²⁶

In most seminaries and Catholic colleges today, scholastic philosophy is relegated to a minor place, and St. Thomas Aquinas is given little attention. While that situation prevails, the foundation will be lacking for the restoration of orthodoxy, and shallow thinking will inevitably continue.

St. Pius X is famous, or infamous—depending on one's viewpoint—for his measures to repress modernism. He tells his bishops they must resist men who have become proud, and "employ them in the lowest and obscurest offices."²⁷ Men in any way tainted with modernism are to be excluded as directors or professors in seminaries and Catholic universities.²⁸

The bishops must censor books and periodicals. They must not allow congresses of priests "except on very rare occasions," for these are used by modernists to promote their ideas.²⁹ Further, in every diocese a Council of Vigilance is to be established, composed of priests, and having the duty of noting any signs of modernism, whether in speech or writing,³⁰ In Sacrorum Antistitum the Pope orders that each teacher submit to the bishop particulars of his proposed courses. He should then be watched throughout the year to make sure he does not depart from sound doctrine.³¹

One could hardly imagine a greater contrast than that between these severe regulations and the lax state of affairs prevailing in our time. It is also clear that the instructions of Pius X could easily be abused, leading to oppression of orthodox scholars. And this indeed happened. Surely the present spirit of laxity has come about partly as a reaction to the abuses occasioned by the early severe policy. Still, drastic measures are needed when the Faith is being destroyed from within, and the action of St. Pius X weakened modernism within the Church.

Sound knowledge was a remedy urged by Pius X, especially knowledge of Scholastic theology and philosophy. It is still essential.

Pius X's punitive measures against the rebellion have a lesson for the hierarchy now. There has to be greater firmness against the enemies within the Church than has so far been shown. St. Pius X was a realist who saw that the menace was "open and bare-faced enemies in our very household, who, having made a pact with the chief foes of the Church, are bent on overthrowing the faith."³² We face the same challenge now.

ENDNOTES

1 Encyclical Acerbo Nimis, n. 27: in My Words Will Not Pass Away, Rizal, Philippines, Sinag-Tala Publishers, 1974, p. 139. All quotes from St. Pius X are from this book.

2 Ibid., n. 5.

3 Ibid., n.22.

4 David Hume: An Enquiry' Concerning Human Understanding, section 2.

5 Ibid., section 7, part 1; original italics.

6 Ibid., section 12, part 3.

7 An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, appendix I, section 1.

8 A Treatise of Human Nature, book 2, part 2, section 3.

9 Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason, B 59; translated by Norman Kemp Smith, London, MacMillan, 1933. A refers to Kant's first edition, B to the second.

10 Ibid., A 127.

11 Ibid., B 856; my italics.

12 Encyclical Pascendi, n. 23.

13 Ibid., n. 26.

14 Ibid., n. 28.

15 Ibid., n. 17.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., n. 40.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., n. 41.

20 Ibid., n. 27.

21 Ibid., n. 42.

22 Ibid., n. 34.

23 Ibid., n. 42.

24 Sacrorum Antistitum; My Words Will Not Pass Away, p. 405.

25 Pascendi, n. 46.

26 Ibid., n. 45.

27 Ibid., n. 40.

28 Ibid., n. 48.

29 Ibid., n. 54.

30 Ibid.. n. 55.

31 Sacrorum Antistitum;, My Words Will Not Pass Away, p. 407.

32 Ibid., p. 433.

Mr. John Young, B.Th., is associated with the Cardinal Newman Catechist Centre in Mary-lands, N.S. W., Australia. He has taught philosophy in three seminaries, and is the author of an introduction to philosophy, Reasoning Things Out, published in the United States by Stella Maris Books, Fort Worth, Tex. Mr. Young writes on philosophical and religious topics for Australian publications. His last article in HPR appeared in December 1998.

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